# OPUS 2 INTERNATIONAL 

Horizons Issues - Alan Bates \& Others v Post Office Limited

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\text { Day } 1
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(10.30 am)
MR JUSTICE FRASER:Mr Green.
    Housekeeping
MR GREEN: May it please your Lordship. One of the matters
    your Lordship was going to deal with first thing today
    I think was the question of when the common issues
    judgment might formally be handed down and whether the
    claimants may have permission in the event that they
    receive a draft to disclose the draft to the steering
    committee of the claimants.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes. I think Mr Warwick's email said
    two members of the steering committee. I don't know how
    many people are on the steering committee.
MR GREEN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: This is the draft which is currently
    embargoed.
MR GREEN: Indeed.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right and my position on this is as
    follows. I have no difficulty with two members of the
    steering committee seeing the draft, subject to
    conditions. One is the names of those two people have
    to be notified to my clerk in an email and that email
    should come from one of the claimants' legal advisors.
    It should identify who they are by name and the fact
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    that they have been specifically told the terms of the embargo and that to breach the terms is a contempt and what the possible consequences of the contempt are.
MR GREEN: My Lord, I'm grateful.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: If those three elements are satisfied then they can be shown the draft --
MR GREEN: I'm most grateful.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: -- under terms of the embargo.
MR GREEN: I'm most grateful, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Now, handing it down, that ball is rather in your court and when I saw "your" court I mean the Post Office's court, although I know it is not Mr De Garr Robinson's side of it.
MR GREEN: Side of it yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I was expecting or had invited typos to be provided by Wednesday.
MR GREEN: Indeed.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Depending on the extent and scope of those I intend to hand the judgment down on Friday, but if there are an enormous quantity and it was a judgment that was sent out more in draft than I would ordinarily hope for, on Thursday morning I might say to you it's not going to be Friday, it's going to be the beginning of next week so I can use the weekend just to deal with the typos.

MR GREEN: Most grateful, my Lord. Would it be possible for us to deal with any consequential matters the following Friday rather than this Friday?
MR JUSTICE FRASER: No, you can have longer than that.
MR GREEN: I'm most grateful.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: The important thing on consequential matters is that when I hand it down I make the order in the relevant terms for the parties to give them the necessary extension of time so that time doesn't run. I don't intend to put the parties in the position that time is running for the purposes of any consequential applications during this trial.
MR GREEN: My Lord, I'm most grateful.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: So you don't even necessarily need to come when it is formally handed down, depending on when that is.
MR GREEN: I'm most grateful.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Is that clear? Yes, good.
MR GREEN: My Lord, in terms of use of the time for claimants' oral opening, what I propose to do -- because I know your Lordship has obviously had sight of the expert reports and joint reports already.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR GREEN: I propose to highlight a few key areas of agreement at a fairly high level, highlight a few key

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areas which we will say at this stage are likely to be important battle grounds for the trial, highlight the importance of the difference of approach of the two experts and the approach we're going to respectfully invite the court to adopt and then, which we hope will be useful for the court, take your Lordship through one worked example of a bug.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: One worked example of ..? MR GREEN: Of a particular bug, so that your Lordship can see practically how a KEL works and practically how it relates to a PEAK -- or one or most PEAKs or one or more KELs because your Lordship will have probably appreciated that you can have multiple KELs referring to one or more PEAKs and vice versa -- the practical realities of the information flow between Post Office and Fujitsu in their system and the extent of the impact that one bug can have, the limitations on the sources of information available to the experts.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: You seem to be counting on your figures but I don't know what number you've got to.
MR GREEN: I'm sorry. I will give your Lordship just a narrative overview to start with.

The limitations of the sources of information available to the experts and what knowledge Post Office had of that bug and when, to inform the court as to its

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approach to these bugs and that will hopefully give the court at least at the outset of the trial both a practical understanding, in addition to what the court has already gleaned from the experts' reports, of how it actually worked, upon which we are going to place I think greater emphasis possibly than the defendant, and to provide a sort of microcosm illustration of what we, the parties and the court, now have, what those documents do and do not do, what the claimants have had to do, what Post Office doesn't do and what Post Office has known in relation to that bug all along.
So with that brief introduction --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: We also at some point, and I would like to do it before lunch if possible because I don't want to cut into Mr De Garr Robinson's time, need to address in outline terms whether either or each of you want an adjustment to part 2 of the timetable to deal with experts' cross-examination, which was an email I sent out about two weeks ago.
MR GREEN: My Lord, yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: So we just mustn't forget that.
MR GREEN: At the moment I think our position is we are not seeking one and we are content to deal with it in that way.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: "We" being you?
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MR GREEN: The claimants. But there may be a different view.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, I' $m$ in a much more developed position than I was at the pre- trial review and I'm obviously raising the point for a reason but we can deal with it in outline terms at about 5 to 1 , and please don't forget that the shorthand writers need a short break between about quarter to 12 and 10 past.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, I wonder whether now would be a good time to discuss that question. It has been something that's been bearing on my mind.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Your Lordship will be aware from the PTR that my judgment is four days is needed with Mr Coyne. That remains my judgment. Now that your Lordship may have had an even greater opportunity to read the expert reports and their length and assess the complexity of their contents and their length, your Lordship may have a different reaction to that submission than the one that you had during the PTR.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, my position -- I will tell you what the situation is and then we can revisit at the end of the day if necessary, although because today is silks day there is a ceremony for the new silks at quarter to 5 which means we will have to stop bang on half past 4.

My position at the pre- trial review was fairly clearly based on anticipation of future expert agreements because I knew that they were still continuing to meet. I knew what your position was about four days and I was fairly robust about that.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Robustness being the word of the moment.
Given what has happened since then, I am now more open minded to you having longer than two and a half days if you consider you need longer than two and a half days. I know originally Mr Green said he wanted I think three but he seems broadly content with two and a half. There's also something of a difficulty brewing in the wings in respect of other litigation on Friday 5 April because as you know this court sits usually on Fridays on other business, so part 2 of the trial, by which I mean the expert evidence onwards, seems to me, Mr De Garr Robinson, if you tell me you need four days, I am going entirely to rejig the second half of this trial so you can have your four days.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm much obliged to your Lordship. MR JUSTICE FRASER: So if you just want to mull that over and we obviously need to set the timetable in more outline terms, though nothing is set in stone, either today or tomorrow and that might mean we need to

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readdress when the closing arguments are going to be.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes. My Lord, I was thinking more time with the experts and then perhaps oral closing arguments at the beginning of next term, but I have heard what your Lordship said and I'm grateful for the indication.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: And that's not impossible either, that way forward. It would break those two weeks, which are currently the first week after the break, expert cross-examination, and the second week, closings; it would break them into a week for the claimants' expert to be cross-examined by you, however many days of the next period Mr Green would want to cross-examine Dr Worden and whether that's two and a half or three, there's not really much difference, and then whatever we do about closings. That's to give you my outline thinking.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm grateful.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right, Mr Green.
Opening submissions by MR GREEN
MR GREEN: Most grateful, my Lord.
My Lord, there is, as your Lordship has seen, some fairly high level agreement. Obviously the Horizon architecture is broadly uncontroversial and Horizon support, at least the outline of it, how it was provided
is uncontroversial.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Are there four statements now?
MR GREEN: There are four joint statements. I think the
fourth doesn't take it that much further.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: But there are four?
MR GREEN: There are four.
And the experts agree that the PEAKs and KELs, the
known error logs KELs and the PEAKs, which are the higher level record created in relation to a KEL, it goes up the support line; the experts agree that the PEAKs and KELs together form a useful source of information about bugs in Horizon, but while they are the best available resource to the experts, they provide a limited and incomplete window on what happened and so cannot paint a comprehensive picture and that's the agreed view of the experts, just to give your Lordship a brief outline of the landscape of the evidence they predominantly relied upon.

It is also true that there are a number of other documents they have had reference to, as your Lordship would expect, I think various emails, Fujitsu presentations and other things which we will come to, how they provide greater insight.

The PEAKs are created by Fujitsu's third and fourth line support teams. So your Lordship has in mind how it
works, the first line support seeks to identify whether there is an existing known error log entry that might relate to a support call. If not, the second line support will create a new KEL, a new known error log record, and then it is the third and fourth line of support teams that create and investigate PEAKs. And if your Lordship wants a reference just as a description of PEAKs there's a helpful one in joint 2 at 0.5 , the reference of which is $\{\mathrm{D} 1 / 2 / 27\}$ which is where the experts agreed:
"PEAKs record a timeline of activities to fix a bug or problem. They sometimes contain information not found in KELs about specific impact on branches or root causes - what needs to be fixed."

Then there is some agreement about bugs and errors, robustness and potential for errors and measures and controls. It is agreed that there were multiple bugs with the potential to have a financial impact on branch accounts and your Lordship will probably have seen from joint 2, paragraph 1.15 \{D1/2/29\} the range of views is between 12 and 29 bugs that the experts have identified as distinct for which they have seen strong evidence of the bug causing a lasting discrepancy in branch accounts. So that's the range of opinion at the moment and for your Lordship's reference the table where

Mr Coyne refers to those is $\{D 2 / 4 / 16\}$, which is in Mr Coyne's supplemental report, which if we can just bring that up on Magnum, your Lordship will see there is an "Evidence of branch impact" column and where it says "Yes", that's where the relevant bugs that he has counted up to 29 are said to have strong evidence of potential impact on branch accounts.

The areas of robustness where there is at least outline agreement, the experts agree that overall the system is relatively robust. They agree that computer systems are considered more robust if access to the back-end database is restricted tightly and they agree that in 2012 Post Office 's auditors observed that there were inappropriate system privileges in this regard and that's found at paragraphs 3.2 to 3.3 of joint 3 , which is at $\{D 1 / 4 / 3\}$. And the source -- so that's paragraphs 3.2 to 3.3 , your Lordship will see at the top there. And the source for that is the Ernst \& Young management letter which is at $\{F / 869 / 32\}$, which over the page at 33 \{F/869/33\} identifies:
"There are inappropriate system privileges assigned to the APPSUP role and SYSTEM_MANAGER role at the Oracle database level on the branch database server ... inappropriate privileged access ..."

And so forth. On page 34 over the page \{F/869/34\}
they say:
"Unrestricted access to privileged IT functions increases the risk of unauthorised/inappropriate access which may lead to the processing of unauthorised or erroneous transactions."

And then at the bottom they say:
"We noted that there is currently no process to review POLSAP user accounts or HNGX back-end user accounts on a periodic basis to determine that user access is appropriately granted given the job
responsibilities . As a result, our review revealed the following ..."

And over the page they set out examples of what they have found and the bottom entry:
"Whilst we noted that there was a monitoring control in place for privileged access to POLSAP whereby accounts associated to the SAP_ALL profile are reviewed and monitoring of failed and successful login attempts for SAP*, DDIC and BASISADMIN accounts is performed, this control does not include accounts associated to the SAP_NEW privileged profile."

And so forth. So that was a document which the experts identified in relation to that point.

Then at the level of undetected errors, in joint 3 , paragraph 3.6 , which is $\{\mathrm{D} 1 / 4 / 3\}$, the experts agree
that:
"PEAKs show that some defects have lain undetected
in Horizon for extended periods without being diagnosed and fixed ."

And your Lordship will anticipate we will look at that carefully through the prism of Dr Worden's countermeasures which he relies on for robustness and detection of errors and correcting them in a timely way.

Then as to the effectiveness of the countermeasures themselves, the experts agree that the effectiveness of various countermeasures has changed throughout the life of Horizon. The existence of the countermeasures has changed as well and your Lordship finds that at joint 3 , paragraph 3.11 and 3.20 ; that's \{D1/4/4\}. Your Lordship will see there 3.11:
"The effectiveness of various countermeasures changed throughout the life of Horizon."

And if we go over the page $\{D 1 / 4 / 5\}$, at 3.20 :
"As Horizon has changed throughout its lifetime, the existence and effectiveness of any countermeasures has too. To have considered the time dependence of all robustness countermeasures over 20 years would have made the expert reports impossibility lengthy. There was not the time to do so."

There is a final point on this page, while I'm
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there, which is also we say highly pertinent to one of the difficulties which is at the core of this litigation, which is that the experts are agreed at 3.22 that:
"Many software bugs can have the same effects as a user error (as illustrated, for instance, by the Dalmellington bug, which produced a remming error)."

Your Lordship will anticipate how that will feed into an analysis of attribution of fault when a subpostmaster raises something and the experts now agree that many software errors will look like user errors.

Then moving on, as to reconciliation and transaction corrections, about which the court has heard quite a lot of evidence already in the common issues trial, the experts agree on the mechanics at least of reconciliation and TCs and just briefly as to that, it is clear that the process of data comparison between third party client data and Post Office held data, much of that appears to be automated to identify where there are discrepancies and some of those comparisons are carried out within Horizon itself, as defined, while others may not be, so there's a difference I think in terms of system about exactly where the automated comparison of external third party client data and

Post Office held data is carried out and we can see that at $\{\mathrm{D} 2 / 4 / 22\}$ which is Mr Coyne's second report at 3.37 to 3.38 which is essentially agreeing with Dr Worden's comments about reconciliation.

Then in relation to the manual allocation of responsibility and TCs, essentially the experts agree that there is a human or manual process which is inevitably subject to errors and in a sense to some extent that is as far as Dr Worden goes, subject to a point which I will return to as to the role that transaction corrections play in this trial.

In relation to other quick topics where there is broad agreement, issues 2 and 14 , which is Horizon alerting and reporting facilities, there are two big agreements about that. One is that Horizon doesn't alert SPMs to bugs and errors itself and that's joint 2, paragraph 2.1 at $\{\mathrm{D} 1 / 2 / 38\}$. And then in relation to functionality for SPMs obviously it's agreed that Horizon's functionality allowed subpostmasters to check cash and stock by counting the same and inputting those figures. The experts generally agree on the steps and processes in dealing with discrepancies and they agree that it was not possible to record a dispute on Horizon itself and that's joint 2, paragraphs 14.1 to 14.3 at \{D1/2/40\}.

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And the two last areas of high level agreement are Horizon shortfalls data and reporting for subpostmasters, which is 8 and 9. There is fairly high level agreement about available data and reporting. They agree factually about what transaction data and reporting functions were available to subpostmasters and Post Office respectively and that's joint 3 at 8.2 \{D1/4/10\}. And they agree, importantly -- although your Lordship has already heard some evidence about this in the common issues trial -- that Post Office had access to several sources of information to which subpostmasters were not privy, which is joint 3 at 8.1, which is $\{\mathrm{D} 1 / 4 / 10\}$.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right. I'm a bit puzzled at some of your references although you were going quite quickly so it might be that I missed some of them. You said joint 2 , paragraph 14.1 to 14.3 . I'm not sure if you actually turned that up, did you? Was that turned up on the common screen?
MR GREEN: $\{D 1 / 2 / 40\}$ is 14.1 to 14.3 , my Lord, at the bottom of page 40.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR GREEN: So that's where the expert agreement is and the reference is -- they haven't set out.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: No, I was looking for a different --

I was looking for subparagraphs of the earlier number 14 which was euro discrepancies which was on page 12 , which is also a paragraph 14 but it doesn't have subparagraphs.
MR GREEN: Indeed.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes, so ...
MR GREEN: I'm sorry if I'm going too fast but this is just --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, I don't know -- when you refer me to these I don't know whether you are expecting me hurriedly to look at them on here before you go on to the next one or not.
MR GREEN: I will perhaps indicate if I invite your Lordship to look carefully at it.

In relation to remote access and editing of transactions, your Lordship will appreciate this is going to be something of a hot potato during the trial. There is a measure of agreement that certain categories of access or tool have been available at various times and at the moment I don't want to go into that in too much detail save to identify what the types are, if I may.

So there is Post Office remote access which was at a minimum read only access to all branch transaction data, which is referred to at joint 3, paragraph 7.2

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which is $\{D 1 / 4 / 10\}$. I'm not asking your Lordship to look at it particularly.

There is the Fujitsu ability to insert transactions, one such tool being the balancing transaction tool used by Fujitsu's SSC, system support centre, third line support, which has been used on at least one admitted occasion $\{\mathrm{D} 1 / 5 / 5\}$, which is joint 4 at 10.3 .

There is privileged users with the capability to edit or delete transaction data and there are some logs relating to this access but what's recorded in those logs has changed significantly over time. That's joint 4 at 11.3 \{D1/5/10\}.

There is accounts altered without consent which is changes to an SPM's branch transaction data made without a subpostmaster's consent which your Lordship will find for example at Dr Worden's first report, paragraph 1136 which is $\{D 3 / 1 / 248\}$.

And there is also reference there to the rebuilding of branch transaction data --
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm sorry, I don't understand my learned friend's reference to paragraph 1136. It may not be helpful but I wonder if he could explain what he means about Dr Worden agreeing.
MR GREEN: So if your Lordship sees, there is a table at 1136 where Dr Worden sets out what he says can be done
and it has got "Data amendment" as the first column and he says:
"Whether Post Office has had the ability to:
" Inject / inject : yes, global users have had that ability .
"Edit/delete: no."
And then "without the knowledge of subpostmaster: no"; "without the consent of subpostmaster: yes".

So I'm just trying to summarise the effect of what's in that column.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That's how I read it .
MR GREEN: I hope that's helpful to my learned friend.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm grateful.
MR GREEN: Then the final one is the transaction repair tool which is referred to at $\{D 1 / 5 / 3-4\}$. It is at the bottom of that page:
"The earlier transaction repair tool affects only [ this is Dr Worden] back-end copies ..."

And then he lists some of the others.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Sorry, where were you just looking at?
MR GREEN: Sorry, the bottom bullet point on that internal page 3 , which is actually --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: The one that begins "The earlier transaction repair tool ..."
MR GREEN: Exactly:
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"... affects only back-end copies of transaction data [ this is Dr Worden's view] and so does not enable remote access."

And then he refers to other things. On that, my Lord, I just invite your Lordship to note on page 7 \{D $1 / 5 / 7\}$, at 10.11 , the experts agree:
"We have not been provided with logs or audits from the transaction repair tool (TRT)."

So just trying to pick out the broad landscape, where the big disputes will be, one of the big areas of difference between the parties is as to robustness and has a couple of facets to it: one is its utility in terms of determining the individual other issues in the trial and we have referred to that on page 9 of our written opening $\{A / 1 / 9\}$ including at, for example, paragraph 17.1.

The issue of robustness has been a fairly focal point of the defendant's case throughout. They first raised the contention that the Horizon computer system is robust in their response to the Panorama documentary, which is at $\{F / 1422 / 1\}$. Your Lordship will probably remember this document from it before, but the Post Office was responding to the Panorama programme on 17 August 2015 and it says that the allegations are based on partial, selective and misleading information:
"The Post Office does not prosecute people for making innocent mistakes and never has.
"There is no evidence that faults with the computer system caused money to go missing at these Post Office branches.
"There is evidence that user actions, including dishonest conduct, were responsible for missing money."

And so forth and then it refers to the allegations and then the last paragraph before "Background facts" is where they say:
"The Horizon computer system is robust and effective in dealing with the six million transactions put through the system every day by our postmasters and employees ..."

And so forth:
"It is independently audited and meets or exceeds industry accreditations."

Then the letter of response makes four references to "robust". I won't take your Lordship to them. The generic defence then reflects that language at paragraph 16, paragraph 50 and paragraph 153, which are respectively -- we don't need to turn them up, but are respectively for reference at $\{\mathrm{C} 3 / 3 / 5\},\{\mathrm{C} 3 / 3 / 21\}$ and \{C3/3/61\}.

And then the third CMC, Post Office themselves
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particularly proposed issue number one, "Is Horizon robust and extremely unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls" and for reference -- we don't need to turn it up -- that's the skeleton argument at $\{\mathrm{C} 8.4 / 2 / 25\}$ and then that becomes the focal point of Dr Worden's report and we respectfully say feeds into his approach to the evidence as a whole. So what he does, in contra-distinction to Mr Coyne, is Dr Worden looks at the idea of robustness in a particular way, which I will break down in a moment, and then through the prism of robustness then looks at the other issues and we respectfully will invite the court to adopt an approach more consistent with Mr Coyne's approach which is to look at what actually happened with particular examples and trace them through to a reasoned and careful conclusion and then from the ground up, as it were, draw inferences upwards rather than from an overarching hypothesis downwards.

Your Lordship has probably seen that in addition to that we have questioned the extent to which something being said to be robust provides any solace to an individual postmaster and that's at page 10 in -- it is \{A/1/10\}
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Page 10 of?
MR GREEN: In our written submissions. And the short point
there, my Lord, is what's different about this is this is not a provider of an IT system and the customer and the customer being able to aggregate and deal with things in the round with the provider. We're looking one hop over and it is no solace to an individual SPM who faces an unexplained shortfall which might be a lot of money for them, even though a small amount of money relatively for Post Office, to be told "But don't worry, it 's a rare occurrence", and so we respectfully say that the entire universe of transactions is not the right comparator for answering at least the other questions and possibly the question of robustness in this trial.

We have made clear from the latest our generic reply that we respectfully say that a low chance multiplied by a high number of transactions is totally consistent with the levels of claims being advanced by the claimants in this case. My Lord, if I can just very briefly take your Lordship to that, \{C3/4/21\}. It's at paragraphs 36 and 37 of the reply.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Which paragraphs?
MR GREEN: It is paragraphs 36 to 37 :
"Notwithstanding the various checks and controls ..."
MR JUSTICE FRASER: It is really 35 to 37 , isn't it?
MR GREEN: It really is, my Lord, your Lordship is right.
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Then in 37, second line:
"In fact, the relatively small chance of errors admitted by the defendant, would be likely to produce the very picture reflected in the claimants' case. The existence of money in the defendant's suspense account(s) ... shows that errors generate financial consequences by which the defendant receives money to which it does not believe it is entitled, and credits those sums to its profits ."

That's a reflection of the suspense accounts being credited profits after three years which we will turn to when we get to Dr Worden's evidence.
"This too is consistent with the claimants' case ..."

And if we go over the page $\{C 3 / 4 / 22\}$, it identifies the publicly maintained position and if we can go forward to page 29 of that document which is $\{\mathrm{C} 3 / 4 / 29\}$, we look at paragraph 52:
"... the claimants repeat its primary case pleaded in GPOC and aver that the terms identified are onerous, oppressive ..."

Et cetera and that relates back -- that's the position on the common issues reflecting the 52.5 , the identification of some errors and so forth. So that's how that fed back into the trial your Lordship has
already heard.
In relation to robustness there's the sort of second big area, but it's absolutely dovetailed with Dr Worden's definition of robustness, which is his definition of countermeasures which your Lordship will have seen. He has identified these countermeasures and he has drawn inference about their effectiveness and as a result of those inferences concluded that the Horizon system is robust and the most extraordinary of these is the treatment of transaction corrections as a countermeasure, because Post Office's position, we respectfully say, is illogical and effectively a one-way ratchet in Post Office's favour. So the approach is to say that the process of making transaction corrections is relevant as a countermeasure but not within this trial, that's effectively the position adopted, and it is we respectfully say an unusual position.

If we look at $\{A / 2 / 44\}$, this is Post Office's written opening for the Horizon issues trial, and we can see at paragraph 114 the opening line of that:
"Post Office's reconciliation processes are outside the scope of the Horizon issues."

So that's the prism through which the Post Office invites your Lordship to be constrained for the purposes of this trial.

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Now, we compare that to what Dr Worden refers to at \{D3/1/71\} and we see at paragraph 257 that Dr Worden says:
"In my opinion, the countermeasure of UEC was so essential in Horizon, and it was effectively implemented. Because of this, many software errors resembling user errors were also corrected."

Now, there what he is talking about is user error correction, which is not the correction of user errors, it 's subpostmasters spotting software errors and drawing them to the attention of Post Office and that feeding through to Fujitsu. And we will look carefully at what the information flow in real life looks like, but UEC is not just an important countermeasure, in it Dr Worden's opinion UEC, which is SPMs spotting system errors and pointing them out successfully, UEC was "so essential in Horizon".

If we then go to page 78 in that document $\{D 3 / 1 / 78\}$, I would invite your Lordship to look carefully at paragraph 294, flatly contrary to Post Office's position in its written opening:
"The processes of reconciliation, TAs and TCs are a very important part of the robustness countermeasures built into Horizon - particularly for UEC."

So, my Lord, that ties back to that paragraph we
have just looked at.
Then just as an extra point, when Dr Worden is presented with KELs in which it appears there might have been a financial impact on branch accounts, he frequently infers that TCs would have been issued to correct the position and therefore it's robust. We will explore some examples of that with Dr Worden in due course. And therefore it would be certainly helpful if my learned friend could clarify what Post Office's position is about the relevance of TCs. If they do not form part of the Horizon system, robustness of which they have insisted is in issue in issue 1 , then to the extent that that robustness is dependent on transaction corrections, the system is not robust. If it is in then it is dependent on that process of transaction corrections and your Lordship will obviously appreciate from the previous trial what that involved in practical terms.

So ultimately, the approach of Dr Worden more globally we respectfully say has an element of circularity about it because what we find is that where bugs are detected -- so where we have been able to find evidence of bugs -- Dr Worden prays that in aid to show that "Well, they can be detected, so the system is working, so it is robust", where bugs have not been

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detected by the system that's prayed in aid as the absence of bugs and where bugs have been found that have gone undetected for a long time, but are finally found several years later, that is still said to be evidence that the system and controls are all robust. So in fact the position is that it is not possible to identify any evidence which could ever lead to the conclusion the system is not that robust on that basis and we respectfully invite the court to scrutinise that approach with some care.

The big difference which I have already indicated between the approach of Mr Coyne and the approach of Dr Worden is Mr Coyne has started with the primary source material and the PEAKs and KELs -- and we will illustrate this in a moment in relation to Dalmellington -- and has tried to build up the picture from those, whereas Dr Worden has looked at everything through the prism of the robustness countermeasures that I have just been describing.

The third big area of dispute is remote access. Your Lordship will appreciate that the position on remote access has developed somewhat to say the least. It is worth just briefly recapping how that position has developed. Your Lordship will remember that Post Office originally made its public statement in response to the

Panorama programme which denied any ability remotely to alter branch data. That's at $\{\mathrm{F} / 1422 / 2\}$ and you see there halfway down the page:
"There is also no evidence of transactions recorded by branches being altered through 'remote access' to the system. Transactions as they are recorded by branches cannot be edited and the Panorama programme did not show anything that contradicts this."

Your Lordship will remember Mr Roll appeared on the Panorama programme.

We have set this section out at page 22 of our written opening $\{A / 1 / 22\}$ and we have traced through the development of the position. It is clear that what Post Office told the public in response to the Panorama programme was not true.

At paragraph 65:
Following the claimants' letter of claim ... Post Office admitted (in their 28 July 2016 letter of response) that in fact Post Office and/or Fujitsu did have some limited capacity remotely to access and edit transactions ..."

Then at the GLO hearing my learned friend said to the master -- wanted to deal with the remote access point upfront and explained that the people who gave that response thought it was correct. He said:

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"... Horizon system is a very complicated system.
It involves lots of departments in ... both in Fujitsu and in the Post Office. And the people who are responsible for the correspondence didn't know that in fact there were these two other routes. Very few people at Post Office knew that there were these two other routes. They were ... they were routes that are under ... essentially under the control of Fujitsu who is the expert independent contractor ..."

## And then at the bottom:

"... the point having been discovered, the Post Office wasted no time in ... in bringing the truth ... the accurate ... and accurate set of facts to the knowledge of the claimants."

## And at the end of that section:

"... the fact that there is a possibility to alter remotely itself is ... not in issue, it now having been discovered and the fact that there are these clever routes by which they can be done."
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I think you have gone over the page to 23 .
MR GREEN: I have indeed, my Lord, yes.
So that was what the court was told at the GLO
hearing, that it shouldn't be in issue because it had now been admitted, and then the generic defence, we
identified what was admitted at that point paragraph 57 of the generic defence which is $\{C 3 / 3 / 25\}$. In fact can we just go back one page to 24 \{C3/3/24\}. There's an admission at the bottom there:
"... bugs or errors ... have resulted in discrepancies and shortfalls or net gains ..."

Go over the page and then that deals with those bugs and errors. You come down to the "Remote editing of branch transaction data" heading at 57 and then subparagraph 1 says:
"Neither Post Office nor Fujitsu has the ability to log on remotely to a Horizon terminal in a branch so as to conduct transactions."
MR JUSTICE FRASER: What's the name of the Post Office or the person who signed the statement of truth on the generic defence? There is just a signature on it but I can't see what the name is. $\{C 3 / 3 / 75\}$.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, it is Jane MacLeod.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Jane MacLeod, right. Thank you.
MR GREEN: Your Lordship will see that the case is then set out in the subsequent subparagraphs:
"A Post Office employee with 'global user' authorisation can, when physically present at a branch, use a terminal ..."

And then:
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"Any transactions effected by a global user are recorded against a global user ID and are readily identifiable ..."

Then 3 \{C3/3/26\}:
"Fujitsu (and not Post Office) has the ability to inject transactions into branch accounts (since the introduction of Horizon Online in 2010, transactions of this sort have been called 'balancing transactions ')."

Then halfway down 3:
"They may be conducted only by a small number of specialists at Fujitsu and only in accordance with specific authorisation requirements. They are rarely used. To the best of Post Office's information and belief, only one balancing transaction has ever been made so as to affect a branch's transaction data, and this was not in a branch operated by a claimant. A balancing transaction is readily identifiable as such."

And so that's the account that we get which appears on its face to conclude the allegation which had been originally made by Mr Roll in Panorama, subject to --
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, just to be clear -- I'm sorry to interrupt, but just to be clear, your Lordship may recall an argument in the pleadings, this is talking about Horizon Online, paragraph 57 is principally about

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Horizon Online not about Legacy Horizon and it is important not to swerve between the two different forms of Horizon in relation to which different forms of remote access were possible.
MR GREEN: My Lord, I agree it is important not to swerve between them.
The development of the case in terms of evidence essentially followed the service of Mr Roll's witness statement, Mr Roll's first witness statement \{E1/7/3\}. Now, in fact that statement was dated 11 July 2016 -your Lordship will understand why a witness statement was taken at that stage before a pleading of this type -- and it was served on 28 September 2018 and at paragraph 18 of that witness statement, for example, Mr Roll says:
"The ability to remotely access the Horizon system at branch level was extensive, in that we were able to change not only data and transaction information, but we also had the ability to insert transactions and transfer money remotely without the subpostmaster knowing. Obviously this was not done by me, however I can recall thinking that a third party may have been able to do that if they could have remotely accessed the system in the way that we could (which may or may not have been possible )."
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So he is being qualified there about him not having done it himself.

We then on the same day are served the witness statements of Mr Godeseth and Mr Parker, Mr Godeseth first witness statement on 28 September 2018. He says that any remotely injected transaction would be easily identifiable as such because it would have a counter number greater than 32 and the reference to that is \{E2/1/17\},58.10. And it is right to distinguish between Legacy Horizon and Horizon Online:
"In Legacy Horizon any transactions injected by SSC would have used the computer server address as the counter position which would be a number greater than 32 , so it would be clear that a transaction had been injected in this way."

So that's served on the same day as Mr Roll's first statement.

Then we get the 16 November 2018 statement of Mr Parker, Parker 1, \{E2/11/5\}, at paragraph 22. He says -- notwithstanding that he is responding to Mr Roll, he says:
"It is correct that the 'remote access' described above could have been carried out without the permission of a subpostmaster. However, any additional transactions inserted remotely would be identifiable as
such from the transaction logs that are available to subpostmasters from Horizon."

So the effect of those two witness statements, one at the same time as Mr Roll and one responding to Mr Roll, is to preclude a transaction appearing as if it has in fact been done by a subpostmaster when actually it hasn't and to do so clearly.

Then Dr Worden says that Post Office 's evidence accords with his experience with support staff more generally and we see at \{D3/1/244\}, paragraph 1114 , he effectively takes a view on the conflict of evidence between Mr Roll and Mr Godeseth and sides with Mr Godeseth saying that it accords with his experiences:
"... that support staff should have a facility like this, so that branch accounts could be corrected in exceptional circumstances - without resorting to DBAs."

And if we go forward to page \{D3/1/245\}, paragraph 1119 , he said:
"Mr Roll worked in the SSC and I established above ... certain SSC users had the ability to transact injections ..."

I think it might be the other way round, inject transactions :
"... although these would have become visible to subpostmasters. So in my opinion Mr Roll could not have

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made these changes to branch accounts 'without the subpostmaster knowing'."

So that's Dr Worden's conclusion on that, that's 7 December and then if we -- your Lordship will remember that Mr Roll's second statement explained how those were to be made and in response to that Mr Parker serves a witness statement confirming that Mr Roll is right and we see that at $\{E 2 / 12 / 9\}$ which is paragraph 27 , where he says:
"In paragraph 20 of Roll 2 [which we will look at in a second] Mr Roll describes a process by which transactions could be inserted via individual branch counters by using the correspondence server to piggy-back through the gateway. He has not previously made this point clear. Now that he has, following a discussion with colleagues who performed such actions I can confirm that this was possible. I did not mention this in my first witness statement because, when faced with a less clear account in Mr Roll's first statement, my recollection was that if it was necessary for the SSC to inject a transaction data into a branch's accounts, it would have been injected into the correspondence server (injecting via the server was the default option which was followed in the vast majority of cases )."
MR JUSTICE FRASER: So apparently it is all Mr Roll's fault.
$\begin{array}{lr}\text { MR GREEN: Apparently. } & 1 \\ \text { MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, I dare say that will be pursued in } & 2 \\ \text { due course. } & 3 \\ \text { MR GREEN: Indeed. And the final reference, just so } & 4 \\ \text { your Lordship has a reasonably complete picture about } & 5 \\ \text { this, is }\{\text { D3/6/21\} which is Dr Worden's second report, } & 6 \\ \text { which postdates Mr Parker's second statement, at } & 7 \\ \text { paragraphs } 83 \text { to } 85 \text {. If we go to \{D3/6/21\} and if we } & 8 \\ \text { look at } 83 \text { to 85: } & 9 \\ \text { "It seems to me that I require further factual } & 10 \\ \text { information before I can comment on this evidence. } & 11 \\ \text { Which 'specific person'? Under what circumstances? How } & 12 \\ \text { frequently? Until I have that information, it remains } & 13 \\ \text { possible in my view that any transaction which 'would } & 14 \\ \text { appear to the subpostmaster as though it had been } & 15 \\ \text { carried out through the counter in branch' might only be } & 16 \\ \text { a transaction that he had given his consent for, as the } & 17 \\ \text { 'specific person' - and which had in effect been made on } & 18 \\ \text { his behalf. } & 19 \\ \text { "Therefore, Mr Roll's new evidence does not cause me } & 20 \\ \text { to alter the opinion expressed at paragraph 1119 of my } & 21 \\ \text { first report, when commenting on Mr Roll's first witness } & 22 \\ \text { statement, that he could not alter branch accounts } & 23 \\ \text { without the subpostmaster knowing." } & 24 \\ \text { 85: } & 25\end{array}$
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"In paragraphs 27-34, Mr Parker provides detailed and specific commentary on Mr Roll's paragraph 20, using his knowledge and the appropriate contemporary documents, where they have been found. Here he acknowledges that Fujitsu could insert transactions into branches by a piggy-back process. I am not yet able to comment on Mr Parker's evidence or the documents he cites."

So that's the manner in which Dr Worden engaged with the picture that emerged in that way through those witness statements.

So, my Lord, that's the background to those big issues and the sort of key features of them. I don't know whether it is worth taking a very slightly earlier break.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I would maybe go on a bit.
MR GREEN: Shall I push on a bit?
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR GREEN: Because I'm about to begin just tracing through the Dalmellington bug to see how that arises .

The Dalmellington bug is a shorthand name for a particular bug and it takes its name from an iteration of the bug which occurred in October 2015 and it is in the Horizon Online system, particularly, but probably not exclusively, affecting transfers of cash between
core branches and outreach branches, which are small part-time branches that use mobile equipment. Cash is sent from Post Office to a core branch and then it is transferred from the core branch to an outreach branch. When the barcode for the cash was scanned at the outreach branch, the number of remittances would multiply so that Horizon showed far more cash on the system than was physically present. And just so your Lordship knows, or has an idea of how it seemed to the postmistress Ann Ireland who was affected in Dalmellington, what in fact appears to have happened is that at the remming in stage the post mistress was presented with the "Enter" button, she presses it, that should take her on to a new screen, but it stays there and it is pressed again and again, and it appears that there is a reasonable inference that the multiple of cash reflects the number of times -- that looks to be how it works. So she ends up with trying to rem in an $£ 8,000$ cash remittance into the outreach branch and actually the Horizon system recording her account as having remmed in 32,000 . So four enters effectively , so she is over by $£ 24,000$.

My Lord, we say that this is quite an interesting bug to look at because of the precise way in which it arose because unusually, in a lot of other cases the

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postmistress or postmaster is trying to work out what's happened, without knowing, but in this case they are on both ends of the transaction because they see a receipt that they have printed out going out and they are at the outreach branch and they see what they get at the outreach branch and they can literally hold them up and go "That cannot possibly be right". So this is a good example of a very particular bug which was at literally one end of the spectrum of visibility to subpostmasters, in contrast to a number of others, and we will see that in the documents that we go through.

My Lord, can I begin by taking your Lordship to \{F/1389\} which is the PEAK. I say "the PEAK" and I will explain in a little more detail in a minute. So this is PEAK PC0246949 which for convenience I will refer to as the 949 PEAK. And just to show your Lordship how the PEAK document works -- it may be absolutely apparent already -- "Call type", "Live incidents/defects" and then there's a "Priority ", priority C, "Non-critical ". And then there's a summary "Horizon -- transaction discrepancies", as we come down, and then "All references" your Lordship will see as a heading, "Type" and "Value" and there under SSCKEL, that is system support centre known error log, your Lordship can see the acha621P KEL. Just as a practical matter, in terms
of knowing what a KEL is about, the way the KEL system was set up, the KELs are named after the person who does them, not the issue. So you can't tell anything about the KEL from the name.

Then your Lordship then sees "Clone call ", PC0246997 which for convenience I will refer to as the 997 PEAK. So that's an associated PEAK.

Then just following this document through, the progress narrative has a very brief summary of the fuller data above, so you can see "Call type: L", means "Live", "Call priority: C", cross-references to non- critical and so forth. And we then come down. The date of the record in the sort of yellowy-beige section is 13 October at 2.46 in the afternoon, 14.46.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Where are you looking?
MR GREEN: Just halfway down the page, my Lord, when it goes from a duck egg blue colour to a yellowy colour.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I see, but date time is the day before at 5.10.
MR GREEN: Exactly.
So the record there in yellow is 13 October and the transfer note begins:
"Please can PEAK investigate this discrepancy issue. NBSC has confirmed that following discussions and checks with the user that this is not a user error issue ..."

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So confirmed not a user error issue, which in this particular case was very easy for reasons I will show.
"... but an issue within the system requiring
Fujitsu investigation."
And then there's the message:
"Hi Eden, need to raise an incident for below issue and ... provide Fujitsu re ... it's been confirmed with SM."

Then you get the same text effectively again about confirming that it is not a user error. And if your Lordship comes down to just under "Problem/request":
"User has discrepancies when transferring cash from one branch to another ( specifically between their main branch to their outreach branch); OUTREACH BRANCH ISSUE.
"User said instead of the system logging it as $£ 8,000$ transaction, it recognises it as $£ 32,000$ transaction.
"User already contacted NBSC and was rightaway directed to us ..."

And the amounts are logged at the bottom: star
$£ 8,000$ over $£ 32,000$. I think the amount should be actually over 24,000 but I think they are recording what it actually did is 32,000 .
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, it says it should have been $£ 8,000$
but it has been recorded as 32,000 .
MR GREEN: Exactly.
And the subsequent pages of the PEAK record the dealings with the PEAK in a bit more detail. I will come back to some more specific aspects of that. If we can just go back to the first page for a second \{F/1389/1\} and we look at "Clone call" and the 997 PEAK, if we go to $\{F / 1389.1\}$ this is the 997 PEAK, which appears to be a PEAK cloned from the other one. So "Release PEAK", there's a reference to another PEAK there and the clone master is the 949 PEAK that we have just looked at. So this is a clone of the master PEAK and it refers to another release PEAK and it also refers to the KEL, the acha621P KEL which is the same KEL referred to in the previous one. And your Lordship will see under "Progress narrative ", this 997 PEAK is opened on 14 October by someone called Anne Chambers who we see quite a bit and then it appears to paste in what's happened on the 13th below it, so it's not actually in chronological order going downwards.

And we get a bit more information there in the middle set out quite helpfully:
"Branch has a discrepancy of $£ 24,000$. 4 other branches have had a similar problem in the last 2 months."

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And your Lordship will see in a minute that she is unable to go back more than two months at that stage to see what else has happened.
"3 of these resolved by remming out the excess. Since these were all branch to branch rems and there is no cross-branch accounting within Horizon this removes the discrepancy."

And then if we can then go to $\{F / 1393\}$, this is PEAK 207, which is just for your Lordship's note not the other release PEAK that was mentioned in the previous document, because that ends 024, it is a third one. And here we can see halfway down that the date is 21 October we're in now and there is email correspondence involving Mr Parker as the originator -- your Lordship will see "Originator" about halfway down the page, just below where it goes from sort of green to duck egg green or duck egg blue, 21 October 2015, 13.35.01. Four lines down:
"Originator: Parker Steve ..."
Which we understand to be Mr Stephen Parker who is giving evidence in this trial. And we can see that there is correspondence from Tony Wicks to Anne Chambers about Anne Chambers having done most of the investigation into this. If we look at the bottom we see Tony Wicks on 20 October 2015 at 15.25 to

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    Sandie Bothick saying:
        "Hi Sandy,
        "Looking at PEAK [949] ..."
        Which --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That's the one we started with.
MR GREEN: Exactly, so that's effectively the master -- it
        is treated as the clone master PEAK:
            "Looking at PEAK [949] it appears to be derived from
        I7991774 and I found TfS incident ..."
            And there is a number there:
            "There is no problem record raised for this, however
        PEAK [997] was used by development to investigate this .
        A code fix has been developed, but requires official
        testing and releasing. I've made enquiries and
        unfortunately LST are unable to take the fix for testing
        and release 12.88 without significantly impacted that
        release to live.
            "As the condition can be avoided by postmasters,
        ie by making them aware of the condition and advising
        them not to press enter multiple times, I propose that
        this is KELed and included in the counter release
        13.05."
            And just a bit further down {F/1393/2},
        Sandie Bothick is replying. She is saying:
            "Hi POA DM ..."
            4 5
            Duty Manager:
            "Have PEAK make you aware of this issue?
            "Do you have a PR open ..."
            And so forth. And then below is what she sent to
        Atos earlier :
            "Hi Katie, I'm coming in blind on this. Looking at
            the incident this is our update from PEAK TfS
            connector ..."
            And so forth. Then there are further references to
        the }997\mathrm{ PEAK:
            "We are continuing to investigate the problem ..."
            Just over halfway down:
            "... but any fix will not retrospectively change the
        branch accounts."
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR GREEN: "So we are aware of the issue and are continuing
        to investigate but NBSC should be able to sort the
        discrepancy out in the meantime."
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I think if you are going to move on to
        another document I think we should take a break.
MR GREEN: Shall we take a break there?
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes. Come back again at 12.
(11.54 am)
                    (Short Break)
(12.00 pm)
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MR GREEN: My Lord, can I just highlight a couple of remaining points in this PEAK. If we can begin at \{F/1393/4\} please.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: This is still in PEAK 207, is it?
MR GREEN: It is still in PEAK 207, exactly.
Now, your Lordship will see at the bottom of that page, Monday October 19th, 2015 at 5.33 pm.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR GREEN: "IT-Solutions R SPM Post Office incident management".
"Hi Ibrahim, as this incident is not getting resolved can we have a concall set up between NBSC \& Fujitsu.
"The site had transaction discrepancy. As per Fujitsu, they have found 4 other instances (outreach branches ..."

## It gives the name:

"... and all but the last removed the discrepancy by completing a rem out for the excess ..."

Then if we go back to the previous page $\{F / 1393 / 4\}$, there is an email which is on 20 October 2015 at 9.53 at the top of the page, part of it, and if we come down four paragraphs -- well, let's maybe take it from the second line:
"She was concerned as she had never seen this

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before. She balanced core and it was correct, but outreach was $£ 24,000$ short.
"Although the core had sent only one lot of $£ 8,000$, the outreach had accepted 4 lots of $£ 8,000$ in one transaction!
"She has spoken to NBSC ref 1358666 who told her it was a technical issue.
"She then phoned the IT help desk ref I7972295. She was unconvinced they understood the problem although they said they could probably ' rectify remotely'. After waiting till the end of day she called back and escalated to option 7 and spoke to Rich who told her to phone NBSC.
"I don't think the helpline understood what's happened. I can understand that as you would think it is not possible. But incredibly Anne's outreach Horizon now shows $£ 24,000$ short and it does not exist. As you can imagine, Anne is concerned and I have told her not to touch the outreach unit until this is resolved for her.
"The incident was passed to Fujitsu who have advised that in order to resolve the issue the branch/NBSC must 'complete a rem out for the excess to correct the cash holding' which Fujitsu are unable to do. The NBSC has subsequently advised that they cannot assist as this is
an IT issue, however Fujitsu are also advising that they cannot assist. As a result, the issue has been passed back and forward for over a week."

Then if we go back a page $\{F / 1393 / 3\}$ to 20 October at 10.42, Kendra Dickinson at the Post Office says:
"Could I enlist your help and support on the below issue please?"
MR JUSTICE FRASER: This is underneath "Hi Rod/Dawn"? MR GREEN: Exactly.
"Whilst I am happy for NBSC to try and support where
they can, the concern I have with the below is that we have no process for managing this type of issue and we are unable to see any of the back-end accounting for this branch. Therefore, any advice that we try and provide could end up making matters worse - this is already showing a 24 K loss. I am not happy for NBSC to give advice on something that is not a process that exists within the knowledge base.
"Similar to a disconnected session, NBSC would have no understanding as to the implications on branch accounting if they were to advise the branch as suggested below."

And then if we go up there, there is more about the difficulty of NBSC giving help and advice with insufficient information, top of that page, which is
under Tuesday 20 October at 11.57:
"... an explanation of the root cause to be supplied by Fujitsu via Atos so that both our Finance Service Centre and NBSC colleagues can be assured that the right advice is given, there is no impact to the branch account and a full audit trail is available. It does not feel right for Atos and Fujitsu to be giving instruction to NBSC to speak to branches with advice with insufficient information.
"If this has happened in this case it would be useful to see that in this email trail.

Then if we go back a page to $\{F / 1393 / 2\}$, halfway down the page -- this is in the Sandie Bothick email that appears to start at the top and appears to include what she sent to Katie, who I think I referred your Lordship to already. If we come halfway down does your Lordship see "POA-Horizon".
MR JUSTICE FRASER: No. Oh yes, I see it .
MR GREEN: Just there and then you have "Provider ref" and a reference to the 949 PEAK.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: This is the one we have seen already. MR GREEN: Indeed. It says:
"Resolution details: update by Anne Chambers: category 70 - final - avoidance action supplied: we have found that if there is a log-out before a user has fully
logged on, then subsequently a pouch is remmed in manually (most likely at an outreach branch), then after the rem in slip has been printed, the same screen is redisplayed and the user is likely to press enter again and duplicate the remittance, possibly several times. A different screen should be displayed which would prevent this happening.
"A rem in slip is printed each time, showing the same details but different session numbers, and a transaction log search confirms the repeated rems."

And then importantly, we would respectfully say, she says:
"This is not an area that has changed for several years so it is likely to have happened before but we have no record of it having been reported to us. I can only check back two months; I've found 4 other instances [of the outreach branches] ... and all but the last removed the discrepancy by completing a rem out for the excess ..."
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Those four must be in the last two months, mustn't they?
MR GREEN: Precisely. So pausing there --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: On the face of the document they must be the last two months.
MR GREEN: Exactly. So pausing there, your Lordship will be
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beginning to get a feel for the fact that it is quite difficult to identify with confidence from a particular KEL that you have necessarily found any related KELs, or from a particular PEAK that you have necessarily identified all of the PEAKs that relate to that problem and there is obviously some information flow practicalities, both in relation to what information flows to the affected subpostmaster and whether there's a clear process for that, and also internally about the reporting of these issues by Post Office through its processes back to Fujitsu because the reporting of those issues is obviously essential to one of Dr Worden's countermeasures in terms of fixes being applied to correct the system errors.

From there can I invite your Lordship just to see \{F/1389\} and $\{F / 1389\}$ is -- that's 949 that we have identified as the PEAK we have looked at and then when we look at the reference to the additional receipts being produced we need to look at a couple of documents --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Do you mean on the same PEAK?
MR GREEN: Yes, this is still -- this is all cross-referring to the same ones. We've got $\{F / 1386\}$, and, my Lord, this makes good the advantage to a subpostmaster -"advantage" is a relative term, but compared to some
other software issues. By being on both ends of the transaction she is able to produce what has gone out and in. So we've got the remming in money which should be $£ 8,000$ and you've got on the right-hand side four separate remming ins of $£ 8,000$, all effectively in the same -- within one minute of each other, those four separate receipts coming down the right-hand side and one slightly on the left, numbered 1 to 4 .

If we then go to 1392 we've got the events log which the subpostmistress was able to see showing rem out slip on the left -hand side where she has written "Rem out" and then on the right-hand side she has identified multiple receipts being printed which are the four receipts we have just looked at. So on this particular bug this subpostmistress at Dalmellington had both ends of the data, as it were, and was able to say "Look, this cannot possibly be right."
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR GREEN: And that is obviously reflected in the recognition internally within Post Office of what's then happened.

Then if we just briefly go back, your Lordship will notice that the date of the event itself is 8 October and then we get the record created at 12 th and notes at 13 th and then the later ones where they are arguing

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about the fact it has been bounced back between helpline and Fujitsu are dated the 20th, just to get the timeline clear in that respect.

Can I take your Lordship now to the underlying KEL which is at $\{F / 1426\}$. So this was a KEL raised by Anne Chambers on 15 October 2015, so on the face of it looks like prior to that date the acha6-- it is difficult to see, prior to that date of 15 October 2015, to what extent there was an existing KEL identifying this on the face of the documents.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR GREEN: And the symptoms are described:
"A cash pouch was received at an outreach branch and scanned into Horizon. The manual process was followed and 2 Delivery Receipts printed. Then the clerk pressed Enter to complete the process, and a Rem In slip was printed. They were then able to press Enter again and another Rem In slip was printed - and the same amount of cash was recorded a second time. They may have repeated several times before using Cancel to escape, resulting in much more cash being recorded on the system than they actually have."

And "Solution - ATOS" at the bottom -- they refer to the problem they have identified which is a problem your Lordship has already seen. "Solution":
"Known problem should now be fixed so any further occurrences need to be investigated - send call to PEAK.
"Outreach branches can avoid the problem by making sure that they do not press Enter again after they have printed both Delivery Receipts and the Rem In slip - if they find the Rem In screen is still displayed they should press Cancel to get out of it, ignoring the message that not everything has been printed."

So actually what's reflected there, my Lord, just pausing, is that what's shown on the screen is actually positively misleading and that is in fairness to some extent reflected in the next sentence on $\{F / 1426 / 2\}$, where they say:
"However, they are unlikely to notice immediately that they are on the wrong screen, and will probably have duplicated the rem in before realising something is wrong."

Because if you successfully press the enter button it 's meant to move on to the next screen, so when it doesn't go away they just keep pressing it .
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That says in the third paragraph:
"The cause of the problem is being investigated ..."
MR GREEN: Indeed.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: And can we go back to the previous page, page 1 \{F/1426/1\}:

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"Known problem should now be fixed ..."
What does "known problem" mean?
MR GREEN: My Lord, this is one of the points -- there are two tasks I'm trying to do, which is to try to interrogate the documents as helpfully as I can for the court, but at the same time try to identify to the court the difficulties that one is -- anyone is faced with when looking at the incomplete picture that the experts have referred to.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right, understood. Let's go on to page 2 again please $\{F / 1426 / 2\}$.
MR GREEN: And your Lordship will see again there:
"... but it will not retrospectively correct the accounts at affected branches."

So that's noted again there.
Now, what in fact happened was there was external third party interest in this problem and that resulted in a Fujitsu presentation on 10 December 2015. To be fair to Post Office, Post Office wanted answers but wanted an identification of root cause and there's also some pressure from a blogger at the time which we will see later, and at $\{F / 1415\}$, there is a Fujitsu presentation on 10 December 2015 on the branch outreach issue. "Initial findings ", the first page confirms it is for Post Office's internal purposes only as
confidential. If we go over the page $\{\mathrm{F} / 1415 / 2\}$ it confirms there are potentially two separate issues at play. It:
"Doesn't correctly close down on the post log on script. This leaves the script on the 'stack' of incomplete processes."
And also:
"The pouch delivery script thinks it has completed doesn't explicitly finish".
And there's some consideration of that.
If we look at page 3 \{F/1415/3\}, as
at December 2015, the date of this presentation, Post Office knew from Fujitsu that there had been 112 occurrences that Fujitsu had identified of duplicate pouch IDs over the past five years, three issues with duplicate pouches, 47 outreach cases, 19 using the "Previous" button after a pouch scan, which was said to have been fixed March 2010, 46 remitted at multiple counters, fixed January 2011, 108 items corrected at the time either by transaction correction or subpostmaster referral, four items still to be confirmed, no items related to the period where the mediation scheme --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: What does BLE stand for at the top? MR GREEN: I'm not --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: If you don't know it doesn't matter.
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[^0]me before was the people involved trying to find out if it there was an existing PEAK number to which it related.
MR GREEN: Precisely.
Then if we go over to page $8\{F / 1415 / 8\}$, this goes to the flow of information from Post Office to Fujitsu in order to ensure timely corrections of the software. One transaction correction completed by Post Office, five remittance transactions completed by PMs, zero calls raised with Fujitsu. Nine incidents in 2012, zero calls with Fujitsu. Seven incidents in 2013, zero calls with Fujitsu. Two unknown outcomes noted in 2013, $£ 25,000$ and 2,500 . And those, until I think it was yesterday or the day before, we didn't have clarity on what had happened on those. There is now greater clarity as a result of some additional documents that we've got from Post Office.

The further "Detailed preliminary findings" on page 9 \{F/1415/9\}, identify 2014, nine incidents, no calls and then 2015 to 2016, one call raised with Fujitsu, which is effectively the call which I think is Ann Ireland's call which I think ultimately goes through. Then "January 2016 fix to be applied".

So that gives your Lordship a feel for how in this particular example the information flow appears to have

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worked. There had been a five -year period over which double remming system errors had been detected, there had been some fixes of aspects of that, but it's uncertain -- it's difficult to analyse precisely the genesis of all of those incidents.

If we now go to $\{F / 1399\}$, we can see that Computer Weekly was running an article about the problem that the CWU was looking into and if we look on page 3 of that document $\{F / 1399 / 3\}$, we can see at the top of the page:
"The alleged problem investigated by the CWU involves the process where subpostmasters transfer money from a core Post Office branch to a remote branch created to serve rural areas, known as an outreach, which is basically a branch on a laptop. These processes are known as remittances."

And so forth. So "Post Office department recognises duplication problem" at the bottom:
"Following a post on a web forum, another postmaster recognised the problem as something she had experienced in the past, and the financial department of the Post Office in Chesterfield was contacted on her advice.
"According to the postmasters' branch of the CWU, the financial department recognised the issue and told the postmaster they would need to send a positive

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monetary change to the Horizon branch accounts ..."
So that was following a post on a web forum. So
although it is clear that there are cases that have been
identified and have been corrected, precisely how that has happened may vary from case to case.
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## At the bottom:

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"The alleged fault, if proved, would question the
Post Office's continued claims that there are no systemic faults in Horizon."
So that was what was happening in November. There
is a follow-up article at \(\{\mathrm{F} / 1405\}\) which is
a Computer Weekly article, on 18 November 2015.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I'm not sure we are there yet. Where do you want to go now?
MR GREEN: I'm not going to take you to the detail of it.
Just so your Lordship knows, there is a follow-up to the point --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Which is at \(\mathrm{F} / 1405\) ?
MR GREEN: This is at F/1405.
So just stepping back from this, this bug is significant in the sense that not only was it one that was at the top end of the visibility for proof for the subpostmaster, who actually got both ends of the receipts, but there is also public pressure being applied in the media specifically on the issue
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in November and then we have actually got the Fujitsu presentation about it, so there's an unusually rich source of information available to the claimants and the court in respect of that.

There are then internal Post Office emails at \{F/1495.1/5\} and the first four pages of this are redacted but it is an email from Paula Vennells, the chief executive, citing a blog post by Mr McCormack, who was a fairly energetic blogger on this topic and I haven't taken your Lordship to his blogs but they were happening in parallel, and she says:
"Dear both,
"This needs looking into please ... can I have a report that takes the points in order and explains them.
"Tim McCormack is campaigning against PO and Horizon. I had another note from him this am which Tom will forward, so you are both in the loop.
"We must take him seriously and professionally.
"This particular blog is independent of Sparrow but clearly related in that it appears to present similar challenges that were raised in the course of the scheme.
"I'm most concerned that we/our suppliers appear to be very lax at handling 24 k ."

Pausing there, that appears to be a reference to the
triple sum rather than to any of the outstanding cases they haven't traced because they were 2,500 and 25,000.

And response on the same day at $\{F / 1495.2 / 1\}$ from a Rob Houghton who was head of IT at Post Office, so we there get:
"I need an urgent review and mini <taskforce> on this one."
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Where are you reading?
MR GREEN: Sorry, immediately under Rob Houghton's response at the top, third of the way down, copied in to Angela van den Bogerd, "The Dalmellington error in Horizon/problems with POL" which was the news article.
"I need an urgent review and mini <taskforce> on this one. It probably needs to link up heavily with Angela's work as FSC are mentioned extensively ..."

This is 1 July 2016, my Lord:
"... - Angela cfi ."
Copied for information presumably:
"I don't know how we respond to this but can we section a few inside people to get all over it and give me/Al/Paula evidence and understanding."

And then at the top of the page the response at 11.59, which is difficult to fit into the chronology, appears to be on the same day, Friday 1 July :
"Can you stand down on this please?"
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Redacted:
"Any specific actions and I will revert.
"My apologies."
Pausing there, the claimants' letter of claim was sent on 28 April 2016 and the Post Office sent its letter of response on 28 July 2016 so nearly four weeks after the decision to stand down on the investigation of that bug. So as at the date that the Post Office was responding in its letter of response, it had front and centre in its mind the existence of this bug.

Now, that bug was not disclosed in the letter of response. The bugs that were disclosed in the letter of response were the three that Second Sight had already found and Post Office letter of response, if we can just turn to $\{\mathrm{H} / 2 / 95\}$, stated --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That's the letter of response, is that right?
MR GREEN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: This is the schedule 6 rebuttal, is that right?
MR GREEN: Precisely.
This is where the Post Office obviously rebuts the allegations that have been made in the letter of claim and at 1.5 :
"Second Sight only reported on a number of already
resolved defects in Horizon (which they called 'bugs '). Second Sight did not discover these defects through its investigations. These were issues already known to and remedied by Post Office. It was Post Office that disclosed them to Second Sight."

So those are the three. Then 1.6 deals with the lack of attribution of any shortfall in the scheme to Horizon. Then 1.7:
"The letter of claim also presents no evidence that a defect in Horizon has caused a postmaster to be held wrongfully liable for any shortfall in their branch.
"Nevertheless, you make repeated references to the existence of historic defects in Horizon in order to give a false impression that Horizon deeply suffers from major defects, that Post Office does nothing about them and that these errors have caused postmasters losses which have gone unremedied. In order to dispel any myths around the defects reported on by Second Sight and cited by other sources, we have set out below in detail what happened in these instances. To be clear Post Office does not claim that these have been the only defects in Horizon."

So what they do do is they respond to the three that were known about, but they don't give any account of the Dalmellington bug or of its true extent which they well

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knew about from the Fujitsu presentation -- sorry, Dalmellington related issue on multiple remmings, because there are a number of different PEAKs and different software code problems that relate to multiple remming.

So if we just look over the page, just parenthetically, my Lord, if we may, at $\{\mathrm{H} / 2 / 96\}$. In relation to the Callendar Square, Falkirk issue, that is said to be an issue that only affects one branch and it is ruled out in the -- at the bottom:
"... also raised as part of a defence in a civil action by Post Office against a former postmaster, Lee Castleton ... The Court accepted the evidence from 'Fujitsus witness, Anne Chambers, and found 'no evidence' of the Falkirk bug in Mr 'Castletons branch."

We now know from Mr Godeseth's witness statement of 16 November that this bug affected 30 branches and resulted in mismatches at 20 branches.

So it's not just in the letter of response that they don't deal with Dalmellington, but it's not a full account perhaps of what was being said.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: The Callendar Square one affected 30 branches.
MR GREEN: Indeed.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That's different to the Dalmellington
one.
MR GREEN: Completely separate.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Is there a list of those 30 branches somewhere?
MR GREEN: I think we've got -- I will trace where it is .
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Just give me the reference in due course.
MR GREEN: Of course.
Coming back to Dalmellington, so what in fact happens is it is not disclosed in the letter of response and then the experts are then provided essentially with 8,000 KELs and about 220,000 PEAKs. My Lord, just for your Lordship's note, in the appendix we have dealt with how we obtained the KELs and the genesis of that disclosure at $\{A / 1 / 12-14\}$ and then we have set it out in greater detail in the appendix.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Which is at 106 I think.
MR GREEN: Indeed.
So what in fact happens is there is the -eventually we get the KELs.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I made an order I think, didn't I? MR GREEN: Your Lordship made an order, exactly. And they had first been -- the KELs had been requested in the letter of claim and your Lordship made observations about the response to that earlier.

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What in fact happens is Mr Coyne is the person who discovers the existence of the Dalmellington bug in his first report. If we look at that, it's \{D2/1/58\}. And he actually locates it -- it is paragraph 5.16 -- and your Lordship will see at paragraph 5.16 he explains what's happened and footnote 46 is the email thread and then he also finds the duplicated branch receipts and then if we can just go to page 60 of that document --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Page 60 of which document?
MR GREEN: Of Mr Coyne's first report $\{\mathrm{D} 2 / 1 / 60\}$. Your Lordship will see that although he does refer to a KEL at 5.23:
"... evidence of cash declaration discrepancies arising from clerks duplicating remittance in transactions ... because of wrong messages being presented on the Horizon counter screen ..."
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR GREEN: He has not at that stage worked out that this is the Dalmellington bug. So it just gives your Lordship an insight into how we had to discover what was done.

Then Mr Parker and Mr Godeseth's evidence is significant because the bug was not dealt with in the first round of the Post Office's evidence at all and only after it was referenced by Mr Coyne was it dealt with in the first statement of Mr Parker and the second
of Mr Godeseth and Mr Parker confirmed the link between the KEL and Dalmellington and says temporary financial impact which was rectified by a transaction correction being issued. Mr Godeseth then discloses the 112 instances of duplicate bar codes and then appends the analysis that I have already mentioned to the court.
Then Dr Worden's initial analysis, which is 7 December 2018, does not reference Dalmellington, so Post Office appear not to have told him about it, or he has not dealt with it, we don't know which it is, and despite the fact that it had actually been referenced by Mr Coyne in Coyne 1 and he is responding to it, and referenced in Godeseth 2 and Parker 1, which are statements which Dr Worden -- I'm sorry, I was corrected by my learned friend earlier, I have forgotten to say that: my Lord, Dr Worden pronounces his name Dr Worden, I have been pronouncing it wrongly.
Despite the fact that Dr Worden has referred to the defendant's witness statements on other matters. He did mention the KEL and he regarded it as having --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Are you talking about Worden 2 now or Worden 1?
MR GREEN: This is Worden 1. Then Mr Coyne, in Coyne 2, identifies further PEAKs on his own without any assistance from Post Office and sets those out -- no

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need to turn it up, I will just give the references \{D2/4/105\} and the PEAKs concerned are the 207 PEAK which we have looked at which is $\{\mathrm{F} / 1393\}$, and 949 PEAK, \{F/1389\}.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Sorry, can you give me the first one again?
MR GREEN: Sorry, the 207 PEAK is $\{F / 1393\}$ and the 949 PEAK is $\{\mathrm{F} / 1389\}$. Then Mr Coyne then attempts to look for PEAKs with FAD codes of those branches whose situations are unresolved and can't find anything. There are four unresolved of which two are a significant sum and he mentions that at Coyne 2, paragraph 4.53, we don't need to go there but it is $\{\mathrm{D} 2 / 4 / 107\}$.

Then in Dr Worden's second report he does refer to Dalmellington, explaining he didn't realise that the KEL he was looking at related to Dalmellington and he concludes that there was no permanent error due to the branch account because it was resolved by a TC, a PEAK and KEL were created, so the system worked well and it was fixed, and his opinion is re-enforced by the small maximum financial impact that he has estimated of incorrect TCs. He doesn't actually expressly mention the 112 occurrences, the 87 other branches affected or there that it lay undetected for five years, at least for some parts of that aspects of it appear to have been
corrected by various fixes, the lack of calls put into Fujitsu or actually directly address the four branches where there is no outcome confirmed.

So stepping back, your Lordship will now have a picture of the task and the information available, why the experts are agreed that the KELs and PEAKs have relevant information in them but not a complete picture, and how this particular bug was addressed.

Now, the postscript to this is that four hours and 45 minutes after our written opening had been filed with the court, so at 4.45 on 4 March, PO disclosed for the first time 36 additional documents.

If we look at $\{\mathrm{H} / 232\}$--
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Are these documents other than the ones you mention in one of your paragraphs as being outstanding that Mr Coyne had asked for?
MR GREEN: My Lord, they are -- well, I think they overlap because they relate to the Dalmellington bug, some of them.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: So 36 new documents. Where are we going now?
MR GREEN: This is $\{\mathrm{H} / 232\}$, so this is the letter on
4 March, 4.45 in the afternoon, so after written openings had been filed with the court and it says:
"During preparation for trial a number of further

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documents which relate to the Horizon issues trial have come to Post Office's attention.
"Disclosure of these documents is being provided by way of enclosed disclosure list. The enclosed list also contains those documents which have been provided to the claimants but not yet formally disclosed."

My Lord, I'm not going to deal with the contents of those documents now, but I am going to have to take Dr Worden to them and some of the witnesses to them, but in fact what seems to have happened, there's some sort of investigation that has been done in relation to the two outstanding branches that we said were unremedied in our opening and a conclusion is reached that it is probably all fine, if I can put it in fairly neutral terms at the moment.

There are other bugs which we are obviously concerned about whether we got the full picture on but that will emerge in the evidence.

The background, my Lord, if I can just very quickly take your Lordship through it. There is correspondence which covers the disclosed documents here and the Dalmellington bug, which starts on 2 October 2018 at $\{\mathrm{H} / 122\}$ in which we refer to the bug or error, we refer to bugs which are in addition to those acknowledged in the letter of response and ask for all documents
relating to these bugs and errors.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR GREEN: So that's when it starts . My Lord, I'm not going to take your Lordship through all the correspondence.
Can I just give you the references.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Go on.
MR GREEN: There's a chaser on 13 December 2018 \{H/147\},
there's the 11 January 2018 letter from Wombles at
$\{\mathrm{H} / 165\}$ offering voluntary disclosure of documents, providing 162 documents for Dalmellington; there's the 22 January 2019 letter at $\{\mathrm{H} / 173 / 6\}$ referring to the four unknown branches that I have just been talking about.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That's a letter from your solicitors?
MR GREEN: From my solicitors.
1 February, we've got Mr Coyne's second witness
statement at 4.51 to 4.53 \{D2/106\}, 11 February, some
disclosure, but 4 March these actual documents relating to those outstanding branches.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Thank you very much.
MR GREEN: My Lord, that's hopefully a helpful introduction to what the micro texture of the facts looks like, trying to build up and answer the question.

Can I just very briefly take your Lordship to a couple of documents which give an overview from the 73
internal perspective of Post Office and your Lordship will have in mind that if we just quickly turn to \{F/1325/145\}, Post Office's public position in its response to Second Sight of 11 March 2015, paragraphs 18 and 19:
"Questions were raised about Post Office's plans to change to a new system when the Post Office's current contract with Fujitsu in respect of Horizon comes to an end in March 2017.
"Post Office's intention to move to a new system does not reflect any dissatisfaction or lack of confidence in Horizon. It is simply that the current contractual arrangements are due to expire."

So that's the public position. And there are a number of documents -- given the time I will just take your Lordship to a couple of them -- which suggest that there were concerns with both the overall IT system and also the back office aspects of that and the ability properly to control and understand the sorts of issues that would be required in reconciling data.

If we can go very briefly to $\{\mathrm{F} / 1557\}$, this is 22 October 2016, paragraph 3:
"Our back office also struggles with the complications of dealing differently with each of our many clients, heavily manual processes, reconciling
disparate sources of data, retrospective financial controls and a lack of flexibility . This backlog of challenges, poor support contracts and a lack of skills have led to a prohibitive cost of change, preventing the about improvements that should occur as part of a business as usual."

And if we go then forward please to $\{\mathrm{F} / 1587 / 1\}$.
This is a draft document dated 28 November 2016, so
I qualify it with the fact that it is a draft, and "Context" it says:
"This document forms an update to the IT strategy approved in July by the POL board. In July we outlined that IT was not fit for purpose, expensive and hard to change."

If we go to page 3 of that document $\{\mathrm{F} / 1587 / 3\}$, paragraph 1:
"The IT strategy outlined a view of the current state of technology within POL as failing to meet POL aspirations on any assessment lens (cost, risk, delivery or service )."

And paragraph 5:
"Our greatest 'run the business' risk areas where we are outside of appetite are age and state of the legacy environment (eg Horizon availability, back office estate, lack of resiliance and [disaster recovery] of

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core platforms ...) ..."
Then Mick 24.11.16 appears to be repeatedly referenced throughout this document. One of the main risk drivers over the page at $\{F / 1587 / 4\}$ is lack of a robust IT and controls environment in the table at paragraph 7, that's one of the main risk drivers identified in this document in November 2017. Then if we can just briefly go to the final version of that document at $\{F / 1610\}$, that's dated 30 January 2017 and your Lordship will note from that page that in context again the line that was in the draft has survived the considered review that doubtless took place before it was finalised :
"In July we outlined that IT was not fit for purpose, expensive and difficult to change."

And the conclusion refers to reporting on the IT strategy in July. And at page 2 \{F/1610/2\}, the first indented bullet point:
"We need to quickly rationalise and resolve misaligned contracts enacted to support legacy IT, obsolescence, a lack of PO technical competence, particular focus on Fujitsu and Accenture."

And on page 3 of that document $\{F / 1610 / 3\}$ at bullet point 1 :
"The IT strategy outlined a view of the current
state of technology within PO as failing to meet PO aspirations on any assessment lens ..."

Which is the quote I have already identified to your Lordship. And quite a lot more of the same. The only last page I would refer your Lordship to just very briefly -- we will have to go to these in more detail with other witnesses, but at page 8 of that document $\{F / 1610 / 8\}$ there's a diagram on page 8 and it is introduced by the bullet point just above it:
"The following highlights the current operational risk areas referred to earlier in the document and the initiatives underway or proposed ... to migrate these into risk appetite - purple - severe risk, red high risk, amber - within appetite but attention required ..."

And your Lordship will note that the Horizon branch systems box is in red in the Post Office 's own internal document.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Which means it is high risk.
MR GREEN: It means it is high risk.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR GREEN: My Lord, in overview then, your Lordship will be hearing some important factual evidence which we respectfully say is going to be an absolutely essential bedrock for the experts then to give their considered 77
opinions on, after the factual evidence that Post Office has put forward has been properly tested, because I'm afraid we've got some aspirational "would have" evidence and conclusions feeding through into the expert reports.

The three key points are the parties radically differ on their approach to working out the answers. We are going to commend the approach of what actually happened rather than the hypotheses. The second is that we are confident that the factual enquiry that will be undertaken will enable your Lordship to have a more robust basis for drawing any inferences as to the answers than without it. And the final point is that the question of robustness we respectfully say, while relevant, is not going to be the determinative prism through which those issues fall to be answered.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Final question. Trial management, we are starting with Mr Latif tomorrow.
MR GREEN: My Lord, yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: He is on the video, is that right?
MR GREEN: He is. He is travelling specially to Islamabad to get a better connection.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: In view of time difference do you want to start at 10 rather than 10.30 ?
MR GREEN: My Lord I think it is all teed up for 10.30 .
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That's fine. I need not interfere any
more.
Okay, so 2 o'clock.
( 1.00 pm )
(The luncheon adjournment)
( 2.00 pm )
Opening submissions by MR DE GARR ROBINSON
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, good afternoon. I will just say something briefly first of all about the claimants' history, Mr Green's history, of how we got here. He devotes 25 pages of his opening submissions to those questions. My submission is that those questions are mostly a distraction from the important questions in this case, which is the Horizon issues. Many of the points that he makes are unfair and some of them we say are downright wrong, but I will not take up time I don't have in addressing them in this opening. Instead, subject to your Lordship, I propose to deal with them in writing in our written closings. If I have time at the end of these submissions I may say a few brief things about some of them, but I suspect I won't have time.

Laying those points to one side, the Horizon issue consists of 15 questions and, as your Lordship will have seen from our submissions, we say they can be conveniently divided into three groups. In descending order of importance, the first question is is Horizon

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robust or does it cause branch shortfalls? The second group of questions can be summarised as was Fujitsu -because we are talking about Fujitsu here -- secretly manipulating Horizon data? And then thirdly there's a miscellany of factual questions about the function and operation of the system.

Your Lordship has already heard from Mr Green indicating that the operational/functional issues are largely agreed. Despite the apparent differences between the experts on proper analysis we say there is no material disagreement between them. They are agreed, for example, that subpostmasters could run over 100 different types of report covering transactions conducted at the branch. In the ordinary course these reports would show enough information for a subpostmaster to be able to balance his or her accounts.

My Lord, these reports can be used to identify the causes of some types of discrepancies but not others because to do more would require knowledge of complex back-end systems which subpostmasters cannot be expected to have and for your Lordship's note that's in the second joint statement at paragraph 9.3 \{D1/2/39\}.

It is important to note that it is not suggested by the claimants that the -- or at least by Mr Coyne at any
rate -- that subpostmasters should be given direct access to information of a back-end kind and indeed in his second report your Lordship will note that Mr Coyne positively disclaims any suggestion of that sort. He deals with that at paragraph 5.380 which is at \{D2/4/225\}.

So why are those issues here? They are here because it is the claimants' pleaded case that there was something wrong with the way in which Horizon was designed and operated for subpostmasters. For example, they say there was an asymmetry of information which was inappropriate. Horizon did not give them the information that they should have done. Amongst other things, the suggestion seems to be that it should have notified them of bugs, it should have given them far more information than it did to enable them to dispute shortfalls.

Your Lordship will see that from paragraph 19.3 of the generic particulars of claim. I won't take your Lordship to it but for your note the reference is $\{C 3 / 1 / 7\}$, where there is a reference to limitations on subpostmasters' ability to access, identify and reconcile transactions recorded on Horizon and the lack of any or any adequate report writing features as repeatedly raised by Mr Bates.

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Now, that is what is noted by Dr Worden in his first report and he discerns an assumption, he says, in the claimants' case that there is something wrong with the level of information that's provided to subpostmasters and your Lordship will see that, for example, in paragraph 954 of his first report, the reference to which is $\{\mathrm{D} 3 / 1 / 213\}$.

My Lord, in my submission he correctly discerned that allegation in the claimants' case, but in Mr Coyne's second report, paragraph 5.380, that's \{D2/4/226\}, Mr Coyne has now firmly disassociated himself from that suggestion. So that's good news, it means we can put that aspect of the claimants' case to one side.

But the claimants' opening does go further. It spends a great deal of time addressing the effectiveness of the information that was provided to subpostmasters, the reports that are covered in the functional and operational issues. In my respectful submission, that is unnecessary and inappropriate for the purposes of this trial. It is not a Horizon issue -- the effectiveness of those reports, what can be done with them is not a Horizon issue. Whether in any given case a report is sufficient to enable a subpostmaster to identify the root cause of a discrepancy depends on the
nature of the discrepancy that he or she is faced with. It is essentially a breach issue and it is not something that should take any time up in this trial. There is already quite enough to be arguing about.

So we can put the operational issues largely to one side. We say, as your Lordship will be well aware, that the critical issue is one of robustness. The claimants seem to think that this is the wrong question. Indeed, they criticise Post Office for seeking to include it in the Horizon issues, even though all that Post Office did was seek to formulate issues that reflected the pleadings.

Now, why is robustness critical ? It is explained in our opening at paragraphs 23 to 26 . When the court decides individual claims an important question will be whether Post Office can generally rely on accounting data from Horizon as evidence of what the postmaster or his staff keyed in at the relevant time, or whether the relevant claimant can say the court should infer or presume that the shortfall shown by the accounting data was caused by a bug. The question of robustness is not dispositive of that question. What the court decides in any breach trial will depend on the evidence of that particular case. For example, it could be shown that the shortfall was caused by a particular bug operating

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in a particular way at a particular time, or it could be shown that the shortfall was caused by a particular transaction correction and that that transaction correction was erroneous, but these are individual breach issues which will turn on the facts of the individual breach trials. This trial is to decide the generic issues. Hence the wording of the Horizon issues themselves. I don't know whether your Lordship has a copy of --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, the ones I' m using are at your annex.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Well, I'm grateful.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: They are in a few places but it seemed the most useful.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes, we hoped that would be helpful to your Lordship.

Issue 1:
"To what extent was it possible or likely for bugs, errors or defects of the nature alleged to the effects ..."

Set out there. Your Lordship will note that the issue did not stop at the word "possible". It is common ground that it's possible. No one is claiming that Horizon is perfect, no one has ever claimed that Horizon is perfect. The interesting question is not whether
it's possible; we know it has happened. The interesting question is whether it is likely.

Similarly with issue 3 :
"To what extent and in what respects is the Horizon system robust and extremely unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls in branches?"

That asks an extent question. It asks a likelihood question. Why? Because as I have sought to explain to your Lordship, that's a useful issue which will then have a bearing on the conduct of breach trials to be conducted in the future.

Similarly with issue 4 :
"To what extent has there been potential for errors in data recorded within Horizon to arise in data entry and so on?"

Again, it is another extent question. And, my Lord, in paragraph 6, Horizon issue 6:
"To what extent did measures and/or controls that existed in Horizon prevent, detect, identify, report, or reduce to an extremely low level the risk of the following ..."

That's a risk question, an extent of risk question.
So, as I say, my Lord, the critical question that's raised by the Horizon issues, the relevant Horizon issues here is not whether it's possible that bugs have 85
occurred in Horizon which have caused branch shortfalls ; we know it's possible, it's actually happened. That's not even an issue on the pleadings, my Lord. The critical issue is the issue that's raised in paragraph 16 of the generic defence and perhaps I could ask your Lordship to look at that. It 's at bundle \{C3/3/5\}. Paragraph 16 reads:
"Highly generalised and speculative allegations are made that Horizon ... is unreliable or vulnerable to manipulation and thus may have been the root cause of some of the losses in branches. Like any IT system, Horizon is not perfect, but Post Office maintains that it is robust and that it is extremely unlikely to be the cause of losses in branches."

My Lord, that means it is extremely unlikely -- in any given case, when you see a loss in a branch, it is extremely unlikely that that loss is going to be caused by a bug.

So, as I say, my Lord, the question is not whether it's possible for Horizon to create shortfalls, the question is whether in relation to any given shortfall Horizon is likely or unlikely, or extremely unlikely, to have caused those shortfalls. In my submission that's the essential question at the heart of this trial. It will allow the parties to know whether at any breach
trial the accounting information on Horizon for the relevant branch and the relevant month is a valid generally reliable starting point.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I'm not in any way being difficult ,
I think we may as well just deal with it upfront at the beginning. Am I to read "robust" as meaning "extremely unlikely to be the cause", or is there more meaning to "robust" than that? Because I think whatever it is, we all have to make sure we are using the word the correct way, or the same way.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: The concept of robustness is a concept which involves reducing to an appropriate low level of risk, the risk of problems in Horizon causing shortfalls which have a more than transient effect on branches. So it involves both measures to prevent bugs arising in the first place but those measures are never going to be perfect and it includes measures which operate once a bug has actually occurred and triggered a result. It is both aspects of the equation.

I don't say that the word "robust" necessarily means "extremely low level of risk", but what we say is that if you have a robust system it produces a result in which the system works well in the overwhelming majority of cases and when it doesn't work well there are measures and controls in place to reduce to a very small

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level the risk of bugs causing non-transient lasting shortfalls in any given set of branch accounts.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right, thank you very much.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: So it is not necessary or indeed in my submission appropriate to investigate all the bugs or errors that have ever been found in Horizon if those bugs have no real impact on branch accounts. There simply isn't the time for that.

The important thing is to focus on bugs which have a financial impact on the branch accounts. And, as I have already sought to explain to your Lordship, one needs to bear in mind that robustness does not mean bugs can't occur, or will almost never occur; it includes the controls and measures which have the effect that when they do occur they are likely, very likely, to be picked up and remedied.

One consequence of that is that some bugs may have an effect on branch accounts which is only going to be transient because the system supporting Horizon will pick up the impact and correct it as night follows day in the ordinary course of the business.

Let me give your Lordship an example. The example of remming in and remming out. My learned friend spent some time this morning explaining the Dalmellington bug and what he described as linked bugs, some other linked
bugs that were also dealt with in the report that your Lordship saw. Actually those other bugs were separate bugs -- they had a similar symptom but they were separate bugs.

In remming it is an easy case. It is particularly easy when it is an internal rem, as it were, from the branch to an outreach branch. There are a very small number of outreach branches. But also more generally when you are remming in cash that has been provided by Post Office and is sent to the branch, the Post Office will have its own record of how much money was sent out and the branch will have its own record of how much money was received. If those two numbers don't reconcile that is going to be picked up as night follows day and that is going to be the result of some process which will result in the problem being resolved. Your Lordship will have seen from the Dalmellington bug report itself that you saw this morning that a large number of the impacts that were discussed in the course of that report were sorted out by transaction corrections without the need for any intervention by Fujitsu or anybody else.

In fact, Fujitsu still fixed those bugs, your Lordship will note, so Fujitsu picked up on the bugs even though they weren't the result of reports from

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subpostmasters to Fujitsu. So Fujitsu itself -- it's quite a good example of how problems in the system, in reconciliation, will result in Fujitsu becoming aware of things because of its own automatic systems and sorting them out. But the important point is that it will be extraordinarily rare for a remming in or a remming out problem ever to produce a result that would have a lasting effect that will cause a branch to suffer a shortfall which leaves it powerless to resist. That's simply not in the nature of the remming process and the reconciliation processes that are associated with it.

While dealing with reconciliation, my learned friend I noticed tried to kick me in the heels by inviting me to state what my case is on reconciliation generally and transaction corrections --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I always ignore those sorts of comments. MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, it is a tempting thing for him to do, I understand why he did it, perhaps I would have done it if I was in his position, but the important thing to note is that the reconciliation process, we all know how it works, it is essentially automated and discrepancies are picked up between the system and when discrepancies are picked up they are then investigated.

There isn't enough time in this trial to investigate the processes -- and there are many of them -- by which
discrepancies are investigated. It simply wouldn't be possible and that's why those issues were positively excluded from the Horizon issues. There was a debate about it and that part of the process was excluded and that's why your Lordship will see from Horizon issues 5 and 15 which deal with reconciliation and TCs, your Lordship will see that those questions are essentially factual.

So to the extent that my learned friend is suggesting that one can only have a Horizon trial if one had disclosure of every single reconciliation process that has been operating in Post Office or Horizon for the last 20 years and every single transaction correction that's ever been sent in the last 20 years, my learned friend is in my respectful submission obviously wrong.

Now, does that mean, as my learned friend would like to pretend, that it is therefore not possible to have a trial of the robustness question? And the answer is : obviously not. We all know that the process by which reconciliation happens means that where there are irreconcilable figures, where there are discrepancies between figures that should be the same, they will be looked at and in the vast majority of cases they will result in conversations, they will result in enquiries,

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which will cause the problem to be resolved in a satisfactory way.

My learned friend wants to say "Well, sometimes" -it being a human process -- "sometimes the corrective process will come to the wrong conclusion." Well, my Lord, that doesn't alter the fact that the process itself is a corrective process, it's a process that will tend to improve the reliability of the ultimate figures rather than take away from the reliability of the ultimate figures.

So, my Lord, that's the very short answer to my learned friend's question. If he wants a longer one, or if your Lordship wants a longer one, we can of course discuss it later.

My Lord, another example of measures which prevent problems from arising is in relation to recoverable transactions. Your Lordship will have seen some discussion of recoverable transaction in the expert reports and also in some of the witness statements. So, for example, when the system crashes, there's a power failure or something similar, it is always possible that a transaction being undertaken at the branch will not at that point have reached the Horizon system, for example because the outage occurs before the basket for the relevant transaction is closed. It is when the basket
is closed that the transaction gets added to the branch's Horizon accounts.

Now, in that situation the accounts will not show the transaction that has been done and it might be that that transaction has already resulted in cash having changed hands. My Lord, does that mean there's a problem in Horizon? Is that the result of a bug which is a matter of some criticism? My Lord, the answer is no because what Horizon does have is a system which enables the transaction that hasn't been recovered to be identified and your Lordship will see from the witnesses who are addressing this issue, Mrs Burke for example, that the unrecovered transaction was actually specifically identified to her and your Lordship will also see that Post Office, because of its own reconciliation processes, was aware of it and was able to deal with it and Mrs Burke's -- or rather Mr Burke's branch did not suffer a lasting loss as a result of what happened on that day.

So, my Lord, those are just two very broad examples of mechanisms in place that have a tendency to reduce to an even smaller level the risk of lasting discrepancies, lasting shortfalls being inflicted on branch accounts as a result of bugs.

But to take a step back, the critical point I would
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like to address your Lordship on is that it is not helpful simply to ask the question whether it is possible that there are bugs out there which affect branch accounts. We know it is possible. The question is, the interesting question for your Lordship is whether bugs are likely or unlikely to affect a given set of branch accounts in a given month in a given breach trial and, my Lord, on that question possibility is not the same as probability. You can't simply say "Well, it's possible it happened", that's not enough.

Now, in their submissions the claimants at times appear to recognise this, but neither they nor their expert Mr Coyne acts on it. My learned friend took your Lordship to paragraph 17 of the claimants' opening submissions this morning. Perhaps we could have another look at that. It is at $\{A / 1 / 9\}$. The claimants say:
"As to the precise wording of the issues, the claimants previously made clear that they consider the wording of some of the issues insisted upon by Post Office to be unhelpful, but their inclusion was ultimately agreed by the claimants in order to reach agreement with Post Office. Post Office had very clear views on two particular points.
"First, on issue 1 (Robustness): Post Office was insistent on including this issue, formulated by the
defendant is whether Horizon is 'robust' and 'extremely unlikely' to cause shortfalls. This reflects language pleaded in [the defence], and indeed 'robustness' has been one of Post Office's 'narrative boxes' and a favoured term in Post Office's public relations pronouncements ... Coincidentally or otherwise, it has also featured in the NFSP's defence of Post Office relied upon by Mrs Van den Bogerd. However, as the claimants made clear in their [reply], whereas the claimants' is that it is relatively robust and has become more robust over time - but not so as to be an answer to the Claim (and in so far as 'robustness' has, in this case, a sufficiently clear meaning-addressed further herein). The combination of Horizon's admitted imperfections (and discovered bugs and remote access) and the volume of many millions of transactions, 14 is entirely consistent with the levels of errors reflected in the Claimants' case."

My Lord, two points are being made in that paragraph. The first one I can deal with quickly. It's that the claimants' own case is that Horizon is relatively robust.

The second point is that the combination of admitted imperfections -- and I apprehend my learned friend would now say the impressions that have been shown as a result

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of Mr Coyne's analysis -- and the volume of the many millions of transactions that are done through Horizon, is consistent with the level of shortfalls in relation to which the claimants make their claims in this litigation.

My Lord, as to the first point, it is simply wrong. Mr Green has shown you paragraph 37 of his reply, that's at bundle $\{C 3 / 4 / 21\}$, where it is specifically denied that Horizon is robust. So on the pleadings at least it is not the claimants' case that Horizon is relatively robust, the claimants obviously don't like that, but after seeing the expert evidence the claimants, as I apprehend Mr Green, are now admitting the central issue which was previously denied. In my submission that's a major achievement from having this trial. In my further submission it is the opposite of unhelpful to have raised it as an issue in this trial.

My Lord, the second point -- perhaps we could look at paragraph 37 -- well, we can pick it up in paragraph 17.2. What the claimants are saying is that the relatively small chance of bugs in Horizon, because of the volume of transactions undertaken in Horizon, is likely they say to produce the very picture that's reflected in the claimants' case.

Now, what's important to understand about that is
that the claimants are relying on the concept of likelihood to support their case, so, as in my submission they have to, they are groping towards a numbers argument, the very kind of numbers argument that Dr Worden makes in his reports and about which they have so many critical things to say in their submissions. They say that the level of bugs in Horizon is likely to reflect the fact of the claimants' case. But what's entirely unstated in their evidence is how the level of bugs encountered in Horizon is likely to produce anything like the $£ 18.7$ million of shortfalls that the claimants say should not have been included in their accounts. My Lord, and it is unsupported by their expert who refuses point blank to engage in any numerical analysis at all and yet at the same time they criticise Dr Worden for trying.

So in my submission, my Lord, the claimants are in an awkward position. In making the case which I have just referred to in paragraph 17.1 they are engaging in an intellectual process which their own expert refuses to engage in and which when Dr Worden tries to engage in it they then criticise him.

The best that they can say is that having found 29 bugs it is possible that other bugs have arisen, but they won't say anything about how likely it is other 97
bugs have arisen, how big the effects of those bugs are likely to be, they won't engage in any kind of questions of that sort at all.

Now, in their submissions the claimants say that they will challenge Dr Worden's numerical analyses.
That is to be welcomed. It will assist your Lordship to assist the soundness of his calculations. At the moment there is no engagement really by Mr Coyne with any questions of likelihood or extent, there are just some criticisms made of some of the assumptions that Dr Worden makes in his report.

Now, it is worth noting that Dr Worden has a number of different calculations, some of which are more complicated and some of which involve more assumptions than others. Let me just deal with one very simple calculation. This requires no understanding of statistics or mathematics. It is set out in section 8.5 of Dr Worden's first report which starts at $\{D 3 / 1 / 148\}$ and it has changed a little bit in Dr Worden's second report but we don't need to address that in any detail at this stage.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I should just tell you for interest I do understand mathematics and statistics. I'm not being funny, but I do.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: No, that's very helpful, my Lord.

I thought I did, my Lord, I have several maths A-levels, but I realised that my own sense of my own mathematical abilities was rather greater than it turned out to be.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I mean this one is just a simple multiplication, isn't it?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Exactly.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I think most school children would probably follow this one.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Exactly. It is one I understand:
Over the period 2000 to 2018 the Post Office has had on average 13,650 branches. That means that over that period it has had more than 3 million sets of monthly branch accounts. It is nearly 3.1 million but let's call it 3 million and let's ignore the fact for the first few years branch accounts were weekly. That doesn't matter for the purposes of this analysis.

Against that background let's take a substantial bug like the Suspense Account bug which affected 16 branches and had a mean financial impact per branch of $£ 1,000$. The chances of that bug affecting any branch is tiny. It is 16 in 3 million, or 1 in 190,000-odd. The chances of affecting a claimant branch are even tinier because the claimant branches tended to be smaller than ordinary branches. One could engage in all sorts of calculations, but your Lordship may recall from

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Dr Worden's second report that he ends up with
a calculation of a chance of about 1 in 427,000 -odd. So for there to be a 1 in 10 chance for a bug of this scale to affect one set of monthly account for a claimant branch, one would need something like 42,000 such bugs.

Of course there's a much simpler way of doing it which really is just a straight calculation. There have been 3 million sets of monthly accounts so the chances of the Suspense Account bug affecting any given set of monthly accounts is 60 in 3 million or about 5 in a million, so to get a one in 10 chance of such a bug you would need to have 50,000 bugs like it .

But, my Lord, all the roads lead to the same basic result which is that even for a significant bug of that sort, the number of bugs that would need to exist in order to have any chance of generating even a portion of the losses that are claimed by the claimants would be a wild number that's beyond the dreams of avarice. It is untenable to suggest that there are 40,000 or 50,000 bugs of that scale going undetected in Horizon for 20 years.

Dr Worden explains that in paragraphs 643 and 644 of his first report and the reference to that is \{D3/1/152\}. And it is interesting, my Lord, that the claimants very sensibly do not suggest that there will
have been bugs of that scale in that number operating -lurking secretly in Horizon for the last 20 years and they don't suggest it because they can't. It's a matter of common sense. And in my respectful submission just that calculation demonstrates that the claim made at the end of paragraph 17.1 of the claimants' submissions is untenable. A combination of Horizon's impressions with the volume of transactions done in Horizon is not entirely consistent with the errors reflected in the claimants' case. In my respectful submission it is obviously inconsistent with that.

Just to be clear, that's not to say that a claimant could not have been hit by a bug. As I hope I have made clear to your Lordship, Horizon is not perfect. It remains a possibility, but the important point is how unlikely it is. But of course the question of whether an individual claimant has suffered an impact as a result of a bug is not a point for this trial. That is a breach issue to be dealt with in an individual case. This trial is about setting a baseline for Horizon's reliability, not a final conclusion that will govern every single breach case that comes before your Lordship.

Now, before addressing the expert reports on robustness it is worth noting the large measure of
agreement that now exists between the experts. There is no dispute about the architecture or capabilities of Horizon. There's no suggestion that Horizon lacks important capabilities or that it doesn't generally perform satisfactorily . There is no suggestion of any systemic problem lurking in Horizon.

In short, it is accepted that Horizon works well for the overwhelming majority of cases and consistently with that it is now common ground between the experts that Horizon is robust and that its robustness has improved over time and your Lordship already has the reference, it is the joint statement, the third joint statement, page 2, \{D1/4/2\}.

Now, what does relatively robust mean? It means robust as compared with comparable systems -- big systems, systems that keep aircraft in the air, that run power stations and that run banks.

My Lord, by the same token it is common ground that the Horizon is not infallible . It has and will continue to suffer faults every now and then. Sometimes, in a really small number of cases, those faults will have an effect on branch accounts, but it should be remembered that robustness is not just about preventing bugs from appearing in the first place, it is also about limiting the lasting detrimental effects when they do

## appear.

Your Lordship will hear evidence that bugs affecting branch accounts are given a high priority when they are addressed by Fujitsu. They are not ignored. And, my Lord, the evidence also shows that bugs which have an effect on branch accounts occur only very rarely indeed. There is a dispute between the experts as to precisely how rarely, but in the context of a huge system that's been in continuous operation for 20 years, that dispute in my submission does not have a material bearing on the outcome of this trial. In the overwhelming majority of cases, branch accounts will not contain a shortfall caused by a bug and the scale of bugs that would be needed to undermine that simple fact would be enormous.

Putting the point another way, the difference now being played out between the experts is at the margins. They accept that there are imperfections in the Horizon system with the result that in some rare cases bugs affecting branch accounts occur and will not be immediately fixed. The issue between them is how slight are the relevant imperfections.

The scale of this difference is magnified by the adversarial process but in the scheme of things, in my submission, it is in fact tiny and to plagarise Lord Justice Lewison in section 1 of his first chapter

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in the interpretation of contracts, the lazy reader can stop here.

My Lord, we say that what is already common ground between the parties means that the claimants must fail in their primary endeavour to persuade the court to draw the inference or make the presumption that they want the court to make or to draw or make, to the effect that when faced with a shortfall in a set of branch accounts the shortfall was caused by a bug in Horizon.

Now, against that background let me say a few words about the experts. The claimants submissions are most unfair to Dr Worden. Your Lordship will see those at $\{A / 1 / 33\}$. First of all, it is quite wrong to accuse him of bias. He is an independent expert whose views are his own. He is not a mouthpiece for Post Office's case and the claimants should not be suggesting that he is, as I see that they appear to do in their submissions.

Secondly, the submissions give the impression that Dr Worden's analysis is limited to the three admitted bugs that -- the three bugs that were discussed with Second Sight and that were then the subject of the pre-action correspondence and your Lordship gets that from paragraph 156 of their submissions $\{A / 1 / 54\}$ where they say:
"Dr Worden's analysis extrapolates from only three
bugs which happen to be those previously acknowledged by Post Office. It appears that Post Office had not disclosed to him the existence of other bugs, which he could not have taken into account."

My Lord, that is an unfair and incorrect account of the evidence that's given by -- or will be given by Dr Worden.

If your Lordship would go to Dr Worden's first report, annex D -- and, my Lord, it starts at \{D3/2/95\} -- your Lordship will see a very lengthy appendix which describes itself as containing:
"... some tables of KELs which are referred to in the report. The tables are:
" First a sample of 30 randomly selected KELs ( selection of every 100th KEL in alphabetically sorted list ), with commentary on the robustness countermeasures which acted in the case of each KEL, as well as its potential financial impact."

Then secondly:
" 62 KELs mentioned in Mr Coyne's report, for which I have also analysed which robustness countermeasures applied and analysed the possible impact on branch accounts."

Third:
"A further sample of 50 randomly selected KELs (also
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every 100th KEL in an alphabetically sorted list ) which
I have analysed for possible financial impact, but
I have not tabulated my analysis for robustness countermeasures."

And fourth:
"A sample of 50 KELs which each include the symbol ' $£$ ' in their text - because in my opinion, this makes them more likely to be concerned with possible financial impact on branch accounts."

So your Lordship will see that Dr Worden was not simply looking at the three admitted bugs and then performing all sorts of mind games on the basis of those bugs, nor did he overlook and ignore the Dalmellington bug which Mr Green addressed your Lordship on this morning; he looked at all of them. He looked at more than just the bugs that were identified by Mr Coyne, he took random selections and he tried to use a form of searching which would disclose bugs that were more likely to have a financial impact on branch accounts.

So, my Lord, that's a first point I should make to your Lordship. It would be quite wrong to proceed, as I apprehend my learned friend would have you proceed, on the basis that Mr Coyne has done an in-depth analysis of the problems in Horizon, whereas Dr Worden has just looked at some pretty pictures about three admitted
bugs. That isn't what Dr Worden did at all .
My Lord, the second point I should note is that in his second report Dr Worden increased the number of KELs and PEAKs that -- I should say he looked at the associated PEAKs as well, he didn't just look at KELs -he increased the number of samples that he reviewed to 200.

And thirdly I need to make it clear to your Lordship that the review that he conducted was thorough, we say much more thorough than Mr Coyne's review. What Mr Coyne intended to do -- this will be obviously investigated with the witnesses -- is Mr Coyne tended to find phrases in particular documents that indicated a problem and he would stop there. He didn't, for example, seek to ascertain in JC1, in his first report, he didn't seek to ascertain whether any particular bugs would actually have a branch effect at all. That's not the exercise that he did. What he did in his first report was just find as many problems as he could. But what Dr Worden did was he considered both potential branch impact and he considered the operation of the countermeasures in practice.

Your Lordship will apprehend that Dr Worden is criticised for engaging in some kind of armchair analysis of countermeasures on the basis of design

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aspirations. My Lord, that characterisation is quite unfair, we would say. But more importantly what Dr Worden did is that he looked at the operation of the system, the PEAKs and the KELs relating to particular problems, and he looked to see how the countermeasures he had identified he had seen built into the system, how those countermeasures worked in any particular case. My Lord, that's an important function to perform if one is engaged in the process of seeking to obtain a balanced view of the robustness or otherwise of an IT system and it is important to note that it is not something that Mr Coyne did at all, certainly not in his first report. Even in his second report he goes no further than saying "Well, there are some bugs which were missed by the countermeasures." Well, my Lord, so there are, of course there are going to be bugs that get missed by all countermeasures. It is not suggested that it is impossible for bugs to arise which have a lasting impact on branch accounts. The critical question is how likely it is that such bugs will lurk in the system and be undetected in the way that the claimants would have you find.

It is in that respect worth noting that Dr Worden found more bugs with non-transient branch impacts than Mr Coyne did in his report and your Lordship will see
that from our opening submissions at paragraph 219.3 and for your Lordship's note the reference is $\{A / 2 / 76\}$.

Your Lordship will be aware that of the 29 bugs that are now listed in JS2, Dr Worden thinks there is evidence to suggest there may be up to 12 bugs that had a non-transient financial effect on branch accounts. Of those 12 it is worth noting that Dr Worden identified five of them.

So this is not a case, my Lord, where some kind of blindfold -- the picture that my learned friend seeks to paint of the process that Post Office went through and the process that Dr Worden undertook in arriving at his report was one in which he was blindfolded by Post Office and somehow stumbled into providing a positive report which just considered the three bugs that Post Office had already identified. My Lord, that's simply a travesty of the true facts.

On the basis of the documents he reviewed, Dr Worden took a balanced view of the design of Horizon and its countermeasures and of the operation in practice of its countermeasures as evidenced by PEAKs and KELs and associated documents. My Lord, and he also took a balanced view of the service history of Horizon, the support function provided by Fujitsu and its efficiency.

Now, that will be a battleground in the rest of this 109
trial, I know, but even the documents that your Lordship saw this morning with the Dalmellington bug, your Lordship will see the rigour that's applied.
There's concern that postmasters aren't given advice that might be incorrect. The rigour associated with that process and the determination of Fujitsu and the other people involved, the other stakeholders, to get to the bottom of what happened is quite striking in my submission.

In relation to the Dalmellington bug they did get to the bottom of what had happened. They identified 112 potential branches with financial impact, 108 of which had been fixed or made good. Of the other four only two had a significant problem and, my Lord, of those two further research showed that those two branches were not actually affected by the Dalmellington bug at all, they just had similar symptoms that were the result of an entirely separate cause and that were fixed entirely separately and my learned friend gave you I think the reference to the document which shows that.

So by January 2016 the Dalmellington bug had been fully investigated and it was quite clear what the results of that bug were and my learned friend seeks to suggest that there was more investigation to be done and that Post Office somehow stopped that further
investigation being done. That's not right at all. By January 2016 Dalmellington had been fully analysed and its consequences bottomed out and my learned friends took your Lordship to a number of emails from Post Office, they were from July 2016, six months later.

So, my Lord, Dr Worden's conclusion is that Horizon is well designed and well supported by a team of people who have been working on it from the start and who are very thorough when investigating possible bugs and your Lordship will I'm sure bear in mind Mr Parker's witness statement where he says that they would keep going until they spotted the problem. My Lord, that's Mr Parker's second witness statement at paragraphs 20 to 23 and for the transcript it is at $\{E 2 / 12 / 7\}$.

Now, contrast the work that Dr Worden did with the work that Mr Coyne did. In the first joint report before the experts even did their work on -- produced their reports, he said that he was going to look for bugs. And the reference is \{D1/1/3-4\}. Now, of course both parties were looking for bugs, but Dr Worden, as I say, found more branch-affecting bugs than Mr Coyne did with lasting effects . But, my Lord, Dr Worden tried to do more than that. He tried to take a balanced view of how Horizon operated in practice and how well its countermeasures operated in fact and that is something

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that Mr Coyne didn't do and as a result it shows a want of quality of his analysis, we would submit.

Now, let's look at the bugs in issue. Could I ask your Lordship to go to bundle $\{D 1 / 2 / 3\}$ which is the joint statement, the second joint statement. If we could pick it up at page 3, my Lord. Now, it is a long table. It looks as if the experts are moving away from each other, but in fact it's a very useful list. This represents the first opportunity the experts have had to identify where they agree and where they disagree on these bugs and to explain what they say about them. I'm not sure how we would have managed if a document like this hadn't been produced.

It is worth bearing in mind how we arrived at this list of 29. Your Lordship will see the heading "Table of bugs/errors/defects with acknowledged or disagreed evidence of financial impact". Mr Coyne's first report didn't specifically look at branch-affecting bugs. His report was more a catalogue of bugs of all sorts and all shapes and sizes. It was a scattergun analysis. A few of the bugs that he identified at great length were branch-affecting.

Now, it was Dr Worden who looked for branch-affecting bugs and in his first report he noted what Mr Coyne had done and what he had not done. The
result was that Mr Coyne responded in his second report, which starts at $\{\mathrm{D} 2 / 4 / 1\}$ and in his second report -- and my learned friend took you to it this morning -- at paragraph 3.21 of that report he set out a table consisting of 22 bugs, of which 21 were said to be branch-affecting and, my Lord, the reference is \{D2/4/15\}.

Several of those bugs had not been seen before, had not been mentioned before. So in JR2, this was the first opportunity that Dr Worden had to comment on and address those bugs and through discussion between the experts, seven additional bugs were added to the list. Bugs 23 to 26 are bugs that are referred to in paragraph 742 of Dr Worden's first report, the reference to which is $\{\mathrm{D} 3 / 1 / 170\}$ and these are identified as potentially branch-affecting bugs and those were added, they were not already part of Mr Coyne's 22 bugs.

Bugs 27 to 29 were added as a result of discussions between the experts.

So if we look at the heading of the table, bugs with acknowledged or disagreed evidence of lasting financial impact $\{\mathrm{D} 1 / 2 / 3\}$. So I think we are intended to take it that this is a table consisting of 29 bugs which Mr Coyne says all have financial impact.

It is acknowledged that there is evidence in 12
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cases for lasting financial impact and the ones where they are acknowledged, my Lord, just for your note, it is bug 1 , which is a receipts and payments mismatch and your Lordship will see from Dr Worden's comments that a subpostmaster report wasn't necessary for that bug. Bug number 2, that's the Callendar Square bug. Bug number 3, that's the Suspense Account bug. And, my Lord, not Dalmellington because that would have been picked up as a normal remming reconciliation as night follows day.

By the way, contrary to the suggestion that the claimants at points make in their submissions, Dr Worden did analyse that bug in his first report.

Next is bug number 10 which is a Data Tree build bug which occurred very early in 1999 , right at the beginning of Horizon. It was very noticeable, says Dr Worden, and very quickly fixed.

Bug number 13, "Withdrawn stock discrepancies" and it may be worth noting that Dr Worden's opinion that it wouldn't have lasted very long.

Bug number 14, bureau discrepancies. Bug number 18, concurrent log-ins. Again that's a very early one in 1999, 1999/2000. Bug number 23, bureau de change. Bug number 24 , wrong branch customer change. Bug number 25 , like a top-up. Bug number 27, TPS. And bug number 28,

## drop and go.

My Lord, it is worth noting that there is a link to JR2. I would invite your Lordship to look at that link in due course. It is a link in which Dr Worden includes an assessment of the financial impact of those 12 bugs with his own base estimate and then a more generous, a more conservative estimate -- he describes it as conservative anyway -- favouring the claimants.

In fact could we look at that. It is the link to JR2 which is $\{D 1 / 2 / 1\}$. It might not be possible, perhaps not. Your Lordship can do it on Magnum anyway, your Lordship will see there is a link --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Is that the one-page document?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: It is two pages.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Is it? I thought it was one page.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Magnum seems to be disappeared. In any event --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: The mean impact spreadsheet?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes and then there is a second page which is his comments on it. So if your Lordship looks at the comments he says:
"This is an estimate of the mean financial impact on all branches across the Post Office network ..."
MR JUSTICE FRASER: The link is just coming up with the spreadsheet.

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MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I see. There should be a second tab to the spreadsheet. Is that not there?
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I'm not sure that's loaded on, because
I did have a look for this. I have seen this and
I haven't seen any text that goes with it.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I downloaded it from Magnum yesterday but it may be that it hadn't quite got --
MR GREEN: There is an "Explanation" tab, if you mean the one on there.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I see. You can't see it at the bottom of the screen.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I see. Does it go on forever?
MR GREEN: No, the "Explanation" tab.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I've got it now. Is that the one -- it has 13 cells with text in and the first says "This is an estimate".
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes. Can one click on the explanation of calculations on the second sheet?
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I think on Magnum the tab has dropped off the bottom of the common screen but there is a second page -- well, I've got mine up anyway, Mr De Garr Robinson.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm very grateful to your Lordship.
Your Lordship will see the first paragraph Dr Worden explains that he has estimated the mean financial impact
and he has given his central estimate in relation to 12
bugs. Second paragraph he says:
"For each of these bugs the table contains a very approximate estimate of the financial impact of the bug if that impact had not been corrected by Post Office in some way ..."

And your Lordship will appreciate I say that's a big " if ":
"... and my estimate of the probability that any financial impact would have been corrected. My central estimate of impact on the SPM reflects that probability whereas my conservative estimate does not."

Then he says:
"As can be seen from the table, my opinion is that the larger financial impacts would have been corrected with high probability. Smaller financial impacts might not have been corrected."

If your Lordship goes back to the table your Lordship will see there is a column -- the 12 bugs are identified that I have listed to your Lordship with the associated KELs where there is one. There's an estimate of financial impact column. Then there's a probability that the postmaster was compensated column and then there's Dr Worden's estimate of loss to postmasters and then on the final column there's a loss 117
to postmasters assuming that none of them were made good during reconciliation or other processes. So your Lordship sees --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: When you say "made good" though I think you need to be clear what you mean because "made good" has a technical meaning in terms of the accounting. I think you mean remedied.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I mean where there is a financial discrepancy caused in the accounts that discrepancy is corrected by some kind of financial transaction.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes. Because making good under the accounting system meant the SPM paying it in.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm so sorry. You are ahead of me.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That's why I'm just checking.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: It is the common issues trial nomenclature that I have to be careful of.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: But that's what you meant when you explained how you did just then. I understand.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes.
Your Lordship will see that Dr Worden's previous estimate had been $£ 1,000$. He increased that to $£ 2,029$. That's per SPM. But in the other column your Lordship will see "Total impact" of all these bugs was $£ 165,000$, mean impact per SPM who was affected, $£ 13,800$ and that compared with his previous estimate of $£ 6,000$. So the
figures have gone up a bit and as he explains in his commentary it is mainly because of the Data Tree build bug, the 1999 bug, of $£ 105,000$.

Your Lordship will see it is those sort of figures that then lead one to the calculation I explained to your Lordship before which leads one to a requirement of tens of thousands of these bugs in order to have any hope of being responsible for even a relatively small portion of the $£ 18.7$ million claims made by the claimants.

So that's the agreed bugs.
As regards the disagreed bugs, a number of short observations that I would like to advance to your Lordship.

First of all, Mr Coyne refers to bugs where there was no bug at all in the PEAK he has cited. This is something we will explore with him. For example, bug number 17 relates to branch customer discrepancies in Legacy Horizon. This was not caused by a bug in Horizon. The system crashed part way through a transaction for an unknown reason and then it was successfully detected and the missing transaction was recovered. I explained to your Lordship before how the recovery system works to identify transactions that may have been missed. That's not an example of a bug,

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that's an example of Horizon working. And it is worth noting, my Lord, that this issue was spotted not as a result of any human intervention by a subpostmaster, it was spotted as a result of an automated report that was available to Fujitsu.

My Lord, secondly, Mr Coyne includes bugs, we say, which were only found in testing and didn't make it into the live system. An example of that is bug number 21, dealing with transaction corrections issues. He makes a reference to one particular bug referring to a PEAK at \{F/314/1\}.

The important point to note about this bug is that it was eradicated before the relevant software even reached the live system. It was spotted in testing. That's what testing is for.

My Lord, a third point observation to make is that Mr Coyne includes bugs which have automatic fixes which Mr Coyne himself acknowledges. I have referred to remming in my opening already. Just one example would be bug 5 . It was a remming in issue. Mr Coyne's own analysis correctly records that this could cause a duplicate pouch of cash to be remmed in by the user causing a shortfall, but what he doesn't say is that Post Office's reconciliation processes check the pouches sent out by Post Office and pouches received by the
relevant branches, an automatic report is run which defects all sort of remittance discrepancies whether caused by user error, bugs or otherwise and then transaction corrections are generated to correct the problem. So it may be a bug, but, my Lord, it's a bug which in the ordinary course of things is almost never, if ever, going to result in a lasting loss to any subpostmaster.

Finally, there are some bugs which both experts agree had no financial impact, or at least one bug. My Lord, that's bug 21. So perhaps the heading to the table in the joint statement should be corrected. It's not 29 bugs that are said to have financial impact, it is 28 .

But whether it is 12 or 28 , my Lord, does not matter. In a system handling the volumes of transaction that Horizon handled, which was used by the number of branches that used it, over a period of 20 years, bugs of this number and scale can have no material impact on the overall robustness of Horizon, or putting the point more pertinently, the chances of one of these bugs affecting a given set of accounts is vanishingly small. Even if you sum them all up, the chances of any one of these bugs affecting a given set of accounts is vanishingly small.

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So what are we left with? We are left with a suggestion that it is possible that there are other undetected bugs in the system which may have an effect on branch accounts but, my Lord, as I have said possibility is not the same as probability. Mr Coyne does not say anything about probability. He makes no -in fact he disclaims any ability to make any inferences about how many bugs there are, what their scale is likely to be and what their impact is likely to be.

Now, in my respectful submission that is the approach which is not helpful. Mr Green and Mr Coyne describe it, in my submission rather curiously, as a bottom-up approach. It might be more accurate to refer to it as a bottom-down approach. Mr Coyne stays at the bottom, sticks just with the bugs that he has found and says nothing more, nothing about the implications of those bugs on the overall robustness of the Horizon system. He refuses to say anything on that question, so we are left with his agreement that the Horizon system is robust.

So he doesn't grapple with the critical question whether the court should infer or presume that the shortfall is shown in any given branch accounts was caused by a bug, my Lord, and it is not a realistic approach either. My Lord, it is common ground that if
you have a bug it may well have a range of impacts, some may be smaller, some may be larger, some may affect more than one branch, but in the scheme of things where you have a bug which has different effects on different people, one has to ask oneself what are the chances of that bug evading any detection by anyone as a result of any of its impacts at any time? That's always going to be relatively low. And if one were to postulate a tiny bug which had an impact of a few pence, my Lord, there would need to be millions of those bugs in order to begin to be significant, to have a significant bearing on the robustness of Horizon.

In the real world we are concerned with bigger bugs, with a wider range of impacts, such as the Suspense Account bug and I ask forensically or rhetorically : how likely is it that there are tens and tens of thousands of such bugs lurking in the system, escaping detection for year after year? In my submission the answer is obvious.

My Lord, before -- I perhaps have a few minutes just to address one point that has a bearing on robustness before moving on. Your Lordship will see both in the claimants' submissions and in Mr Coyne's report frequently repeated assertions that Post Office operated in accordance with the cost-benefit analysis. I think

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the impression is sought to be achieved that because Post Office addressed some problems by adopting a cost-benefit analysis, this means that the procedures in place for dealing with or identifying bugs and fixing them and so on were not robust, that there was some kind of threat to the system because Post Office was cutting corners or something like that. But, my Lord, one needs to be careful with the evidence that is cited in support of these claims. Many of the claims of this sort rely on two or three pieces of paper, no more than that.

It is worth looking at one example of the evidence that's relied on in this case. My Lord, it is the claim in paragraph 144.1 of the claimants' submissions \{A/1/50\}. I don't know if your Lordship has a hard copy of it there.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I do.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Your Lordship will see the claim made in 144.1:
"It has been identified that known issues/bugs were often deferred and dealt with on a cost-benefit basis."

So your Lordship will see the point and your Lordship will see exactly what they are trying to make of the point.

Footnote 105 refers to a paragraph in Mr Coyne's first report, paragraph 5.161. That paragraph refers to
a document which is at $\{F / 11 / 40\}$. This is minutes of 1 a risk and compliance committee on 16 September 2013 and your Lordship will see the attendees. If I could ask your Lordship to go forward --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Were any of those attendees legally qualified?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm so sorry?
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Are any of those attendees legally qualified?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, I'm not in a position to answer that question.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Maybe you could just find out because that might affect what I do in terms of ordering a review of the redactions, that's all.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, I should tell your Lordship that questions have been raised about redactions and a further review has been undertaken by my instructing solicitors and also by junior counsel --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: It has been done already, has it? MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right. I assume the result of that review was that they were properly redacted?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: The result of the review is that there are a relatively small number of cases where a different judgment call has been made, usually where one can see

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why a different decision was made, but in the main the redactions have remained.

My Lord, I can tell your Lordship that
Susan Crichton was general counsel.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Susan Crichton.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Who is the first attendee. In fact the chair.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Can you just -- not now, because I don't want to know now, but can you just identify for me on
how many separate occasions the review led to disclosure being made where they had previously been redacted, following the review you have just told me about. Not now.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I will find out.
If we could go forward to page $3\{F / 1140 / 3\}$ the document says:
"It was reported that following the recent Ernst \& Young external audit four risks [have] been identified. Three of the risks raised had been addressed, however the final risk, relating to the communication by Fujitsu of changes made to the Horizon system, was still outstanding.
"It was identified that it would cost over $£ 1$ million to implement the mitigation being suggested by the audit and that this was not proportionate to the
risk being managed."
And the decision made was that:
"The committee agreed that the risk be accepted with Dave Hulbert as the owner and Lesley Sewell being ultimately responsible."

My Lord, this is evidence that is asserted by Mr Coyne and adopted by the claimants as evidence that known issues/bugs were often deferred and dealt with on a cost-benefit basis. So you will see how high the claim is put, but it is worth looking at the Ernst \& Young report that's referred to. My Lord, that's at bundle \{F/1127\}, or rather a committee meeting which considers the Ernst $\&$ Young recommendations. This is a risk and compliance committee meeting relating to the acceptance of risk following Ernst $\mathcal{E}$ Young audit of 2012/2013. "Purpose":
"The purpose of this paper is to:
"Update the risk and compliance committee to a risk that IT\&C have 'accepted' following the 2012/13 Ernst \& Young IT audit.
"Background.
"2.1. The 2012/13 Ernst $\mathcal{E}$ Young IT audit found no significant exceptions but did identify a small number of improvement opportunities. Four high level improvement opportunities were recorded. Three have

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progressed and are either complete or in the process of completing. For one, IT\&C believe we have sufficient process and mitigation in place to accept this risk. This paper is to highlight this decision to the Risk \& Compliance Committee."

And paragraph 2.2 reads:
"The specific observation was with regard to change management monitoring control. The actual observation read 'management should make use of a system-generated list of changes in performing the monitoring control to further enhance its effectiveness '."

## 2.3:

"The risk being that changes may be made to the system that are not approved and not found through monitoring."

So it 's a process suggestion, my Lord, it's not something that has any bearing on the quality of any changes to the system.

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"The Post Office service management team currently monitor IT system changes on a monthly basis by cross-referencing known and approved changes against a list produced by Fujitsu. E\&Y observed that this could be enhanced if the list was generated by the IT system rather than by change records.
"IT service management engaged with Fujitsu to understand how this could be achieved and it was concluded a very difficult and potentially expensive approach to adopt this as all changes are recorded as 'events' within the IT system of which there are multiple thousands per day with changes only being a small percentage. The cost and difficulty in extracting these specific change events on a regular basis would outweigh the value in monitoring the change."

So the options considered were:
"1. Continue with the existing approach of using a list generated by the change records."

Or:
"2. Develop an approach with Fujitsu to generate a list from the IT system of events."

And then over the page, my Lord $\{F / 1127 / 2\}$ the proposal at paragraph 5:
"To continue with the existing process of monitoring but to additionally raise this as a risk within IT\&C and to monitor any exceptions found through the existing process. If exceptions are found then reconsider the proposal from E\&Y and assess the impact of the change versus the benefit."

And, my Lord, if we then go down to paragraph 7 "Key
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risks /mitigation":
"There is a risk that some changes may not be monitored using the existing process. In mitigation of this, the current process has never uncovered any changes that have not been monitored and that is supported by the annual IT audits by Ernst $\mathcal{E}$ Young."

So, my Lord, that's the decision. That explains what the proposal was, how carefully it was considered and what the conclusion was. That is not evidence for the proposition that when a bug arises, quite often what Post Office and Fujitsu would do was do nothing because it costs them money. Your Lordship will bear in mind Mr Parker's witness evidence in which he said that bugs with a branch impact were always treated as high priority.

So, my Lord, obviously I have not made my case just simply by referring to one document, but I would invite your Lordship to be cautious when dealing with submissions of that sort from the claimants and indeed from Mr Coyne.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: We are probably going to have to have a break.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: We are.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Is now a good time?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: It is a perfect time, my Lord.

> MR JUSTICE FRASER: We will come back in at 25 past and don't forget at the very end we just have to deal with that timetable point.
> (3.15 pm)
> (Short Break)
> ( 3.27 pm )
> MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, having dealt with the operational issues and robustness I was now going to move as quickly as I could to remote access. To save time I'm proposing to take your Lordship to some relevant paragraphs in our opening submissions and for that purpose I would invite your Lordship to go please to paragraph 40 of those submissions, which is at \{A/2/17\}. This is a context point. It's a really really important context point. It's a point that applies to transaction corrections as well, but for present purposes I'm making it in relation to remote access. It is the second order issue that your Lordship I'm sure will be familiar with now. At paragraph 40 we say:
> "On a number of issues on which Mr Coyne places considerable emphasis in questioning Horizon's robustness, Mr Coyne overlooks that they are second order issues that can only have minimal effect. At best they represent a very small fraction of a very small

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fraction of any cases. Remote access is one such issue. Transaction corrections are another."

Paragraph 41 reads:
"Taking remote access as an example, the need for remote intervention affecting branch accounts will obviously be rare. On any view, the occasions on which privileged users at Fujitsu have exercised their ability to remotely inject, edit or delete branch transactions or accounting entries will represent a tiny percentage of the relevant transactions/accounting entries. And the occasions on which they have done so negligently or dishonestly will, in turn, represent a very small percentage of those occasions. So, compared with the volume of business recorded in branch accounts, the number of cases in which false data will have been remotely introduced will be extremely small (multiplying a small chance by a small chance). This is a 'second order effect' ... which is, by definition, extremely unlikely to have any significant impact on the robustness of Horizon."

My Lord, if we take a step back and think again about the 3 million sets of monthly branch accounts that have occurred over the last 20 years, I ask rhetorically how many interventions, insertions, deletions, editing would one need into branch accounts -- and I emphasise
into branch accounts, not other kinds of remote access, we're talking about interventions which have an impact on branch accounts, transactions done in the branch or stock or cash held at the branch, those kind of things, how many of those interventions would one need in order to generate a material risk that any given branch's accounts are likely to be wrong? You would need hundreds of thousands because the chances of any intervention actually being wrong -- all human intervention is subject to error so there will be an error rate, or there might be an error rate, but it's going to be a relatively low error rate on any view, so one would need hundreds of thousands of those even to produce the number of interventions that could have even a small impact on the general body of branch accounts. The numbers would have to be unimaginably huge for this to have any material impact on the issues with which your Lordship will be wrestling in the Horizon issues trial.

It is hard to overstate the importance of this point, my Lord. These remote access issues are here because of concern expressed that Fujitsu -- and we are only talking about Fujitsu, who are professionals -- was using its administrator rights in such a way and on such a scale as to undermine the reliability of the

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claimants' branch accounts. And it is vital to understand, in my submission, that in the real world this is not going to be an answer to that question, this is not going to have a bearing on the robustness of the system and on the reliability of any given branch accounts in any given month.

So, my Lord, that is a first and in my respectful submission critical point of context that should always be borne in mind. There's a sense of unreality. It is quite understandable, the issues here are quite eye-catching, my learned friend quite understandably has developed his submissions as to how the history of this issue has arisen and how matters have been revealed in the course of time, one quite understands why he has done that, but when looking at the history of the case and when looking at the witnesses and what they say about remote access it's really important to bear in mind in my submission that even if the claimants' case succeeds at its highest, it's never actually going to have a material impact on the reliability of branch accounts. That's just not what this activity is about.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Now, this is the same point I think, is it not, that where the dispute used to be this couldn't be done, now the dispute is in theory it can be done but in practice it never would have been; is that a fair
summary?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: No, my Lord, I would put it as follows. If your Lordship would like me to address on what --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: No, it is just so that I understand
firstly that it's the same point that Mr Green developed
along those lines and secondly if it is the point which
I accurately understand the way you are putting it, it
is that Fujitsu did have the ability to do that but in
practice never would.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: No, my Lord, I'm going to take you to this in a few minutes, but let me-- first of all one has to distinguish between Legacy Horizon and Horizon Online.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Correct.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Horizon Online, there has been one occasion when a transaction was inserted into one branch's accounts at the BRDB, one occasion, and my learned friend wants it to be more, so does Mr Coyne and there will be evidence given on that question.

In relation to Legacy Horizon it is different. There's a complication because whereas with Horizon Online access was made to a central database, or server I should say; with Legacy Horizon the data in the first instance was maintained on server's held at the

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branch, or what were called counters. So there there was an element -- there was a greater complication because counters held data and counters could go wrong and they would need backups. Transactions could sometimes be inserted into branch accounts when there had been problems. It's a very different process from the position in relation to Horizon Online and I'm not seeking to give you a full account of Legacy Horizon, that's in the evidence and I don't want to be taken to be summarising it.

There were transactions insertions made into counters on occasion. There were also occasions when counters broke and their data had to be basically backed up from another source. It was called replicating from another source. And there were variants of those two processes. My Lord, those were occasions therefore when it could be said that what we mean by remote access took place.

So I don't say remote access never took place but what I say is, take the claimants' case at its highest, how many occasions of remote access of that sort in Legacy Horizon would there have to be in order to generate a material risk to the reliability of any given set of branch accounts?
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I understand that point and I understand
that's your case and in a way that is central to the different way in which the two parties are approaching it and I'm not in any way suggesting that one of those ways is preferred at the moment. All I was doing was seeking to establish -- all it comes down to really, Mr De Garr Robinson, is are you and Mr Green using the term, or using your broad categorisation in the same way, that's all.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: No we're not and that's one of the difficulties .
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That then brings me on to my next point. You don't appear to be using the terms in the same way. MR DE GARR ROBINSON: That is one of the problems.

My learned friend -- and I think Mr Coyne also -- adopts a construction of the phrase "remote access" which is unimaginably wide. It includes, for example, transaction corrections, because transaction corrections are a process by which Post Office presses a button in some office somewhere and something pops up on the screen and then a postmaster has to decide whether or not to allow that change, which is specifically notified to the postmaster to allow that change into his or her accounts. My learned friend treats that as an example of remote access. That's not how I understand it at all and indeed it is not how I understand the pleadings.

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But it shows your Lordship the width of -- I would say
the lack of utility of the definition that he is seeking to propose.

I on the other hand have a more practical approach which is what's this question about? It's about whether or not people remotely could make changes to branch data such that their branch accounts would be wrong. There are all sorts of things that could be done remotely that would have no impact on branch accounts. You might have a counter for example in Legacy Horizon that was locked, there was a binary bit that was on a zero instead of a 1 and it needed to be turned to a 1 . There was a process by which Fujitsu could unlock the locked counters, locked items of that sort. That had no conceivable impact on branch accounts. Now, one could call that remote access if one wanted to, but it's not a relevant form of remote access.

When I talk about remote access I'm talking about action taken remotely to either inject new transactions or to edit existing transactions or to delete existing transactions in a way that could change the accounting position of the relevant branch.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: And by Fujitsu only? Because I think you started this passage by saying only Fujitsu.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes, only Fujitsu.

> MR JUSTICE FRASER: That's very helpful because that defines for me the way you are using the term.
> MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm grateful.
> MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right, thank you very much.
> MR DE GARR ROBINSON: So your Lordship has the second order issue.
> MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
> MR DE GARR ROBINSON: As I say, in my submission it overwhelms everything else. It makes the next 40 minutes really rather -- I don't want to say irrelevant, that's disrespectful, but of marginal importance.

> My Lord, further points of context I would ask your Lordship to note. If I could move on in the submissions to page 83, paragraph 243 \{A/2/83\}, paragraph 243 , headline point, my Lord, irrelevance of or immateriality -- is that a word, I'm not sure -- of the suggestion of some master criminal sitting in Fujitsu's offices manipulating branch data for his personal benefit:
> "Although claimants will probably draw attention to a dramatic, but only theoretical, possibility of the malicious alteration of transaction data by a rogue employee of Fujitsu, there's no evidence that this ever took place, nor any allegation to that effect. It is

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unlikely to assist the court for the parties to engage in speculation as to what might have happened, in theory, if there had been some rogue employee who had abused his or her access rights. If there is any reason, in a specific case, to think that it might have happened, that can of course be explored ... but there is no generic issue as to any malicious alteration of transaction data."

So again this is a real world point, my Lord. Your Lordship will see speculation -- well, a discussion in Mr Roll's witness statements about speculation as to whether it might be possible to pay a gas bill or make a bank transfer using the transaction insertion facility that was available in Legacy Horizon, but that is all it is, it's just a theoretical possibility that need not detain the court for five minutes.

And in paragraph 244 we continue:
"The real thrust of claimants' case is that, in the course of using their abilities to insert, edit or delete data to correct problems arising in the operation of Horizon, Fujitsu personnel might accidently have introduced a further or different error into transaction data. This is a clear example of what Dr Worden calls a second order issue ..."

And I have addressed your Lordship on that. As we
say at the end of that paragraph:
"Such second order issues are, for this reason
alone, not viable candidates to explain any significant proportion of disputed shortfalls ."

So having got rid of the master criminal theory and having made it clear of how peripheral this issue really is, let's then move on to the position and let's move on to paragraph 246 \{ $\mathrm{A} / 2 / 83\}$ :
"... the picture is complex. There are different Fujitsu methods for altering different kinds of data remotely, and Fujitsu's current methods are themselves different from the tools and methods that are available under Legacy Horizon. The Fujitsu witnesses have done their best to recollect, investigate and to some extent hypothesise as to what may have been possible in the fairly distant past.
"The picture is also complicated by the fact that the parties do not agree on what counts as remote alteration of data."

My Lord, this addresses the question your Lordship has just asked.

For example, Mr Coyne includes transaction corrections. Curiously, my Lord, it is worth noting that although Mr Coyne includes transaction corrections as a form of remote access, he excludes the predecessor

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that applied until 2005, namely error notices. So error notices weren't, TCs were and the reason he gives for that is because TCs are electronic, that they were communicated to the branch through the system rather than being sent by post. This to him is a major difference. I say it is a distinction without a difference.

Then, my Lord, paragraph 248, another red herring to do with global users. I say red herring, that's perhaps unfair to my learned friend. There is an issue between the parties as to whether global user rights could be exercised outside the branch. It is quite clear that there were some people who did have the privileges needed to go into a branch and make changes to the branch, to use the branch machines if that's what they wanted to do. That's common ground. There's an issue as to whether it was possible to use those rights remotely, go to somewhere else from some kind of central office at Fujitsu and use your global user rights to make changes to the branch. My Lord, Fujitsu's evidence is that that is not possible, but it is challenged by Mr Coyne and the claimants, so that's an issue that your Lordship will have to decide.

Then, my Lord, another important contextual point is in paragraph 249 \{A/2/84\}. There are complications of
terminology and this is to do with different kinds of data:
"Mr Coyne discusses the deletion of session data and the deletion of transaction data as though these were in essence the same thing. That is misleading. Horizon holds more than just transaction data; it stores and tracks a lot of other forms of data that are needed to make the system operate properly, including data that does not relate to customer transaction and which does not affect a branch's accounting position. Session data is a good example of this: it may well not include transaction data at all ; it can consist entirely of other types of data associated with a counter session (such as the data 'flag' that determines whether a stock unit is locked or unlocked and available for use). The deletion of data of that kind does not affect branch accounts and cannot create a discrepancy. It merely affects the availability of the system to a [postmaster] or an assistant wishing to perform transactions or conduct other branch business."

So again it is very important to be clear about what kind of data we are talking about, when we are talking about editing, deleting or inserting data, what kind of data are we talking about, because there are all sorts of irrelevant data the ability to change which is

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utterly benign and indeed is important, an important part of the system and the system wouldn't work without it. So that's an important distinction as well.

Having made those contextual points clear, my Lord, let me just say a very few things. Most of these points will be clear to you already.

First of all, we are not really concerned about the reading of data, we are concerned about the addition, editing or deletion of data, obviously.

Secondly, the position is very different now from what it was when Legacy Horizon was in operation about nine or ten years ago. Horizon Online's data, all the data is written directly to the BRDB, the central databases maintained I think at Fujitsu's offices, but with Legacy Horizon data was held on counters before being downloaded to the central data services, I think as I recall, at the end of the day. So where remote access is concerned it was possible that access could be obtained to counters until 2010, but it's different now. It 's important to understand that.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, I can understand why you make that submission and it is important, but I have to consider Legacy Horizon and Horizon Online.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Oh, of course. I'm not suggesting any different.

Thirdly, I should mention the way in which the evidence has developed in relation to Legacy Horizon. I will be absolutely frank with your Lordship, I wish it hadn't developed in quite the way that it has, but we are talking about the state of affairs that persisted during 2000 and 2010, it's a long time ago. The system -- there is no Legacy Horizon system still in operation that people can go and check, that people are still operating. People are working off their recollections and off design documents that are now very elderly and that problem has been compounded by the fact that when Mr Roll made his witness statement in 2016 -it was provided in September last year -- the things that he said in that witness statement were quite hard to follow and we will see how hard they were to follow when he gives evidence later on this week. The result is that the responsive evidence by Fujitsu witnesses wasn't as focused as it should have been and wasn't as clear as it should have been and wasn't as accurate in certain respects as one would like it to have been and I must face up to that completely, but what I do suggest to your Lordship is that it wouldn't be right to draw any great inferences as a result of the way in which this the evidential position has developed.

I make no criticism of Mr Roll for giving his 145
evidence in the way that he did, he is not being blamed for this process, it is simply a fact of the matter, it 's simply what happened and it is only right that your Lordship should be aware of that.

Against that background, my Lord, it may be helpful to have a summary of what I would include as remote access in this case and, my Lord, that's in Mr Godeseth's third witness statement, which is \{E2/14\}. I would like to pick it up at page 4 of that witness statement $\{\mathrm{E} 2 / 14 / 4\}$. He says at paragraph 14 :
"Having further explained that global users and the TIP repair tool cannot insert, inject, edit or delete transaction data remotely, to the best of my knowledge, the following types of remote access as defined in paragraph 3 above, are or have been possible:
"14.1. Privileged users could, theoretically, inject, edit or delete transaction data in Legacy Horizon ..."
"As far as I am aware", he says, "this has never happened."
14.2:
"Members of the SSC could inject transaction data into a branch's accounts in Legacy Horizon."

And then, my Lord, when we are still talking about Legacy Horizon it may help to jump forward to
paragraph 14.5:
"In Legacy Horizon ..."
And Legacy Horizon alone:
"... Fujitsu could cause data to be rebuilt from copies of the same data as described ..."

In Mr Parker's second witness statement.
So this is a simplified summary. There are complications particularly in relation to the rebuilding of data referred to in 14.5 , but your Lordship has a sense of the three basic categories of remote access that we say was possible in Legacy Horizon and, my Lord, as regards remote access in Horizon Online, at paragraph 14.3:
"Privileged users can, theoretically, inject, edit or delete transaction data in Horizon Online. As far as I am aware, this has never happened."

## And 14.4:

"Members of the SSC can inject additional transactions into a branch's accounts in Horizon Online using a designed piece of functionality called a balancing transaction (BT). Audit records show that this has happened once."

So your Lordship will see the scope of the dispute. It is disputed by the claimants that there's only ever been one balancing transaction in Horizon Online.

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I believe it is not accepted by the claimants that privileged users didn't use their privilege user rights to muck about with branch accounts, if I can put it that way, but I'm not sure about that. I'm not sure what their positive case is. I think their case may be just that it was possible, not that it actually happened.

And then in Legacy Horizon it was possible to inject transactions and that happened more frequently than has happened with balancing transactions and it is possible to rebuild data from machines which had problems.

So is that a helpful summary of what I say --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm grateful.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Thank you.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Now, Mr Roll deals with the Legacy Horizon position. He worked in third line support in the software support centre at Fujitsu. In that capacity he could make transaction insertions and he could rebuild data. But his evidence is quite unclear about this, or at least his evidence in his first witness statement is not very clear and it will need to be unpicked as to what data he is talking about.

Your Lordship will have seen in paragraph 14 there's a reference to the TIP repair tool, the transaction information processing repair tool. My learned friend
addressed your Lordship on that this morning. That's addressed by Mr Godeseth at paragraph 10. I say it is a red herring. Paragraph $10\{\mathrm{E} 2 / 14 / 3\}$ he explains how Mr Coyne is confusing balancing transactions with exercises of the TIP repair tool and then he explains why the TIP repair tool doesn't have an impact on branch accounts:
"" The TIP repair tool (which was available in Legacy Horizon and is available in Horizon Online) is used on data that has failed validation on the transfer between the BRDB and the TPS system on Horizon Online and is therefore quarantined within TPS. I understand from speaking with colleagues that it served a similar role in Legacy Horizon in relation to data moving between the Riposte Message store and the TPS system."

And, my Lord, this is important:
"The TPS system is used to transfer data out of Horizon and on to other external systems. The TPS system (in either Horizon Online or Legacy Horizon) does not hold or generate data that is used to produce a branch's accounts from a subpostmaster's perspective. Accordingly, an error or change in TPS data will not affect a branch's accounting position.
"The TIP repair tool is used where the format or content of the data output from Horizon is incompatible
with the systems to which it is being delivered. For example, a system may require that certain data fields are populated. If these criteria are not met, the receiving system may reject the data. The TIP repair tool is used to correct these incorrect or missing attributes. The correction does not change the core information about the transaction."

And then there is a reference to a PEAK which shows mandatory fields were omitted from four messages and the TIP repair tool was used to insert suitable values:
"These are all time stamps so have no impact on accounts, but the receiving system expects the fields to be there. In practice, there are multiple time stamps in messages, so other, appropriate time stamps would have been used (which may differ by a few seconds from the missing one )."

My Lord, here is an important point:
"The changes are made to the data in the TPS system not in the BRDB (or the Riposte Message store in Legacy Horizon)."

Your Lordship has already heard submissions about front of the system and the back-end of the system. Branch accounts are in the front end of the system, they are within Horizon, Horizon generates accounts for the branch. The data that is in the Horizon system then has
to be extracted from the Horizon system into the back-end systems, so Post Office and Fujitsu -- mainly Post Office -- so that it can be used by Post Office for its accounting functions. The most important accounting system that Post Office currently uses is called POLSAP. It deals with all its internal financial matters from paying rent on buildings to salaries and also movements resulting from Horizon transactions. POLSAP draws data down from the front end. The important thing is that the TIP repair tool changes the data that is taken from Horizon and put into POLSAP, but changing data in POLSAP would not change anything in the branch accounts. It's just -- they're just different things. My Lord, the accounting systems are separate. The only way in which POLSAP could be used in such a way as to result in a change to branch accounts would be if Post Office used POLSAP to decide to issue a transaction correction, Post Office then issued a transaction correction to the branch and the postmaster accepted that transaction correction. That's the only way it could happen.

So it is really important to understand the fundamental difference between facilities which enable changes to be made to back-end systems and facilities which enable changes to be made to branch accounts. And, my Lord, that is overlooked in the claimants'

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submissions. A good example of that is at paragraph 273 and perhaps we could look at that. For the record it is \{A/1/94\}. Paragraph 273, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes, I've got it on the common screen.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: "Mr Coyne's view is that the above tools have the potential to affect transaction data and potentially branch account data by way of incorrectly altering the transactions prior to entering the recipient systems such as POLSAP and external clients (after processing by the counter). The end result may be the issuing of a flawed TC by Post Office who may not be aware of the error."

My Lord, actually the point is well made there and I apologise because I was suggesting this was a paragraph which showed that the point wasn't understood. The point is that when we're talking about changes to back-end systems like this we're not talking about second order issues, we're talking about third order issues. We're talking about a change to the POLSAP figure as a result of some intervention which is wrong, which results in a mistake being made by Post Office in deciding to issue a transaction correction, which then results in a mistake being made because the postmaster accepts the transaction and it is loaded into his accounts.

One is not going to find an answer to the question whether Horizon is robust by referring to tools which can affect the data that goes into POLSAP.

My Lord, I note that the claimants and Mr Coyne place emphasis on what they say is a failure to follow proper permission controls by Fujitsu and there is a reliance on an audit recommendation by Ernst $\mathcal{E}$ Young in 2011. That is referred to again and again and again in Mr Coyne's report and again and again and again in the claimants' submissions. My learned friend took your Lordship to it. It's at $\{\mathrm{F} / 869\}$ and it is referred to -- well, it is referred to in many many paragraphs, but including paragraphs 5.161 and 5.196 in Mr Coyne's first report, the references to which are $\{\mathrm{D} 2 / 1 / 97\}$ and \{D2/1/107\}. And it is also referred to in paragraph 282 of the claimants' opening submissions, for the proposition that Fujitsu had weak user management controls.

My Lord, could we go to that document please. It is \{F/869\}. You have already seen it once. My Lord, but your Lordship hasn't seen the first page, or rather -if it your Lordship goes to --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I think you mean the second page. MR DE GARR ROBINSON: It is the second page $\{F / 869 / 3\}$. Paragraph 1 "Executive summary":

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"The finance leadership team at Post Office Limited has implemented and process improvements throughout the organisation during the past financial year.
"In particular, focussed management action has addressed many of the issues raised in our prior year management letter and led to significant improvement in the overall payroll control environment. The recommendations we have made in this report should be seen as refinements rather than fundamental control deficiencies in comparison."

My Lord, they are put forward in the evidence as fundamental control deficiencies. Again this doesn't win me the case but I do invite your Lordship -- when your Lordship sees frequent references to documents, it can sometimes be very beneficial to read the whole document carefully. My Lord, that's my first submission about that document.

The second submission I would make about the document is that although Mr Coyne refers to it several times and indeed there's a suggestion that Ernst \& Young's recommendations aren't being carried into effect, he doesn't refer to a later document, Ernst $\mathcal{E}$ Young control themes and observations 2013, which is at \{F/1138\}. If I could ask your Lordship to go to page 2 of that document $\{F / 1138 / 2\}$ and again it is the letter
which introduces this document, second paragraph down:
"As part of our audit of the financial statements, we obtained an understanding of internal controls sufficient to plan our audit and determine the nature, timing and extent of testing performed. Although the purpose of our audit was to express an opinion on the financial and not to express an opinion on the effectiveness of internal control, discover weaknesses, detect fraud or other irregularities (other than those which would influence us in forming that opinion) and should not, therefore, be relied upon to show that no other weaknesses exist ..."

I'm so sorry, my Lord, I'm actually reading the wrong text.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: "... to show that no other weaknesses exist or areas require attention."

In other words we have identified some of them but don't reply on that as saying there aren't any others.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Exactly. If your Lordship goes on to page 4 \{F/1138/4\}
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Page 4? "Overview". Is that the one? MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Third paragraph down:
"Focused management action in the past few years has addressed many of the issues raised in prior year management letters. Whilst there continue to be

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challenges in areas including POL's IT environment, management have taken steps to ensure these challenges are and continue to be addressed."

So, my Lord, what your Lordship gets from a reading of the documents as a whole that the audit processes which were regularly undertaken by Ernst $\mathcal{E}$ Young of Fujitsu and of its permission controls and operating controls, regulations, the picture actually to be derived from those documents is not that Fujitsu was not doing the right thing, the picture to be derived was that Fujitsu was being monitored for proper conduct and although there could on occasion be improvements, they were essentially acting in the right direction.

My Lord, unless I can assist your Lordship further, that summarises my overview of remote access.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That's very helpful. I have read everything that I have been asked to -- I haven't read everything obviously in terms of the database, but I have read all of the documents that both of the parties asked me to read, and that's very, very useful, thank you very much.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, I was going to address your Lordship -- your Lordship may not want to be addressed on this -- on two points which I apprehend are included by way of prejudice. One is on the process of
disclosure that's been followed in this case and the other is the so-called shadow expert allegation.
I don't know whether your Lordship would feel the need to hear any submissions about any of those things.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, I would have thought the best place to do that is probably in closing because actually at the moment whatever the situation is suggested to be vis-à-vis shadow experts, or so-called shadow experts, it will become a lot clearer after the cross-examination, I would have thought, but I'm not shutting you out from addressing me on it if you want to.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: No, my anxiety is to help
your Lordship not to set hares running.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I would have thought closing.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Very well. My Lord, all I would say about shadow experts is two things. First of all, dark inferences are drawn as if having an advisor advising you before you have actually appointed an expert is something that is somehow untoward or inappropriate. My Lord, in cases of this scale it is commonplace in my experience.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, it depends on what they have been doing, which is why it is probably best left until after the cross-examination I would have thought.

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MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, that brings me to my second point. There appears to be if not a suggestion then an implication sought to be achieved that the technical advisor has in some way been used in order to shield the experts and the parties from adverse documents. My Lord, if that is the suggestion being made, it is wrong and it should not be made. I can tell your Lordship that all the documents reviewed by the advisor were reviewed with a view to ascertaining whether any of them constituted adverse documents and any adverse documents that were revealed as a result of that review have been disclosed and it is important that your Lordship should not allow yourself to be -- it's so easy in cases of this kind to be drawn into the sort of painting of pictures. My learned friend is actually creating something out of nothing and it is --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I don't think you need concern yourself that I am easily drawn into painting pictures.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm very glad to hear it, my Lord.
So, my Lord, assuming your Lordship doesn't wish to
hear me on disclosure and the procedure that was adopted and your Lordship has submissions in the annex to our opening -- written opening submissions, all that remains is for me to talk about timings, the trial timetable.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.

## Housekeeping

MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Since the PTR I have been giving anxious thought as to the extent to which I can properly cross-examine Mr Coyne within the compass of two and a half days and were I required to do that then I would do that.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Of course.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: It is my view, having thought about it quite carefully, that it would be very, very difficult to get it under three days and three and a half days would be doable but under three would be very hard indeed, but if your Lordship were to say it should be two and a half days then it can be done in two and a half days.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Mr De Garr Robinson, I will -- and just for the purpose of everyone in court because obviously counsel know this but not everybody will. I separately raised this point of my own volition --
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: You did.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: -- about three weeks ago after I read the first joint statement which emerged from the meeting which I think was taking place the very day of the PTR or possibly a couple of working days later, so the trial timetable that was set down for the PTR was not chiseled into granite and I expressly invited this debate on

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Day 1.
If you are going to have longer, and on current understanding of the different expert issues it seems to me that that's sensible, we just have to grasp the nettle now about how that's going to impact the second half of the trial. I mentioned this morning difficulties in respect of another case on Friday the 5th anyway. It seems to me that the best way forward is to keep the shape of the first half the same, that the week commencing 1 April you should be given your four days to cross-examine Mr Coyne. We then won't sit on the 5th and on Monday the 8th we will start with Dr Worden, which if Mr Green wants three days he can have them, if he wants four days he can have them but I know he said at the pre- trial review he would only want three but what's sauce for you is sauce for him, which means we are going to have to address closings .

Now, I know from time to time I have come across as somewhat more robust about counsels' availability but obviously in this case that's slightly different now because we are starting the trial and this is an alteration and I know at the pre- trial review Mr Green had some observations about going into the week after that and you said this morning that the beginning of the next term might be a better time for them.

So I'm open to suggestions and debate about that, but the primary decision is when do we do the evidence and it seems to me you want your four days and I'm prepared to give you your four days.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Well, my Lord, I certainly want three to three and a half days.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right, if you go three and a half days what we will do is do a hard start with Mr Coyne on the Monday morning, because apart from anything else people need to plan or organise their diaries and it's bad practice to start an expert just before the weekend and then he is in purdah and Mr Green can't speak to him, or vice versa.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: So that's my current thinking.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm grateful. Shall I discuss it with Mr Green and then we can come back to your Lordship with hopefully an agreed approach.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Mr Green, two things. Longer for cross-examination, I have made that clear.
MR GREEN: My Lord, I'm anticipating within three days.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right, that's fine. You will have to discuss it with Mr De Garr Robinson about when you might do your closings .
MR GREEN: Indeed.

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MR JUSTICE FRASER: The beginning of the term afterwards at the moment I'm supposed to be on TCC business but that can and will be rearranged to fit around you. I think term starts on 1 May which is a Wednesday, so you could have 1 and 2 May, or you could have two days the week after. I think any longer than that it's beginning to get difficult in terms of the timetable for the whole year and actually the difficulties in the timetabling are probably more my difficulties than yours because I'm the one that has to write the judgment.

So do you want to have a chat about that, about closings, but for the moment as far as cross-examination of the experts, Mr Coyne will be called on Monday, 1 April and you, Mr De Garr Robinson, can have as much of the four days that week up to and including Thursday the 4th as you want and the same the other way round: Dr Worden will be called on Monday the 8th and you can have as much of the three into three and a half days that week to cross-examine him as you want.
MR GREEN: My Lord, I think the Thursday is Maundy Thursday, I don't know whether that --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: No, I think that's a week out, isn't it? I think Maundy Thursday is the following week because Easter is so late.
MR GREEN: Yes exactly. It is so late.

## MR JUSTICE FRASER: So that whole week we don't have any Easter issues at all that week. <br> MR GREEN: That's excellent. <br> MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right? Is that helpful? <br> MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, it is extremely helpful, thank you. <br> MR JUSTICE FRASER: Couple of other admin points. I have obviously been working on hard -- well, I have actually been working on the system but I've got three screens already and if I bring my laptop down I'm going to end up with four screens so I would like a file please from you of your witness statements that actually have the trial bundle pages printed on them. I don't need the exhibits. And the same for you, Mr De Garr Robinson, just a file of your evidence of fact at the moment with the trial bundle pages printed on them. <br> Obviously I would like yours for tomorrow morning. <br> MR GREEN: My Lord, yes. <br> MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yours can come at some stage during the week and at some point I would like a hard copy file of your two experts' reports in the same file, no appendices, again with the trial bundle pages on them and the same for your expert as well. <br> MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Your Lordship may prefer to have the appendices as well because there is quite a lot of work

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done in the appendices of the --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I've got the appendices -- actually if you think -- you are right, it is probably sensible to have those with the trial bundle references on. The reason I said no appendices was simply to try and reduce the amount of work you have to do, that's all. Is that quite clear?
MR GREEN: It is easy to do.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: And obviously the witnesses will need to have, as they did in the common issues trial, a bundle. MR GREEN: Indeed.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: And I think there have been some recent statements, haven't there, just making corrections et cetera.
MR GREEN: My Lord, yes, there are some small changes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: So I imagine examination-in-chief will be quite straightforward.
MR GREEN: Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Is that everything? Thank you both very much and tomorrow morning.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, actually having nodded when your Lordship said "Is that everything" I should mention that Mr Henderson and Mr Draper will be doing some cross-examining --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I had guessed that.

| MR DE GARR ROBINSON: So in proper reflection of my real | 1 |
| :--- | ---: |
| role in this case I will be allowing them to take pole | 2 |
| position. | 3 |
| MR JUSTICE FRASER: Just so that you know, because I think I | 4 |
| did say this at the beginning of the common issues trial | 5 |
| but I will just say it to you, as far as counsel are | 6 |
| concerned I don't mind where you sit, where they sit. |  |
| They can sit up front -- there's actually a practice | 7 |
| direction about this for the Rolls Building | 8 |
| specifically . So please don't think that if you would | 9 |
| rather have Mr Henderson next to you or Mr Draper next | 10 |
| to you all the time, that as junior counsel they have to | 11 |
| sit behind you, because as far as we are concerned we | 11 |
| don't do that. But I anticipated they would be doing | 12 |
| some of the cross-examination and I'm sure that might be | 13 |
| the case for the other side as well. | 14 |
| Is that everything? | 15 |
| MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes. | 16 |
| MR JUSTICE FRASER: Thank you all very much. Tomorrow | 17 |
| morning. | 18 |
| (4.15 pm) | 19 |
| (The court adjourned until 10.30 am on Tuesday, | 20 |
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[^0]:    MR GREEN: I'm not sure I know, my Lord. I was going to hazard a guess but I'm not sure I'm right. Maybe we can check that.

    And if we go forward to page 7 \{F/1415/7\} of that document please, in 2010/2011 there were 65 incidents of a slightly different iteration where the "Previous" button -- if you used the "Previous" key during or just after the pouch barcode scans you get a multiple remming in problem and:
    "No more occurrences found post fix ."
    And then 46 remittances at two counters, that's the same pouch being remitted at the same branch at more than one counter. 46TCs reviewed and applied by Post Office and then a fix applied in January 2011, "No more occurrences found post fix ", fully aware of both at the time.
    MR JUSTICE FRASER: And are these -- I think you said previous iterations?
    MR GREEN: Previous iterations of related but not identical code issues that led to multiple remming in.
    MR JUSTICE FRASER: Because they are not all under the same PEAK number, are they?
    MR GREEN: They're not. So tracing exactly where it is found is not absolutely straightforward.
    MR JUSTICE FRASER: Because part of the document you showed

