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Horizons Issues - Alan Bates \& Others v Post Office Limited

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\text { Day } 4
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drawing a distinction between transaction data on the one hand and data in the background, operational parts of Horizon on the other. Are you aware of that distinction, does that have any resonance for you?
A. It does. I was -- in my mind it is very similar. The data that postmasters -- that's going into the message store when you are doing a transaction, how it is replicated up to the server and then how it is processed, that's the sort of information I was talking about.
Q. But when you talk about data corruption often you're talking about things like for example a bit being a zero instead of a 1 --
A. Yes.
Q. -- you described that in your witness statement. That's not transaction data of that sort, is it, it's different kinds of data?
A. It could be transaction data that's been corrupted.
Q. I will take you to the relevant passage of your witness statement later but for present purposes can we please agree that when I say transaction data I mean a record of a transaction undertaken in a branch, or a branch activity that causes a change in the branch's cash or stock, I don't mean the wider collection of data, for example all sorts of data have fields that are allocated

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to all sorts of tables throughout the database, correct?
A. Right, yes.
Q. That kind of data, even if it is attached, if it's relevant to a transaction, that kind of data isn't seen by the subpostmaster, is it?
A. No.
Q. And it won't affect his branch accounts at all, will it?
A. I don't know.
Q. Well, often it won't. Do you know that often it won't?
A. Often it won't.
Q. It is to do with things like harvesting. That data will be harvested by the system for other purposes?
A. Yes.
Q. For example to monitor what transactions are being done, what products are being sold by Post Office, that kind of -- and many many other things. You do recognise that?
A. Yes.
Q. So that kind of data, which I think you may previously have been referring to as transaction data, that's not what I mean when I say transaction data, I mean data relating to transactions that actually has an impact that the postmaster sees in his branch accounts?
A. Right.
Q. Okay, thank you.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: And are you going to adopt a similarly precise term for the other sort of --
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes, I'm going to call that operational data.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: So, Mr Roll, just so we're all using the same terms and we all understand --
A. I will try and stick to --

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Do you now understand the differentiation as far as today is concerned?
A. Yes.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: There's transaction data and operational data, is that --
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, yes. I'm sure there are better terms but those are the terms I'm going to use.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Now, having established points of nomenclature, could I ask you, Mr Roll, to go to your second witness statement. It is E1, tab 10 and it is paragraph 14 of that witness statement which starts at page 9 \{E1/10/9\}. You have it in hard copy I think with you. It may be more easy to use that.

Now, what I'm interested in is some -- I will let you find it. You will see that it is under the heading "Transaction corrections and patterns of software errors", so in this section you are talking about TCs

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and software errors and paragraph 14 you then start talking about software errors and what I'm interested in is the text that's in red over the page at page 10 \{E1/10/10\}.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Which I don't think will come up on the common screen but it doesn't matter because you are using the hard copy. Have you got your amended one, Mr Roll? Have you got your amended one with the red text?
A. Yes I have mine.

MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Now, I only saw this shortly before you started giving evidence yesterday -- well, I saw it shortly before court sat at 10.30 yesterday morning. The first thing I would like to ask you is why was this text added to your witness statement here?
A. I was trying to clarify something that had come to mind after re-reading this a few days ago. It is possible that if a postmaster is doing a transaction and as he -between pressing "enter" and the data being written there could be a corruption or an error that would cause that data to change.
Q. And why did you include it in this particular paragraph?
A. I had specifically said "bugs" before that, in the line above it, and I wanted to clarify that there were other things that could have caused problems.
Q. Oh, so you're not talking about bugs here, you're
talking about other causes?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say:
"As well as being caused by bugs, software errors
could also be caused by data corruption."
Stopping there, when you say "software errors" --
A. Transaction data errors.
Q. -- you mean data errors?
A. Yes.
Q. So when you say "data errors could also be caused by
data corruption", is that circular, or are you -- could
you explain what you mean? It looks like you are saying
data corruption could be caused by data corruption --
A. Sorry, I see what you mean.
Q. -- and I would like to give you the opportunity to
explain what you mean?
A. There could be some corruption of data at that point
that might cause the postmaster to -- for the account to
Qay he has a certain amount of money perhaps that he may
Q. You are talking about hardware errors causing data
corruption, aren't you?
A. It needn't necessarily be the hardware that caused the
problem, it could be the software that's become corrupt,

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## the transaction --

Q. Well you have just told me you weren't talking about software bugs, you were talking about --
A. No, sorry, the transaction data could be corrupt at that point. Just one of those spurious things that happens.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Just pausing there, you said software
bugs, I think yesterday we worked out that's coding.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Coding.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Can we keep to that.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: So you're not saying these kind of things are caused by coding?
A. Sometimes it is caused by coding bug, or it could be a potential bug, other times it could have been something else. It could just be data corruption that just happened at the moment.
Q. I'm struggling to understand this, Mr Roll, because you say "as well as being caused by bugs" and you just told me about a minute ago that you put this in here because you were distinguishing between issues that are caused by bugs and issues that are caused by other things. Now you are saying these things are caused by bugs after all. Which is it?
A. Sorry, what I'm trying to say in this added bit is it's not caused by bugs, it's data that has become corrupted at a specific moment in time just because it has become

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corrupted.
Q. And I'm suggesting to you, Mr Roll, that in that scenario it will generally be because of some hardware error in the counter in which the transaction is being entered. Would you accept that?
A. No.
Q. Well, let's proceed. You then say:
" If the corruption happened just as a transaction was being written to disc, it could have altered the value of a transaction and the subpostmaster may not have realised."

So what you are suggesting is the subpostmaster types in a number on the screen and actually the number that comes up is different from the number that he or she has typed?
A. No, the number that he or she has typed would be correct, but in-between pressing the "enter" key and it going off you've got milliseconds between it going between there and being written to the disc. If the data corruption occurs in that instant ...
Q. I see.

You then say:
"This would not be detected by the system as there would not be a mismatch in the figures ."

Is that your evidence?
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A. That's what I'm suggesting there, yes.
Q. Well, could I suggest to you, Mr Roll, that where that happens there are cyclic redundancy checks being constantly done which check to see whether the amount typed in is the same as the amount that goes into the system. It is something that's continually done within the Horizon system, isn't it?
A. You are probably right there.
Q. It is done at both levels. We're talking about Legacy Horizon. It is done at the Riposte level which operates the message store, as it were, and it is done at the operating system level, the NT which operates -sorry, the NT, the Windows that operates the counter itself. There are cyclic redundancy checks that are applied as these processes are being done at both of those levels, aren't there?
A. I don't remember that precise detail.
Q. But I suggest to you that that is the case and are you in a position to dispute that?
A. I'm not in a position to dispute that, no.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Are you saying six on Legacy Horizon?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm talking about Legacy Horizon, the counters that were used in branch at that time and your Lordship will remember that --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: No, you don't need to go into any more
explanation, I just wanted to check.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: And those checks will automatically and immediately tell if there is a difference between what the application is attempting to write, what's actually being typed in, and what is actually being written into the system; that's right, isn't it?
A. Usually, yes.
Q. I would suggest to you, Mr Roll, it always happens, it's a constant feature of the Legacy Horizon system. It's one of the fundamental consistency checks that is always applied in the operation of the system. Do you accept that?
A. I accept that's how it is supposed to work, yes. I'm still not sure that it would be $100 \%$, but --
Q. Well, let me ask you about your experience. In your 44 months at the SSC did you ever encounter a situation where a cyclic redundancy check missed an error of this sort?
A. I can't remember that.
Q. I suggest to you didn't, Mr Roll.

Could I also ask you whether you were ever aware of this -- in your experience you ever actually saw this problem happening with a subpostmaster?
A. I don't think I did, no.
Q. You said --

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A. I don't think I did.
Q. You don't think you did?
A. No.
Q. So what you're saying in red text here in paragraph 14, it's really largely a -- and I don't mean to be rude when I say this -- it's an armchair theoretical exercise that you are discussing, it 's not something that actually reflected your experience when working at the SSC, is it?
A. No, it was something I was thinking of hypothetically.
Q. I'm grateful.

Then just to complete this point -- and this may be beyond your experience because it appears that you didn't actually see any of this happening while you were there, but just to complete, would you accept that if and when the cyclic redundancy check spotted there was the mismatch of figures being typed in and figures going into the system, as well as sending an event straight away to the SSC which would be picked up by the SSC's automatic systems, it would also prevent the counter actually undertaking the transaction. Do you accept that?
A. Yes.
Q. I'm grateful. Now, I would like to go to paragraph 8 of your first witness statement please and that's at
\{E1/7/2\}. I would like to pick it up at the third sentence where you say:
"Any errors made by subpostmasters would be relatively easy to identify, and would normally be picked up by 1 st or 2 nd line support. If an error was referred to us then it was extremely unlikely to be due to a mistake made by a postmaster ..."

Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Having read that could we then move please to what Mr Parker says about this and I would like to go to bundle E2, tab 11 and it is at page $6\{\mathrm{E} 2 / 11 / 6\}$ and it is the text just underneath the numbered paragraph 26.1.3. Mr Parker says:
" If a branch required assistance to attempt to determine the cause of a discrepancy they would contact NBSC in the first instance. Discrepancies are not unusual in a retail system."

I imagine you would accept that, Mr Roll.
"They indicate a difference between the operator's declaration of cash and stock on hand and the system's calculation and as such are a business operation issue. However ..."

He says and this is the point I'm going to ask you about:

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"... it was not always possible for NBSC to identify the cause of a discrepancy. For example, a user may enter a deposit of $£ 100$ into a customer's bank account on Horizon but rather than taking $£ 100$ from the customer, they may make a mistake and give the customer $£ 100$ as if it had been a withdrawal. In that scenario, NBSC would not have been able to identify the cause of a discrepancy. Clearly, NBSC is also unable to assist when losses have been caused by theft ."

Now, do you accept what Mr Parker says in the paragraph I have just read out?
A. Yes.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: NBSC is the helpline, isn't it?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, yes. It's the first line of support.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: And is that Fujitsu or Post Office?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: The NBSC is run by Post Office. It then goes through to the second line.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Mr De Garr Robinson, I just wanted to check that.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Because in other statements it is referred to as the helpline. I just wanted --
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, it is sometimes referred to as the helpline. It is confusing because there is the

HSD as well as the NBSC and they are both elements of the first line of support.

So where you say, Mr Roll, in paragraph 8 of your statement that any errors made by subpostmasters would be easy to identify and would normally be picked up, that's not right, is it? There are all sorts of errors that are made by the postmaster that will not be picked up. Would you accept that?
A. From my memory of when we were working there, no, but from reading this ... yes.
Q. You would accept that. So, for example, if an irate subpostmaster phones into the NBSC and says "These figures aren't right, there's a glitch in the system, there's a glitch in the system", keeps insisting there's a glitch, it would not be easy -- in fact in many cases it would be impossible for the first or the second line of support to say categorically "That's definitely a user error" and close the matter down. In that kind of situation wouldn't what would happen be that the second line of support would refer on to SSC for investigation ; do you accept that?
A. Yes.
Q. Then I would like to go back to your witness statement -- it is quicker to do it in hard copy, Mr Roll -- paragraph 10 of your first witness statement 15
$\{E 1 / 7 / 2\}$ you must have in front of you. You say, second sentence -- so we have a problem like that, it gets passed to the SSC and I think you would accept that the SSC would always investigate to see if it could be attributed to a bug or other fault within Horizon --
A. Yes.
Q. -- yes? So you then say:
" If we were unable to find the cause of the discrepancy then this was reported up the chain and it was assumed that the postmaster was to blame."

That's your claim. I would like now to compare it to what Mr Parker says about this. It is in his first witness statement again, this time at page 13 \{E2/11/13\}. Paragraph 46, Mr Parker says:
"In paragraph 14 Mr Roll states, 'I would reiterate that the main recurring issues were software issues : It is a symptom of working within a software support team that the majority of issues that come in have been attributed to a software issue by, for example, a lower line of support. This can lead to a mindset of 'look at all these Horizon errors' but what this indicates to me is that the previous levels of support are functioning correctly, removing the majority of other causes (user/hardware problems). It does not indicate that the majority of Horizon errors could be attributed to

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    software."
    By "software" he means coding. Would you accept
    that, Mr Roll?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And then if we could move on over the page
    to page 14, paragraph }49{E2/11/14},\mathrm{ he says:
"Mr Roll further states that if SSC was 'unable to find the cause of the discrepancy then this was reported up the chain and it was assumed that the postmaster was to blame' (paragraph 10). That is not my experience: it is a simple truth of support that the majority of issues reported in the system are attributable to user action or user misunderstanding much system functionality."
Stopping there, Mr Roll, would you accept that?
A. I would accept that -- and as he says, those issues would have been picked up at first or second line support. The way I remember it is that we were dealing with issues not necessarily the majority of issues caused by the user, but that's how I remember it.
Q. I think I'm seeking to suggest to you, Mr Roll, that as a matter of just common sense the majority of issues reported in a system, whether it goes to first, second or third line of support, the majority of issues reported in the system are attributable to user action or user misunderstanding of system functionality?
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A. Yes.
Q. As a matter of common sense you would accept that?
A. Yes.
Q. So "Hence", Mr Parker says:
"... someone working in a support environment analysing a new issue would examine the possibilities of user error as a first hypothesis but any final conclusion is only generated based on the evidence. Where the evidence does not support a conclusion that there's a problem with Horizon, the SSC feeds the existent factual data back to Post Office and might say something along the lines of ' all indications are that the branch has made a mistake' but Fujitsu neither attributes 'blame' or agrees the final conclusion ..."

What I would like to suggest to you, Mr Roll, is that when a problem was, when you were there, reported into the third line of support and the problem would then be allocated to a member of the SSC, that SSC member would look for ways in which the symptom that's complained about could be attributed to a coding error or other problem within Horizon; that's right, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. And they worked quite hard to try and figure -- they would look at all the data, the system log, the event log, transaction data; all the data, vast array of data
that's available to Fujitsu, and they would work very carefully through to try and see whether there's a credible explanation that's based upon a coding bug or some other systemic problem with Horizon, yes?
A. Usually.
Q. Usually.
A. There were instances which I can't remember but I know that at the time I felt uncomfortable with what was going on because of the pressure that was put on us to find -- to either find a problem or to say that we couldn't find a problem. So there were time constraints and we weren't given -- this is my recollection, but I can't give you specific details. And this is why --
Q. So --

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Can you just let him finish .
A. This is why I first spoke to people about this, because there are instances that I remember being unhappy with it .
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: But you can't give any specifics --
A. No.
Q. -- and we can't look at the documents to see what you are talking about?
A. No.
Q. And it's not that -- I think we discussed this yesterday. You are not suggesting that there was any
pressure put upon you to put it down to human error, it 's simply that you are saying that not enough time was given to do the job to your satisfaction, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. I challenge that, Mr Roll. I formally suggest to you that that didn't happen.
A. All I can say is that is how I remember feeling, but it was a long time ago.
Q. But from the SSC's perspective your job was to investigate a problem as thoroughly as it needed to be investigated?
A. Our job in the team; it wasn't always me who was doing the work that I was worried about.
Q. Well, quite often it was -- looking for these kind of problems, quite often it was someone more senior in the team that was looking at these kinds of problems --
A. Yes.
Q. -- isn't it? And you can't speak to the amount of pressure that they were under, can you?
A. Not from direct memory, no. It's just, as I said, the impression I took away with me.
Q. So you would accept, wouldn't you, that everyone in the SSC including you did a professional, rigorous and thorough job?
A. We tried to, yes.
Q. If we could go to your second witness statement please now which is at E1, tab 10 and I would like to ask you about paragraph 14 \{E1/10/4\}. You say:
"I do not believe that it is realistic to say that all software errors would have been picked up by the processes which were in place, or that the likelihood of software errors staying disguised as human errors was very small ... I believe there were likely many cases where subpostmasters would have been held responsible for problems which had not at the time been identified as software errors, either because they could not identify the problem and did not pursue these with Post Office or Fujitsu, or because when they were raised we ... were ultimately unable to identify the problem at the time."

Now, I would like to ask you about your belief that there were "likely many cases". Mr Roll, that's speculation, isn't it, that's not a statement of fact?
A. That is how I felt, yes, that's --
Q. You felt it? What was the basis of your feeling?
A. Going back to what I have said a moment ago about feeling that at times we were under pressure and we couldn't do the job properly.
Q. How often -- do you have a recollection as to how often you were under pressure?
A. No.
Q. My sense of the evidence you have given -- and I want to tell you this so that you can tell me whether you agree or not -- is that it didn't happen very often?
A. Not very often, no.
Q. Okay. So can you say how many times --
A. No.
Q. -- you had a sense when faced with a problem that it was likely to be a bug but you hadn't --
A. I wouldn't be able to say.
Q. You couldn't say how many times --

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Keep your voice up, Mr Roll.
A. Sorry. I have no idea.

MR DE GARR ROBINSON: It is just your language. You say "I believe" -- that's your present state of mind -"there were likely many cases where subpostmasters would have been held responsible for problems which had not at the time been identified ". How can you say "many"? When I ask you about the problem you say it is because "Sometimes I was busy and wasn't given enough time to investigate ". You very fairly say -- although you cannot be categorical, you can't identify particular incidences but you don't believe that happened very often.
A. First of all --
Q. On that basis how can you say that you believe there were likely many cases where it happened?
A. First of all, it wasn't necessarily me that was busy, it was comments from other people in the team about how busy they were trying to find a solution and I heard that infrequently, but that led me to the belief -that's the way I think I feel it, that if I was aware of a few then there must have been more. So it's speculation, yes.
Q. You accept that it is speculation. You are talking about something that happened between 15 and --
A. 19 years ago.
Q. -- 18 years ago. It would be fair to say, wouldn't it, that your recollection is very hazy about these kind of things?
A. Certainly some of it, yes.
Q. Would you accept that your recollection of this kind of thing is hazy?
A. It is quite hazy, but the feeling persists that sometimes things could have slipped through.
Q. Sometimes things could have slipped through. One last question before I move on. When you were under time pressure and you didn't feel that you were being given as long as you needed to do your job, is it that you were given ten minutes and told to do something else, or

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is it that you needed four hours and that you were only given three? I would like a sense of what you mean when you say that you didn't have the time that you wanted?
A. You might have had eight or ten hours. From my recollection -- I may be getting different things mixed up here, but we had so many days to come to a resolution, to resolve a problem, so if we didn't get the problem for a couple of days then our window had closed. It was shorter than it should have been.
Q. And did you communicate concerns about this to anyone else -- to Mr Peach, your superior?
A. I believe that was -- it was mentioned at times, yes.
Q. You mentioned it to Mr Peach. And did you mention it to Mr Parker?
A. I don't think so, no. Mr Peach was the manager.
Q. But Mr Parker was your deputy manager, wasn't he? He had authority over you, didn't he?
A. I never saw it as that, no.
Q. So it 's not something you discussed with Mr Parker, it 's just something you discussed with Mr Peach who isn't giving evidence, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. I see.

Then there's one phrase I would like to ask you about. It is where you say:
"I believe there were likely many cases where subpostmasters would have been held responsible for problems which ... we (Fujitsu) were ultimately unable to identify the problem at the time."

Are you suggesting that problems reported to the SSC would not be resolved at that time, but then at some later time when a further problem arose it would then be identified? Are you suggesting --
A. I wasn't trying to suggest that, no.
Q. It is just your use of the words "at the time"?
A. I'm sorry, that is misleading, yes.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: I'm sorry, Mr De Garr Robinson, I have lost where -- the passage you were asking about.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: It is the sentence beginning
"I believe there were likely many cases".
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Can you maybe give me a paragraph and page number?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Paragraph 14 of Mr Roll's second statement.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: It is just the screen had moved, that was all. So we are still on paragraph 14.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Well, the sentence starts on page 4 and then goes over to page 5.

So you are not suggesting that you are aware of a problem that was identified at some later stage but

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manifested itself at some earlier stage and was not corrected at that stage and therefore was left there, you're not suggesting that that happened in your knowledge?
A. Sorry, could you say that again.
Q. I'm not being very clear, I'm so sorry.

I'm trying to investigate with you whether you are seeking to allude to the following scenario and I suspect that you are not, so I will be quick. At time T zero someone phones in with a problem, gets through the two lines of support, gets through to the SSC, it is investigated. The investigator tries very hard to find a coding problem or some other problem in Horizon that's responsible for it, can't, puts it to one side, closes it down and then the problem reappears through some other postmaster at some later stage, gets through the first and second lines of support, gets to the SSC and a coding problem is then identified, but that leaves the poor first subpostmaster in the cold. I was just seeking to investigate with you whether you are seeking to suggest in that sentence that that ever happened?
A. No.
Q. I'm grateful. Because the truth is that in that kind of scenario, when the second problem is identified and the root cause determined then all occasions on which this
problem has manifested itself in the past would then be investigated and identified, would they not?
A. Yes.
Q. So in that scenario information would be provided to Post Office to allow the earlier subpostmaster to be made whole -- I don't know if I'm allowed to use that expression, my Lord.
A. Yes, I would --
Q. Thank you. Then I would like to go to Mr Parker's second witness statement now please, which is $\{\mathrm{E} 2 / 12 / 5\}$. I would like to ask you about paragraph 15 of Mr Parker's witness statement which is about recovery processes. He says:
"Mr Roll states that 'Fujitsu's stance was generally that if there was a problem with transactions following a recovery process and if SSC could not identify the cause, then the problem must have been caused by the subpostmaster not following the recovery process properly '."

And then Mr Parker says:
"I agree that if Fujitsu was unable to identify the cause of a discrepancy that was said to relate to a recovery issue, having investigated the matter, the likely conclusion would be that the discrepancy (if there was one following the recovery process) was

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probably the result of human error. The key point here ..."

And this is what I' m seeking to discuss with you, Mr Roll:
"The key point here is that the SSC would thoroughly review all of the available evidence. I am confident that if there had been a software issue in relation to the recovery process, the SSC would have identified it or in the very unlikely case that we could not determine root cause, would have at least documented its symptoms."

Full stop. Would you accept that, Mr Roll?
A. Yes, if we couldn't determine the root cause then it would have been documented. But I should say, if we couldn't determine the root cause then that would have been passed on to the Post Office and the assumption would have been that the postmaster had made a mistake.
Q. I would like to suggest to you that Mr Parker here is saying that if there had been a software issue -- he means coding issue --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: That means coding, does it, there?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, I believe so.
"... if there had been a [coding issue] in relation to the recovery process, the SSC would have identified it ..."
Stopping there, do you accept that?
A. No.
Q. And why do you not accept that?
A. We may have passed it -- if we may have suspected --
sometimes it would have been identified as a coding
issue. Sometimes if we couldn't identify it and
suspected it as a potential one, it would have gone to
development. But we may not have detected the software
issue -- the coding issues ourselves.
Q. He goes on to say:
"... in the very unlikely case that we could not
determine root cause ..."
Would you accept that the situation you have just
described would be a very unlikely one?
A. Terminology I suppose. Unlikely.
Q. Very unlikely, Mr Roll.
A. I wouldn't agree with that.
Q. But you would agree unlikely?
A. Unlikely, yes.
Q. Then he says:
"... [we] would have at least documented its
symptoms."
Would you agree with that?
A. They would have been recorded.
Q. They would be recorded in a what, in a KEL?
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A. I don't know. 1
Q. In a PEAK?
A. I can't remember.
Q. The system would maintain knowledge of the symptoms and
would be aware of or would be looking out for any
recurrences?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said I think that this would then be passed on
to the fourth line of support, is that right?
A. From my recollection of it, yes.
Q. And what would the fourth line support then do with it?
A. I think they would look at the code and see if they
could find a problem with it.
Q. So in most cases, save in the unlikely case, the third
line of support would have spotted the problem. If they
didn't spot the problem they would document the symptoms
so that the system would be alive to the possibility of
recurrences and at the same time they would pass the
problem over to fourth line support who would give the
problem an even more thorough investigation, is that
right?
A. Usually, except if we were under pressure, as I said
before --
Q. Well, if you were under pressure, Mr --
A. -- to provide an answer to our manager who was probably
A. I don't know.
Q. In a PEAK?
A. I can't remember.
Q. The system would maintain knowledge of the symptoms and would be aware of or would be looking out for any recurrences?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said I think that this would then be passed on to the fourth line of support, is that right?
A. From my recollection of it, yes.
Q. And what would the fourth line support then do with it?
A. I think they would look at the code and see if they could find a problem with it.
Q. So in most cases, save in the unlikely case, the third line of support would have spotted the problem. If they didn't spot the problem they would document the symptoms so that the system would be alive to the possibility of recurrences and at the same time they would pass the problem over to fourth line support who would give the problem an even more thorough investigation, is that right?
A. Usually, except if we were under pressure, as I said before --
Q. Well, if you were under pressure, Mr --
A. -- to provide an answer to our manager who was probably
under pressure himself to provide an answer to --
Q. It is very hard to discuss the pressure you were under, Mr Roll, because you are talking in such generalities.
A. I'm sorry.
Q. I don't criticise you for that because it is a long time ago, you are doing what you can do. But can I suggest to you that in circumstances where there's a problem that's been encountered and it is suspected that it may be the result of some kind of bug or other problem in Horizon, the matter is not going to be closed by anyone at the SSC. One way or another, either at third line or at fourth line, the people are going to keep going until the suspicion has been fully exhausted; would you accept that?
A. No. If we couldn't find a problem, then it may have been closed. The information could have been passed back to Post Office saying "We can't find any problems" and from then on it would have been -- I assume it would have been put down as a postmaster's error or whatever.
Q. So you don't know what it would have been put down as in relation to the postmaster?
A. No.
Q. What I'm asking you is not just about the situation where you haven't been able to attribute a problem to a coding issue or some other problem in Horizon. You

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try and attribute and you fail. If you had been given proper time, which I think you say happened in most cases, then you would be satisfied that it wouldn't be the result of a coding problem or some other problem in Horizon, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. But you say sometimes -- not very often, but sometimes you didn't get the chance to spend as much time on it as you would have liked; is that what you are saying?
A. Yes.
Q. I have already challenged you on that evidence. But here is my suggestion to you, Mr Roll. In circumstances where having got as far as you've got you actually suspect that a coding issue or some other problem in Horizon is responsible, you would not stop, you would not close down the PEAK --
A. No, you would pass it on.
Q. You would, wouldn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. So in any case where you have a lingering suspicion that there's a problem in Horizon of some sort causing this symptom, you would never close it down but you would always pass it on for further investigation?
A. If you thought it was a coding issue, yes.
Q. If you suspected it was a coding issue?

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A. Yes.
Q. Or other problem in Horizon?
A. I'm not sure whether we would have closed some of them down or not at that point.
Q. What, with other problems? Why would other problems in Horizon be dealt with differently?
A. Some of the areas we had a lot of control over -I don't really know how to explain this, I can't really remember much about it, but there were times when we couldn't find a problem with the message store and the data -- it was passed back to the Post Office as closed because we couldn't find any supporting evidence for what the postmaster was saying.
Q. Yes. But how does that answer my question?
A. I think I'm getting side-tracked here, I'm sorry.
Q. My suggestion to you is that on any occasion when you or anyone else at the SSC had a lingering suspicion that a problem that had been identified --
A. Yes.
Q. -- was the result of the Horizon system --
A. If we had a suspicion then it would be passed on.
Q. -- it would absolutely not be closed down and blamed on the subpostmaster, would it?
A. No.
Q. Thank you. But however, if having done your
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investigation and having formed the view that you don't have a suspicion of a problem in Horizon, does the last sentence of paragraph 15 of Mr Parker's statement \{E2/12/6\} apply? He says:
"Having conducted a careful investigation which did not reveal any software issues, human error would be by far the most likely explanation."

Would you accept that as a matter of common sense?
A. I need to backtrack a bit here because sometimes, going back to the pressure, we would not suspect a software coding issue, a bug, a coding bug, there might be something else, but if we were under pressure then we wouldn't necessarily have the time to fully look at that to understand what was going on, so then we would close the KEL.
Q. Are you suggesting to me that in your situation as an SSC team member there would be checks that would need to be done in order to answer the question whether there was a problem in Horizon causing this situation and you would deliberately close a PEAK and close down the problem even though the check had not been done?
A. As far as I can remember, on occasion that did happen.
Q. Mr Roll, I suggest that's extraordinary and it's unprofessional and it's not what any member of the SSC should ever have done?
A. I know.
Q. Are you saying it's what you did?
A. On occasion I was instructed to close a particular call which was not software related or anything, basically to quieten it down.
Q. Well, that's quite remarkable, Mr Roll. Why is none of that in your witness statement?
A. It is.
Q. You are telling me there was a specific occasion when someone with authority over you told you to close down a call when you hadn't finished your investigation, are you?
A. I'm not putting that very well, but yes.
Q. Who was the person who told you that?
A. Mik Peach.
Q. So Mr Peach told you -- what was the nature of the problem?
A. The nature of the problem was that a postmaster was reporting that a system was rebooting unexpectedly. We looked -- or I looked at it and I found that the -- she was actually powering the system off and she insisted she wasn't. It was a mobile system and she was -- as I said, we could see from the message store that the system was being rebooted and she insisted she wasn't rebooting it. So I did some tests on the test rigs in

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the testing area at the end of floor 6 where we were and I found that on one of the test rigs I could simulate the same problem. If I turned the screen off, it actually turned the whole computer off. And when I dismantled the equipment I found that the screen button had been miswired and it had been wired into the motherboard so that it actually cut the power off and not the power to the screen, so it rebooted the system. That's documented in the PINICLs.

I asked for the base unit to be brought back but in the meantime -- we then found out that this was a known build error but somebody in the hardware department had built a batch of computers and wired them up incorrectly. They had sent them out to the estate but they -- they had realised they had done it and they knew about it but they hadn't informed anyone else.

So I pinpointed the problem, spoke to Mik Peach. Mik Peach got back to me later and said "Yeah they know about this ". When the system came back and I confirmed it, I was asked not to put any more information on this on the PINICL and it was being dealt with internally.
Q. Let's talk about -- I was going to ask you about that later. So that's not an occasion where Mr Peach told you to stop investigating something that needed to be investigated?
A. Not to stop investigating, no, he told me --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Both of you, if you talk over each other we can't transcribe it. So you wait for Mr De Garr Robinson to finish. He will, I can assure you, wait for you to finish .
A. Sorry, your Honour.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right, Mr De Garr Robinson.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: The answer you have just given me was
the result of a question which I asked which is are you seriously -- I now can't reformulate my question.
My question was based upon a claim that you have just made to the effect that there was a problem which required further investigation. You said this didn't happen with coding bugs but sometimes with other issues that were less the SSC's purview, sometimes it did, where more investigation was needed and you said Mr Peach told you not to do that investigation but to close it down. Now, do you remember giving that evidence?
A. That's ...
Q. We could go back to the transcript, if you like, Mr Roll.
A. What was it you said exactly before that part?
Q. Page 35 of the transcript.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Line 17 I think. Well, the passage goes
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from line 3 to about line 13 .
Can we go higher on the common screen -- that's it, just stop there. Page 35.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: You say:
"Answer: On occasion I was instructed to close a particular call which was not software related or anything, basically to quieten it down."
And if we could go actually further up, it is at line 16 on page 34 :
"Question: Are you suggesting to me that in your situation as an SSC team member there would be checks that would need to be done in order to answer the question whether there was a problem in Horizon causing this situation and you would deliberately close a PEAK and close down the problem even though the check had not been done?"
That was my question to you. So I was asking you whether there were occasions when you needed to do further sessions and you were told not to. And you said:
"Answer: As far as I can remember, on occasion that did happen."
So that's quite a bold claim. And then I say:
"Question: ... I suggest that's extraordinary and it 's unprofessional and it's not what any member of the

SSC should ever have done?"
And you say "I know" and I say:
"Question: Are you saying it's what you did?" And you say:
"Answer: On occasion I was instructed to close a particular call which was not software related or anything, basically to quieten it down."

Now, I took you, Mr Roll, to be saying "Yes, I was told not to perform investigations that I felt I needed to perform", but the example you have just given, which
I will be coming to, is not an example of that at all, is it?
A. No, it's not. The line on 16 and my response at 22 , I -- the way I remember that happening in the SSC is that not myself but other people were under a lot of pressure to come up with a "can you find anything, we have to know by lunchtime if you can find anything in this message store" and then they would come back and say "No, we can't find anything".
Q. Mr Roll, first of all that's not addressing the point that I'm suggesting to you. You are not suggesting, are you, that people in the SSC were told not to perform checks that they felt they needed to perform in order to do their job properly?
A. Oh, I see. No.

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Q. And can I suggest to you that no one in authority at the SSC would ever have wanted a team member not to perform a check that needed to be done in order to satisfy that team member whether there was or wasn't a problem in Horizon?
A. The feeling I still have is that on occasion we could have done more if we had had more time but that occasionally due to time pressures we didn't have the time. That's -- it's just my feeling from 19 years ago.
Q. Your feeling from 19 years ago and could I suggest to you, Mr Roll -- it may be wrong, but my understanding of your evidence is that that feeling is that it only happened on relatively rare occasions, it wasn't something that was frequent.
A. Rare occasions, but that was the feeling I had then and it has persisted.
Q. Very good.

If we could move to page 6 of Mr Parker's second statement $\{\mathrm{E} 2 / 12 / 6\}$ and look at paragraph 19 at the bottom of the page. He says:
"Fujitsu has mechanisms in place for detecting potential issues. In ... my first statement I briefly explained that the system management centre monitors system events and I briefly described the work of the communications management team in paragraph 26.1.2.

Each of these teams would generate support actions based on system generated event information."

That's true, isn't it?
A. Horizon was an evolving system, it probably still is . In the early days a lot of the processes weren't in place and we had to find them, we had to find the problems and develop the processes to -- so that by the end of by the time I left then yes, this was true.
Q. I suggest to you that this sentence is true of the entire time that you were working at SSC, Mr Roll.
A. My recollection is that we improved the systems tremendously over the years.
Q. But from the word go these teams did exist and they would generate support actions based on systems generated event information from the first day that you were there?
A. Yes, if the system was able to generate the event.
Q. But you're not, I presume, in a position to tell me what events it was able to generate when you arrived --
A. No.
Q. -- and what events it was able to generate when you left?
A. No, but as we put more processes in, the system is much more able to detect errors.
Q. Well, it's difficult for me to ask you questions about

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that kind of claim.
Then he says:
"It is also the case that the sheer number of
subpostmasters using the service and reporting issues
via the help desks make it very unlikely that there is
any significant number of hidden errors."
Would you accept that?
A. A significant number, yes. There may have been the occasional one.
Q. Yes, but can we say the vast majority of problems that were caused by the system would have manifested themselves in some kind of reporting --
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And he says:
"These mechanisms are so effective at identifying
when bugs are a cause of problems that it would be very rare for a bug to not be detected."

Would you accept that?
A. If it was a known bug, yes.
Q. What do you mean by that?

MR JUSTICE FRASER: We are talking coding, yes? Coding.
A. Coding, yes.

MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes.
A. If a coding bug was detected then we could put in place mechanisms to detect when that was -- when that bug had
had an effect.
Q. I think Mr -- I'm grateful for that answer, but I think Mr Parker is making a slightly different point. He has described the mechanisms in place and you generally agreed them.
A. Right.
Q. And he says:
"These mechanisms are so effective at identifying when bugs are a cause of problems that it would be very rare for a bug to not be detected."

That's true, isn't it? Sometimes the bug could get through --
A. Yes.
Q. -- but it would be very rare for that to happen, would you accept that?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Then on to paragraph 20 \{E2/12/7\}:
"Once an issue has been raised, Fujitsu is experienced in providing support and will go to great lengths to investigate the root cause."

Stopping there, would you accept that? That that was true of your time when you were at the SSC?
A. Yes.
Q. "In paragraph 61 of my first statement I explained that Fujitsu use a custom solution, developed and

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administered by the SSC, which allows us to record support knowledge into a known error log ... KELs record support knowledge which is intended to assist staff in the support and understanding of the Horizon system."

I apprehend you won't disagree with any of that?
A. No.
Q. He then says:
"Mr Roll's statement that 'subpostmasters would have been held responsible for problems which had not at any time been identified as software errors ... because when they were raised we (Fujitsu) were ultimately unable to identify the problem at the time' assumes that if Fujitsu was not able to get to the root cause of an issue, it must have been a software error rather than a human error. But as I explain ... above, if Fujitsu was unable to identify any software issues after carrying out a careful investigation, human error would be by far the most likely explanation."

Now, would you accept that, Mr Roll?
A. I would accept that it is the most likely explanation, yes.
Q. Thank you.

Then if we can move on to paragraph 23 \{E2/12/7\} -I'm reading this to you to give you an opportunity to disclaim any intention of what Parker thinks you might
be doing. He says:
"I think that Mr Roll may be trying to suggest that Fujitsu were quite happy to assume that issues were the responsibility of subpostmasters. That is not the case. We investigated matters thoroughly and if we identified an error in Horizon, we dealt with it appropriately. Our investigative and analytical procedures have always been thorough in my view and while I obviously cannot say that in each and every case our diagnosis was correct, I am confident that that was the case in the overwhelming majority of cases."

Now, Mr Roll, a couple of questions, perhaps three or four. Given the discussion we have just had, could I invite you to indicate whether you are or are not trying to suggest that Fujitsu were quite happy to assume that issues were the responsibility of subpostmasters?
A. I don't know what the management's position was on how protective they were of their system, the directors et cetera at that level. At our level certainly we would -- I would certainly agree with what Mr Parker has put in the second part there --
Q. What, you mean "we investigated matters" --
A. -- "in the overwhelming majority of cases".

MR JUSTICE FRASER: You said the second part, which part do
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you mean?
A. Sorry --

MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Do you agree then that "We
investigated matters thoroughly and if we identified an error in Horizon we dealt with it appropriately"?
A. Yes.
Q. You agree with that. Do you agree that:
"Our investigative and analytical procedures have always been thorough in my view ..."

Do you agree with that? Is that your view too?
A. Generally speaking, yes.
Q. "... and while I obviously cannot say that in each and every case our diagnosis was correct, I am confident that that was the case in the overwhelming majority of cases."

Is that your view?
A. In the majority of cases, yes.
Q. Thank you.
A. I wouldn't want to suggest that Fujitsu were happy to assume.
Q. Very good. I'm very grateful for that, Mr Roll, and that means I don't need to ask you any more questions.

Could we now move on to your second witness statement please. I would like to ask you about paragraph 9, it is $\{E 1 / 10 / 3\}$. It is under the heading
"Transactional integrity ", and here you are taking Dr Worden to task about something he said in his expert report and you say:
"At paragraph 156, Dr Worden describes zero sum baskets, other branch actions being zero sum, and transactional integrity. I agree that the system was designed with these intentions in mind but there were limitations and errors in the system. Data corruption and glitches sometimes meant that transactions were not zero sum. I recall on more than one occasion where subpostmasters had problems with a deficit showing in their accounts, and then as a result of working through a process to try to resolve it, the deficit doubled."

Let's just break that down, if we can. You refer in that paragraph to three concepts. Transaction baskets and accounts. I think you will accept, won't you, that when you are doing business at a counter, several transactions can go into a basket, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And then many baskets, once they are entered into the accounts, make up the accounts, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. The zero sum point only relates to baskets, doesn't it?
A. I can't remember. I'm not sure.
Q. So I'm just trying to understand what you mean when you

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## say:

"Data corruption and glitches sometimes meant that transactions were not zero sum."

A transaction is never zero sum, is it, it's the basket that's zero sum having summed up all the transactions that are in the basket?
A. I think you're correct there, yes.
Q. Then if I could ask you to go to what Dr Worden says about transactional integrity. That's at \{D3/1/39\}. Could I ask you to read -- it is quite long so I won't read it out, you will be pleased to know. Could I ask you to read paragraph 156.3. This is the paragraph that you take issue with.
(Pause).
A. Okay, I have read that now, yes.
Q. Now, you say -- we have just read the relevant paragraph from your witness statement. You said you agree that the system was designed with these intentions in mind but you say there were limitations and you go on to say that data corruption and glitches sometimes meant the transactions were not zero sum and we have discussed the difficulty I have with your use of the phrase "transactions".

You then go on to give an example. You say in paragraph 9 of your witness statement $\{E 1 / 10 / 3\}$ :
"I recall on more than one occasion where subpostmasters had problems with a deficit showing in their accounts, and then as a result of working through a process to try to resolve it, the deficit doubled. Sometimes we found the source of the problem as a known bug ... and we could resolve the problem, but we were not always able to find or understand the cause."

Mr Roll, I'm slightly bemused by that because the example you have just given there is not an example of a limitation or error in transactional integrity, is it?
A. No, it's not, I ... I must have misunderstood or misread what $\operatorname{Dr}$ Worden was saying in paragraph 156.3.
Q. Well, could I suggest to you, Mr Roll, that what Dr Worden is saying in paragraph 156.3 is true and that you don't have any contrary examples to offer to suggest that it didn't always happen?
A. No, I misunderstood his -- what he put.
Q. Were you asked to -- did someone invite you to disagree with this paragraph?
A. No.
Q. That's not what happened?
A. No.
Q. I see.

Then the example you give is discussed by Mr Parker at paragraph 8 of his second witness statement, which is

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\{E2/12/4\}. If I could ask you to read paragraphs 8 and
9 , is that the example that you have in mind?
A. I can't remember exactly.
Q. Have you looked at the KEL that Mr Parker refers to in paragraph 8?
A. No.
Q. So you haven't looked at any of the underlying documents?
A. No.
Q. Or the PEAKs?
A. No.
Q. Mr Parker says at paragraph 10:
"I am not aware of any case in which baskets were not zero sum (ie any case in which a non-zero sum basket was accepted into Horizon), although given the lack of detail in Mr Roll's statement on this point it is difficult for me to state definitively that such an issue never arose."

Would I be right in thinking that you can't think of an example of that happening either?
A. Yes, I think I got my terminology wrong in the zero sum basket.
Q. So would the answer to my question be right: you can't think of an example of that happening --
A. No. You are right, yes.

## MR JUSTICE FRASER: So what terminology should I read it as saying?

A. I'm afraid I can't remember the full terminology that I should be using for the Horizon system, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I'm not asking about that. Is there any other word that I should change to reflect what your evidence is on this, or not?
A. No, your Honour. I was trying to point out in this that due to errors sometimes when a postmaster tried to correct it actually doubled the error.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right.
Back to you, Mr De Garr Robinson.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Then if we could continue with paragraph 10 of Mr Parker's statement, halfway down he says:
"I would expect any such issue ..."
This is a true transaction integrity issue:
"I would expect any such issue to result in a receipts and payments mismatch which would be (1) picked up by Fujitsu's reconciliation reporting ..."

Stopping there, that's right, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. And secondly be:
"... visible to the branch when they balanced at the end of the trading period."

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That's true also, isn't it?
A. I don't know.
Q. Fair enough, Mr Roll. But you accept, do you, that when you were there it would have been picked up in reconciliation reporting?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. And it would have resulted, as he says in the last sentence, in investigation and resolution by the SSC?
A. We would investigate it, yes.
Q. I'm very grateful, thank you.

Then if we could go back to your second statement, paragraph 10 \{E1/10/3\}. It's a very long paragraph and I'm not going as quickly as I expected. If I could ask you just to have a quick look at paragraph 10 so you can remind yourself what you're talking about.

## Have you --

A. Yes.
Q. Now, I would like to ask you, Mr Roll, how good is your recollection of this particular instance?
A. It's a bit hazy but I can remember the sort of basics.
Q. And I'm interested in your suggestion that it was "impossible to fix". Was it really impossible to fix?
A. From my understanding of the problem, yes. To fix the software, to recode the amount of software that would have needed to be recoded would have meant, from my
understanding, a basic rebuild, so it would have taken too much effort.
Q. You refer to your understanding; was this a problem that you yourself worked on?
A. I can't remember. It's certainly one I was aware of, because we discussed it.
Q. So it might have been something that you picked up in discussions with other people?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say you have a recollection of something you can't actually remember -- it is not clear enough for you to know whether you actually worked on it or not, it might just be what other people told you, is that right?
A. It was a fairly common problem this.
Q. A fairly common problem?
A. From what I remember.
Q. So this is a problem that you suggest happened a lot of times, did it?
A. Periodically . We were aware -- we kept an eye out for it because we knew it would happen.
Q. And then you refer to a workaround. You say at the top of page 4 \{E1/10/4\}:
"Eventually the problem would be escalated to SSC and a workaround established."

Again, are you speaking from your experience, or are 53
you speaking from your recollection of what people may
have said when you were at work?
A. I can't remember if I worked on that or not. It was something we all kept an eye out for.
Q. So it is something you kept an eye out for. Is it something you ever actually saw in your own experience?
A. I think so but I can't be certain.
Q. Very good. And you say a workaround established. What was the workaround?
A. You basically had -- the net result of this would be that because the system wasn't able to differentiate which organisation the money would go to, it could have gone to the wrong one. So we could monitor the systems processing this data, pick it up and then by examining the actual reference data we could see which organisation it should go to and then we could make sure it went to the right one.
Q. So is that what happened, the SSC set up a system --
A. Yes.
Q. -- to monitor where these problems might be occurring?
A. Yes.
Q. And fix them when they did?
A. Yes.
Q. I'm grateful. And presumably you would go back and look in the past to see if it happened in the past, to deal
with it in that situation as well?
A. Yes.
Q. But even before that had happened though, this wouldn't have an effect on any branch accounts, would it? It wouldn't affect the net position on any branch accounts? A. No.

MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, I see the time.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Do you want a break?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm not going as quickly as I expected and I need to tighten up.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Sure. So we will come back at 5 to.
Are you going to go into the afternoon with Mr Roll?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Most certainly.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: And then you have just got Mr Henderson.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes, and we are not allowed more than an hour with him anyway.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: No, I rechecked my transcript of that. I said that I was imposing that limit to make it clear you didn't need to put everything to him but you could have longer than that if you wanted.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I wish I hadn't said it, my Lord, because you are quite right and I really ought to be careful about my mouth.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: No -- I have just been asked for the short break for the shorthand writers but we were

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I think 30 seconds ahead of that.
Same form as yesterday: don't chat to anyone about your evidence.

## (11.46 am)

## (Short Break)

(11.58 am)

MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Mr Roll, I'm going to try to deal with some evidence that you give about the recovery process as quickly as I can. If I could ask you to go to paragraph 11 of your second statement $\{E 1 / 10 / 4\}$. We are in the same section of your witness statement that we were in before, so this is all under the heading "Transactional integrity" and you say:
"I do recall that problems sometimes arose after subpostmasters used the recovery process and that this was a not uncommon problem which affected even experienced subpostmasters. This might suggest that there was a problem with the recovery process itself, or at least that it was not as straightforward as it should have been."
"Might suggest": I don't mean to be discourteous, Mr Roll, but that's a mealy-mouthed phrase. Are you positively claiming that in your judgment there was a problem with the recovery process?
A. No. There was a possibility but that's all. It's
a long time ago and I can't remember what the process was now.
Q. So you are not suggesting there was a coding bug in the software dealing with recovery --
A. No.
Q. -- which affected branch accounts, are you?
A. No.
Q. So would it be fair to say -- I use this term
advisedly -- that in that sentence what you are doing is speculating as to the possibility of a problem, you're not suggesting that there is likely to be one?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you suggesting that there were investigations that should have been undertaken by the SSC that weren't undertaken?
A. No, I'm not suggesting that.
Q. So why are you even mentioning it, Mr Roll? I'm slightly puzzled.
A. It sticks in my memory that there were problems with the recovery process that we got involved with that we had to try and fix. At times there were the -- I suppose it was either the number that came in or something that stuck in my mind about this that made me feel there was something that could have been not quite right with it.
Q. Are you suggesting -- let me take it in stages. First

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of all, you are saying problems were reported to the SSC by subpostmasters in relation to the recovery process, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And you will accept, would you, that whenever those problems came in they were investigated?
A. Yes.
Q. And you will accept, would you, that when they were investigating they were investigated thoroughly?
A. Yes.
Q. And that thorough process, I think you have already accepted very helpfully in a prior discussion with me that generally speaking, when there is a thorough investigation of that sort if there is a problem it's likely to be identified?
A. Yes.
Q. And I infer that it is your evidence that all of those investigations you are referring to were unable to find any problem with Horizon itself, is that right?
A. I don't know if it was ever considered there was a problem with Horizon itself.
Q. But, Mr Roll, let's just be clear. When an investigate is carried out -- it's a bit like philosophers trying to test a theory, you try and find something that disproves the theory that you're trying to establish. In the same
way, your job at the SSC, when you get a problem in is you are looking for something in Horizon that could have caused it ; that's where you are starting, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And that process was followed whenever there were these problems reported into the SSC about the reconciliation process, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And on each occasion when these investigations were done the investigators were unable to find a problem with Horizon that was responsible for it, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. So why do you now suggest that despite all of that, there could have been a problem with the recovery process in Horizon when you worked there?
A. I'm not sure what it is, but I was not happy with the way that some of these were dealt with. But I can't -I can't remember why, but I know that at the time there was something that made me uneasy about it.
Q. So are you suggesting that on every occasion that a problem came in, something was reported in in relation to reconciliation, you were the one that investigated them all?
A. Oh, no, I wasn't -- everybody -- it would have been farmed out.

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Q. So are you saying that you knew enough about everybody else's investigations to be uncomfortable about the investigations your colleagues were doing?
A. No.
Q. Right, so are you saying that you were uncomfortable with the investigations that you did?
A. No.
Q. So what were you uncomfortable with?
A. Sometimes the pressure we were under, the timescales. I think that's what it must have been. Again --
Q. So are you suggesting that there was a particular timescale issue with respect to reconciliation processes that had a particular application to reconciliation problems that didn't apply to other problems that you were investigating in Horizon?
A. All I can remember is that I felt uneasy about something, about this process, but I can't tell you why, so ...
Q. My attention has been drawn to the fact that on a number of occasions I have talked about reconciliation when I should have been talking about recovery, I do apologise, but I think we have understood what I'm talking about.
A. Yes.
Q. I apologise.

Well, let's just go quickly. In principle, when a system goes down when a transaction is being done at the counter, either because the system itself has gone down or there is a power outage at the branch or whatever the reason might be, there's always going to be a possibility that some transactions being undertaken at the counter may not have reached the Horizon accounts of that branch when the system goes down, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Because, for example, there's an outage before the stack has actually been settled by pressing the button that enters the stack into the branch's accounts, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's inevitable. You can't design a system which doesn't have that problem, it's an inevitable part of a system design where there's a possibility that crashes may happen mid-transaction, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. So in that situation what do you do to build resilience into the system? Could I suggest to you, Mr Roll, that what you do is you build into the system a facility which identifies the transactions that were mid-way but that didn't actually reach the accounts, that have not recovered, yes?
A. Yes.

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Q. And that is the recovery process that we're discussing?
A. There is -- I seem to remember there being far more to it than that, but ...
Q. If you want to elucidate then I don't want to stop you, Mr Roll, but I really don't know what you mean.
A. I ... I would have included -- there was a lady giving evidence yesterday about having to go and find -a transaction hadn't gone through, it hadn't been recovered. She was able to find the customer. I don't remember the full story about it. But she went to the bank and she found that -- she was able to find the money or to find a paperwork trail to get the money put back into her account. That's all part of the recovery process for me, it's not just ... I'm not making myself very clear, I'm sorry about this .
Q. Well, you are talking about Mrs Burke and in Mrs Burke's case what happened, in short, was that the system went down before she had entered the transaction into her accounts, then when the system came back up again the system identified the transactions in relation to which there was a problem. Later on the system identified the transactions that had gone through, so there was a physical piece of paper identifying the transaction that hadn't gone through and she was able to look at that physical paper and look at her transaction log and
see that indeed it had not gone through.
Now, I would suggest -- I will be suggesting to the judge in due course that that's an example of the Horizon system doing what it is supposed to do, namely to produce some evidence identifying the transaction that hasn't actually reached the Horizon accounts. Isn't that what the recovery process is designed to do?
A. That's I think what it is designed to do, but I think what she was trying to point out was that the paperwork -- some of the paperwork that she had wasn't produced by the Horizon system and --
Q. Well, I'm not sure that this is very helpful.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: That's just what I was about to say actually. Whatever the Mrs Burke situation was or wasn't --
A. Sorry.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: -- I'm not sure you are necessarily going to be able to help me with and I'm not sure, Mr De Garr Robinson, that it's necessarily a correct question for this witness, other than to say: when you were asked about the recovery process and you said that you thought there was more to it than that -- do you remember that?
A. Yes, your Honour.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: And then there was a phrase I think
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where you said "I would have included ..." and then it appeared to me, if I may say so, that you then got distracted talking about Mrs Burke.

So far as your recollection is when you worked for Fujitsu, Mr De Garr Robinson is now going to suggest to you I think again, or reput the question, about what the recovery process involved and if you think there are other steps or other examples of what the recovery process either did or ought to have included then you can tell me what they are.
A. Right.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: So, Mr De Garr Robinson, do you want to do that.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I rather think you have actually asked the question already --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I would rather you put it, if that's all right.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Mr Roll, as I have explained, the recovery process is a form of resiliance designed into the system to ensure that if a transaction doesn't reach the system, which is always possible because of timing issues in the nanoseconds before you press "enter" to push the stack into your accounts and so on, the purpose of the system is to ensure that the missing transaction, the transaction that hasn't reached the branch accounts,

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has been identified, both to the postmaster and indeed to Fujitsu, because Fujitsu can see this material in their own log.
Are you saying from your own experience that there were any occasions where that did not happen?
A. I can't remember.
Q. Thank you.
Then going back to paragraph 11 of your witness statement \(\{E 1 / 10 / 4\}\), this is a sentence we have already been discussing the first part. You say:
"This might suggest that there was a problem with the recovery process itself ..."
Then you say:
"... or at least that it was not as straightforward as it should have been."
Let me repeat my question. Are you saying from your own experience you can recall examples of where the recovery process was not as straightforward as it should have been?
A. No. My understanding of the recovery process is that it should have been -- it should have been able to be dealt with at first or second line and if we got involved then there was a problem with it.
Q. So it's simply the fact that if a subpostmaster was insisting there was a glitch or something and in
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circumstances where the first and second line couldn't categorically say that it wasn't the result of a glitch, it would go to the SSC and you're saying the mere fact that that would on occasion go to the SSC is a basis for suggesting there's something wrong with the system, is that right?
A. No. What I'm saying there is that some of them came through to us and then my recollection is that the majority of them we would have dealt with and we would have found a problem, but that on some times we couldn't find a problem and we couldn't identify where there had been a problem.
Q. Well, could I suggest that another way of putting that is that you looked at the symptoms that were complained about and you checked -- there was a very thorough investigation as to whether Horizon might be responsible and as a result of that thorough investigation you couldn't figure out a way in which Horizon could have been responsible; would that be another way of putting what you have just said?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. Then let's move on to paragraph 12 of your statement $\{E 1 / 10 / 4\}$. You refer to paragraph 167 of Dr Worden's report $\{\mathrm{D} 3 / 1 / 43\}$ where he deals with what he calls TCs, that's transaction corrections, that "Post

Office would soon suspect a software error" and so on and you then say:
"I do not recall Fujitsu carrying out any analysis of transaction corrections to try to identify if there may be an underlying software error."

Now, I only want to ask you a couple of questions about this, Mr Roll, but why are you talking about transaction corrections? When you worked at Fujitsu there was no such thing as a transaction correction, was there?
A. I don't know, wasn't there? I ...
Q. Do you honestly not remember?
(Pause).
A. No I don't. There were corrections made ... we made corrections to transactions.
Q. "Transaction corrections" is a term which refers to a message that's sent by Post Office to a subpostmaster's branch suggesting that there ought to be a change, a transaction entered into their branch to change the accounts in some way, that the subpostmaster then gets to accept or if he disputes it not to accept into his branch accounts. It's an electronic message that goes from Post Office to the branch and it is generated usually as a result of quite sophisticated reconciliation processes undertaken both by Post Office

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and Fujitsu.
At the time that you worked for Fujitsu TCs didn't exist. What they had instead were what were called error notices and error notices would be sent from Post Office to the branch but a similar practice was followed. That's what Dr Worden is talking about.
A. Right.
Q. Were you not aware of that?
A. I wasn't aware that he was talking about those.
Q. So you thought he was talking about something different?
A. Something completely different.
Q. Did you not -- I don't wish to probe into privileged matters, but was it not explained to you what he was -perhaps I am probing into privileged matters.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, you are if you put the question that way.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: You could say "Did you know 'transaction corrections' was a specific term that had a specific meaning in Horizon?"
A. I didn't know they had that specific term -- meaning.

MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Well, here Dr Worden is talking about TCs. Was it not necessary for you to be told what TCs were?
A. I misinterpreted the term "transaction corrections".
Q. TCs were actually identified, they were defined in Dr Worden's report. Did you read the definition?
A. No.
Q. It does look as if you are making quite a convenient claim on the basis of -- well, I don't understand the basis upon which you are making it. What did you think Dr Worden was talking about when he talked about TCs?
A. We corrected transactions -- it was part of our job, if you like -- on the message stores at times.
Q. Oh, you are talking about transaction insertions that were undertaken by -- that's what you thought --
A. That's what I --
Q. -- Dr Worden was talking about?
A. That's what I misinterpreted there, yes.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: I wonder if you could possibly finish your sentences. Mr De Garr Robinson isn't interrupting you but you will often start a sentence, stop it, and then start another one. If you could just answer in complete sentences it would help enormously.

Right, Mr De Garr Robinson.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm sorry, would your Lordship give me a moment.
(Pause).
My Lord, I will move on. I don't think this is going to be a productive line of cross-examination

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bearing in mind I hadn't prepared for it in that way. Let's stay with your second statement, Mr Roll, and go to paragraph 19 \{E1/10/6\}. Perhaps I could ask you to simply read the paragraph to save time.
(Pause).
A. Yes.
Q. You say at the end of the paragraph:
"... generally this was a developing area, so generally if the SSC found something that should have been picked up by the system we notified the developers so they could fix the software, so it did incrementally improve over time. However, sometimes the decision was taken that the chances of the unexpected error happening again were too remote to merit a development/fix. In this case the developers would be instructed not to work on a fix."

Were you involved in these cases? So do you have personal experience of these cases?
A. I think I had experience in one or two where we found a problem but it was deemed -- it was one that could be easily monitored and checked out for by writing a small bit of code and that was -- it was easier to do the workaround than it was to do the software fix, so that's what we did. There is a bit of a syntax error where it should have read instead of "instructed not to" it would
be "not be instructed" to work on the fix. They wouldn't be told not to do it .
Q. I see. First of all, you are not talking about a decision not to do a software fix or a coding fix for bugs causing an impact in branch accounts; we're not talking about that kind of problem at all, are we?
A. It would be a ... no, it 's not an error that the postmaster would have been aware of. It wouldn't have affected his accounts.
Q. So you are talking about problems that didn't affect branch accounts. You have said one or two cases. Could you describe either of them or both of them?
A. No, I couldn't, just the recollection --
Q. Could you give some indication of the nature of the problem?
A. I can't even give you that, I'm afraid.
Q. Well, could you give some indication of the process that was gone through to decide what the appropriate response was, whether there should be a workaround or a fix?
A. Well, the -- we would find out what the problem was, what the impact was, how easy it was to find the problem and then that information would be passed on up the management chain for them to decide whether it warranted a software fix to be developed and released, or whether it would be faster and as reliable to put a workaround

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in place rather than a fix .
Q. And what's the nature of the workaround you're talking about? You're talking about some facility built into the system which would pick up when this thing happened --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and made sure it was made good?
A. Yes, it could be corrected at -- when it was picked up rather than writing software to make sure it didn't happen in the first place.
Q. But you're talking about something within the system, so the system would automatically monitor for these occasions --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and make sure that they were fixed more or less automatically, is that what you mean?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. So really what you're talking about is a debate between how best to fix a problem, do you do it by way of some kind of change of coding so that the problem never arises, or do you do it by way of change of coding to ensure that when the problem does arise it is immediately fixed; would that be fair?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: And in either situation is the code changed?
A. The underlying code -- in the first situation where you directly change the code so that the problem doesn't arise, that is when the code would be changed for -- on the Horizon system, but in the second scenario then no, the code for the Horizon system need not necessarily be changed, but something running on one of the servers -you could write a small batch programme that would be supplementary to the code.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right.
Mr De Garr Robinson.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Thank you.
I would like to move on to paragraph 16 of your statement $\{\mathrm{E} 1 / 10 / 5\}$. You say:
"In my first statement, I refer to the pressure that the SSC team and Fujitsu were under generally due to an awareness of the financial penalties imposed by the service level agreements between Post Office and Fujitsu ... I believe that although individual penalties were quite modest, when applied across multiple counters/post offices the cumulative figures involved were very high, potentially amounting to tens of millions or more. I disagree with Stephen Parker's statement that these potential financial penalties were

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not a factor for the SSC ... as we were aware of them and often commented on them, eg 'That's saved Fujitsu another 25 million '."

So I'm now going to ask you some questions about this general issue. Could we first of all go to Mr Parker's first witness statement, that's at \{E2/11/12\}. He starts by saying in paragraph 43:
"Mr Roll refers to a 'perception ... that the Service Level Agreements between Post Office Ltd and Fujitsu involved financial penalties payable by Fujitsu to Post Office' (paragraph 12). I am aware that there were Service Level Agreements for issues such as stuck transactions (Fujitsu had 10 days to retrieve transactions that had not replicated from a counter)."

Stopping there, Mr Roll, did you know that?
A. I couldn't remember the timescale for that. But I knew there was a timescale to get them off and sent across.
Q. He then says:
"It is quite normal for contracts such as the one between Fujitsu and Post Office relating to Horizon to have such agreements."
A. Yes.
Q. Would you agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. "The same level of diligence was (and is) applied to all
incidents, whether an SLA was relevant or not."
That's Mr Parker's evidence. Do you disagree with it?
A. No.
Q. And then he says:
"The possibility of financial penalties was never a factor for the SSC."

## Would you accept that?

A. I don't see that as a yes or no answer I'm afraid. There were SLAs for the harvesting of batch transactions from the correspondence servers which I think it was supposed to get from the correspondence server to the bank within three days or something. Now, we were aware that if the harvesters failed for a couple of nights in a row then you would have a huge backlog of transactions which you were then -- we were aware that Fujitsu was facing or could potentially have faced penalties for not getting those transactions through in time.
Q. Right.
A. So there was perhaps -- we were aware -- I wasn't involved in the work of getting those transactions through, that was not my area of technical ability, or whatever. So -- but there was the awareness that certainly if we managed to get them through in time then we would save Fujitsu a lot of money.

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Q. So that's the $£ 25$ million reference --
A. That was an example, yes.
Q. -- that you give.

So let me get this straight, because there's
a danger of a false impression being given by your evidence, both in paragraph 12 of your first statement \{E1/7/2\} and indeed in the paragraph of your second statement we have just read out. You are not talking, are you, about pressures on the process by which problems being reported in to the third line of support would be investigated, that could affect branch accounts; you're not talking about those things at all?
A. They -- they were also -- we were aware of the penalties for those but not to -- the pressure wasn't as great for those.
Q. What penalties were you aware of in relation to problems coming into the SSC?
A. The problems regarding the counters coming into the SSC you're thinking of now, or ...? Because these other problems for the servers, the harvesters, they would come into the SSC as well.
Q. But those problems won't have any impact -- I'm sorry, I'm being slightly unfair to you, Mr Roll. This entire extraordinary trial process that we're engaging in --
A. Sorry, yes.
Q. -- is about whether branch accounts generated by Horizon
were accurate or not, or reliable or not.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Why is it an extraordinary trial
process?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Because it's so large and I don't mean
that in any critical way. I probably shouldn't have
used that word.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: The group litigation.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes. In my experience it is unusual.
This is my first GLO, your Lordship may have noticed.
So my concern is the process by which the work that
was done in the SSC to investigate problems with Horizon
that might have had an impact on branch accounts.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And it's fair to say that's the concern of most of the
people sitting in this court today. And so when one
reads your witness statement, one's natural reaction --
and I don't mean this as a criticism, but one's natural
reaction is to think that that's what you are talking
about. The impression that I'm getting from what you
are saying now though is that you are not saying that
the service level agreements, which may have had targets
for harvesting data for banks and so on and so forth,
you're not saying that those service level agreements
created a perception within the SSC which caused people 77
in the SSC to think that when they were investigating problems that might have an impact on branch accounts, they would have to do a quick job and not do a proper job?

That's an extraordinarily long question and if you would like me to make it shorter I' $m$ happy to do so but if you've got my point then I would invite you to answer it .
A. From my recollection there was pressure if you weren't -- if you couldn't pinpoint the fault in the counter, the problem with the data, whatever, then there was -- you know, there was the -- there was pressure put on you, you were asked "How was it going? We need an answer", which was a degree of pressure.
Q. Well, you use the phrase "there was a perception", you use the impersonal. One often sees that phrase used. Are you saying that you, Mr Roll, physically were aware that there was an SLA that had the effect that the SSC couldn't or shouldn't properly investigate any bugs that might affect branch accounts?
A. We were aware that there was an SLA and that we had to investigate within the timescale.
Q. And was there a perception -- because I'm going to suggest to you that there wasn't, Mr Roll -- was there a perception that this SLA of which you were aware meant
that you couldn't do your job properly?
A. I felt that that might be the case in some areas.
Q. You felt that it might-- this is -- how strong and accurate is your recollection of all of this?
A. Vague.
Q. I see. Well, let's --
A. And this is another -- sorry.
Q. No, I think it was me talking over you, Mr Roll.
A. This is another one of those things where I had
a feeling that things weren't right, but --
Q. But it's difficult at this remove in time to put your finger on it?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, let me continue with paragraph 44 of Mr Parker's statement $\{\mathrm{E} 2 / 11 / 12\}$ :
"I do not understand what Mr Roll means when he says that 'any discrepancy in the Post Office accounts had to be resolved speedily' ... there was (and is) a process run by the management support unit ..."

Do you remember the MSU?
A. Now you mention the term, I do remember the term.
Q. But nothing else?
A. No.
Q. "... which involves examination of various system reporting and may result in business incident management

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service ... entries going to Post Office ."
Was that true? Is that in your recollection?
A. I don't remember.
Q. "An incident may also be raised by MSU with the SSC to provide support to the MSU in resolution of the BIMS."

But you probably can't comment on that either.
What he is talking about here is various systems reporting. It may be consistent with what you were talking about before about harvesting. He is not talking though about the identification and fixing of coding issues in Horizon that might impact on branch accounts.
A. $\mathrm{Mm}-\mathrm{hm}$.
Q. Are you aware of any case where there was a contractual pressure on Fujitsu to speed up that process or to deal with that process in a given space of time?
A. I don't remember any specific details, no. I don't, no.
Q. Then he says:
"These are subject to service level agreements and Mr Roll may be referring to this process. However, if Mr Roll is suggesting that Fujitsu routinely rushed out fixes or work-arounds due to SLA time pressure, that is not the case."

Mr Roll, I would like to give you an opportunity to say that you are not suggesting that.

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A. Which paragraph are we looking at now?
Q. Paragraph 44, last three sentences. It 's the sentence
    beginning:
            "However, if Mr Roll is suggesting that Fujitsu
    routinely rushed out fixes or work-arounds due to SLA
    time pressure, that is not the case."
    I'm inviting to you say that you are not suggesting
    that this is the case.
A. I would agree with what Mr Parker has put here, yes, and
    it is wrong to suggest that they were not done properly
    because of SLAs.
Q. Thank you.
    Then would you also agree with what he says in the
    next sentence, " fixes would be expedited based on
    service impact"?
A. Yes.
Q. And would you agree that " it would be quite wrong to
    suggest that they were not done properly because of any
    SLAs"?
A. No, the fixes would be done properly.
Q. Thank you.
    Then if we could go back to your second statement,
    paragraph 15, it's {E1/10/5}. To save time could I ask
    you simply to read paragraph }15\mathrm{ please.
    (Pause).
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    A. Yes.
Q. First of all, you say:
"The test team felt they were under enormous
pressure to complete the testing within certain
timescales which negatively affected the test regime."
That's quite a bold claim. The testing wasn't your
team, was it?
A. No, they were on the same floor as us, some of them.
Q. So you're talking about your recollection of -- would it
be fair to say office gossip?
A. Yes.
Q. From 15 or 19 years ago?
A. Yes.
Q. How many conversations of this sort did you have during
your time at Fujitsu?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Was it a view that was expressed by the entire test team
on a regular basis, or was it something that was said to
you by one or two people a couple of times?
A. My recollection is that the majority of the team felt
pressured.
Q. The majority of the team felt pressure. What did they
say about this pressure? What did it make them do?
A. I can't remember.
Q. Budget restrictions, you refer to them in paragraph 15 .
Q. First of all, you say:
"The test team felt they were under enormous pressure to complete the testing within certain timescales which negatively affected the test regime."

That's quite a bold claim. The testing wasn't your team, was it?
A. No, they were on the same floor as us, some of them.
Q. So you're talking about your recollection of -- would it be fair to say office gossip?
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Q. The majority of the team felt pressure. What did they say about this pressure? What did it make them do?
A. I can't remember.
Q. Budget restrictions, you refer to them in paragraph 15.

What did you know about Fujitsu's budgets, Mr Roll?
A. ICL were bought out or taken over by Fujitsu and at the same time an American company was taken over as well. ICL were not, from my recollection, were not very profitable at the time and nor were the American company, so shortly afterwards when Fujitsu couldn't turn them around they were merged into Fujitsu. There were lots of redundancies. My recollection is that the Horizon project, which I seem to remember had originally been a joint DSS project but they had backed out, the Post Office went with it on their own, my recollection is that Horizon was the only profitable part of Fujitsu at the time.
Q. And consistently with Horizon being profitable, there were no redundancies in the SSC when the takeover happened, were there?
A. No. I think one or two people were a bit worried there might have been, but there weren't. There were redundancies in the test team from what I remember.
Q. There were redundancies in the test team? I'm not in a position to deal with that point now.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: What year are we talking?
A. 2002 maybe.

MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Could I just advance some general propositions and see if you will agree with me.

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Isn't it the case that Fujitsu had every incentive to make the support operation work, to minimise the problems requiring changes and to minimise the problems requiring fixes down the line; wouldn't that be right?
A. Yes.
Q. It would be more expensive in the long-run for a company such as Fujitsu to do the support work badly than it would be to do it properly, wouldn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. That's a statement of the obvious.

And the $£ 25$ million that you referred to, that was -- bearing in mind the focus that this trial has, that has no bearing on the kind of transactions that we're talking about, does it?
A. No, that was the servers and the batch transactions.
Q. Okay. If we could just move on to Mr Parker's second witness statement at paragraph 24 at page 7 \{E2/12/7\}. I would like to suggest to you -- I'm going to read out passages and invite you to agree or disagree, Mr Roll. At paragraph 25 \{E2/12/8\} he refers to paragraph 16 \{E1/10/5\} which we have been looking at from your statement:
"At paragraph 43 of my first witness statement I explained that the possibility of financial penalties or service level agreement breach was never a factor
which affected the diligence with which SSC would investigate an issue."

I have already put that to you:
"By way of further explanation ..."
Then he talks about schedule 15 to the service level targets for Horizon services and perhaps I could invite you to read paragraph 25.1 to yourself.
(Pause).
A. Yes.
Q. At the time had you ever seen this document?
A. No.
Q. Were you aware of what was in it?
A. Not directly, no.
Q. Then he says:
"There were no specific financial penalties relating to the SSC processing of incidents."

And then he quotes some text from the service description.

Did you know that at the time?
A. No. This is the 2005 version, is it, 30 November 2005. Is this -- was this -- is this the same as when I was there in 2004?
Q. I believe so, yes. Mr Parker is nodding at me.
A. Right. My recollection is that incident processing, some incidents weren't subject to SLAs but the ones

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I have already mentioned, the harvesters, were, and that some of the financial data from the counters --
Q. But not incidents of the sort that this trial is
concerned with, perhaps I could ask you that. You weren't aware that there were any --
A. No.
Q. -- SLA targets which related to the incidents with which we are concerned in this trial?
A. No.
Q. Thank you. Then I can skip over paragraph 25. Let me finish with 25.4 \{E2/12/9\}:
"The SSC had operational targets to turn incidents around based on an order of priority. As explained in paragraph 22 above, if an issue was causing a financial impact in a branch's accounts, it would be treated as high priority ..."

Stopping there, Mr Roll, would you agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. "... and high impact by SSC."

Would you agree with that, it would be treated as high impact?
A. Yes.
Q. "However, any increase in priority would not adversely impact the diligence with which work was done."

Do you agree with that?
A. I still feel that some work was rushed. I can't tell you why, but I feel that.
Q. Very good and I won't -- I don't wish to discuss your feelings on the point any more than we have already. Let's just talk briefly about getting fixes out. If I could go to paragraph 13 of your first statement please $\{\mathrm{E} 1 / 7 / 2\}$ and again to save time let me just ask you to read that paragraph.
A. Sorry, which paragraph is that?
Q. Paragraph 13 at the bottom of the page.
A. 13, thank you very much.
(Pause).
Yes.
Q. First of all, the need for multiple upgrades, that's normal in any IT infrastructure of this sort, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. The fact that there were a limited number of time windows, that's also normal for any large IT infrastructure of this sort?
A. Yes.
Q. These things are unavoidable given the scale of the Horizon system, aren't they?
A. Yes.
Q. Then you say:
"... there could be six weeks delay before a fix

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could go out, and during that period Post Office branches could continue to be affected by the coding issue."

But you would accept, wouldn't you, that if there was an urgent fix dealing with a high priority, high impact problem, that would generally be treated as an urgent matter requiring a hot fix ; would you agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. Urgent fixes were expedited, weren't they?
A. Probably within two or three days from what I remember.
Q. And that's just normal -- what you are describing here -- the impression might not be coming through from paragraph 13 , but actually what you are describing is the normal operation of proper risk management process in a commercial business, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. And then you say:
"... there could be six weeks delay before a fix could go out, and during that period Post Office branches could continue to be affected by the coding issue."

Let me just make it clear, Mr Roll, if you had identified a coding issue that was affecting branches and if there was a period of time between identifying

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[^1]
## A. Paragraph?

Q. Paragraph 14, page 3. It is only a sentence:
"As well as software issues, I can also recall that there were regular IT hardware issues at branch level."

What kind of issues are we talking about, Mr Roll?
A. I'm sorry, I still haven't found the page. Paragraph 14 ?
Q. Paragraph 14.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: You are in the wrong statement. We're in your first statement.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: It is your first witness statement, Mr Roll.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: It doesn't have any red on it .
A. I'm sorry.
(Pause).
Yes.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: What kind of issues are you talking about?
A. Hardware issues could have been keyboard failure, or a hard drive failure . "Software" here I mean --
Q. I don't need to ask you about that otherwise we will be here forever and it is not your fault, I just ...

So you're talking about those kind of issues and you say "regular". Later on in your second statement you say that you personally received one of these about once

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a month, yes?
A. That's what I was thinking, yes, when I ...
Q. And would that be reflective of what other people at your level of seniority in the SSC team were also receiving?
A. I don't know.
Q. You don't know. I was going to take you to numbers, but I won't. Let me move on instead to your second witness statement, the one with red in it. It is E1, tab 10 and I would like to ask you a couple of questions about paragraph 6 \{E1/10/2\}. This is all under the heading "Hardware failure". It is on page 7.

You talk about hardware failures in paragraph 5 and you say:
"I would estimate that I was involved with
a hardware failure on average at least once a month.
These problems could and did affect branch accounts."
How would they affect branch accounts?
A. I can't remember.
Q. Then you give an example:
"The most extreme case that I can recall was a complete failure of a counter to communicate with the server, which required the server to be removed to the SSC so that the data could be recovered, and a replacement counter installed in the sub-post office.

Prior to the problem being identified, data could be accumulating on the counter without it being replicated to other counters or the correspondence server."

This is something you experienced personally, is it?
A. Yes.
Q. And do I infer from your use of language that this happened to you once?
A. I remember one specific instance fairly clearly when it happened.
Q. Do you remember any other instances? Can you say for sure that there were any other instances?
A. No.
Q. So it may well be that this happened only once in your four years at the SSC, is that right?
A. For me, yes.
Q. You are talking about stuck transactions, aren't you, what we saw on a PEAK yesterday, marooned transactions, yes?
A. In this instance because the counter couldn't communicate at all, well, yes, they were marooned transactions. It was just very difficult to get them off.
Q. And the way to get them out was to move the machine from the branch to the SSC so that it could be downloaded, is that right?

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A. Very briefly, yes.
Q. You say -- it is a phrase in paragraph 6 I would just like to ask about. You say:
"Prior to the problem being identified, data could be accumulating ..."

Why do you say could be rather than was? Was it not clear whether that was happening or not?
A. Sometimes you may not have been aware -- if the counter hadn't been switched on for a while then data might not be actually accumulating, there might not be any stuck transactions on it.
Q. When there is a stuck transaction on a machine, that is something that's going to get identified as night follows day, isn't it, and spotted?
A. Eventually, yes.
Q. It's not something that's going to be missed and just allowed to lie there? Fujitsu itself --
A. It would be spotted.
Q. Fujitsu itself would spot that this was happening?
A. Eventually, yes.
Q. From its own monitoring, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. So that's one example of a hardware failure that could affect branch accounts because a transaction is stuck on a machine and isn't getting through to the system and
the truth of the matter is that was in an extreme case that was very rare, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And when it did happen it would be spotted and it would be fixed in the way that you described, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Then in paragraph 7 you say:
"I recall there were also PIN pad problems which caused issues in branches, and problems with other peripheral devices such as keyboards which only occurred intermittently, although I cannot recall the specific detail of these now."

Can I just get this out of the way quickly now. PIN pad problems, those are not problems which could affect branch accounts, are they?
A. I don't recall what the problems were with them or how they affected the system.
Q. And problems with other peripheral devices such as keyboards, they wouldn't affect the branch accounts, would they?
A. Probably not, no.
Q. And then you come to paragraph 8 which I think is the example that you tried to give earlier when we were discussing -- and let's see if we can finish this off before lunchtime. Could I ask you to read paragraph 8

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please, Mr Roll.
(Pause).
A. Yes.
Q. So you are describing there a problem that was spotted -- it's the kind of problem that's always ultimately going to be spotted, isn't it?
A. This particular problem, no, it -- I don't think any of the other counters that were affected had the problem, because most postmasters don't bother turning the screen off, to save the screen, it's ... so ...
Q. So you're saying it's very rare?
A. It's very rare that it would have been spotted.
Q. And it's to do with a mobile post office which makes it even rarer --
A. Yes.
Q. -- because they are a tiny proportion of the branch network, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. So we're talking about a tiny, tiny incidence, a tiny problem, but my question wasn't about how frequent it was, my question was it's a problem when it does arise that's always going to be spotted?
A. I don't know if it would always be spotted. If it was -- caused a problem at one point then it might be that it would be 24 hours before the system fixed
itself, in which case it might not actually --
Q. I see. So if the problem caused a persistent failure to replicate, that is a problem that --
A. Yes.
Q. -- was always going to be spotted?
A. Yes.
Q. So when you say it wouldn't necessarily be spotted,
that's because the system itself might deal with it appropriately?
A. Yes.
Q. But if it didn't, it was always going to be spotted?
A. Yes.
Q. Very good. And in this particular case the problem was spotted and the data was replicated, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And again, that would always be the position,
wouldn't it : once the problem is spotted this is very easy to deal with?
A. In this case, yes.
Q. Well, in all cases of this sort, yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.

Then Mr Parker deals with that in paragraph 7 of his second statement, that's $\{\mathrm{E} 2 / 12 / 3\}$. Could I ask you to read paragraph 7 to yourself. It is quite long.

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[^2]"Evidence (from event logs) shows that the power is being switched off every morning shortly (ie 5 or 6 minutes) before the [postmaster] logs on."

So that was the problem?
A. Yes.
Q. Then if we go three boxes down, 5 March at 12.09 , this is you:
"After carrying out tests on our rigs ..."
Stopping there, what rigs are you talking about?
A. I think we had three mobile test rigs in the -- on our floor.
Q. So you are not testing the postmaster's equipment, you are testing your own equipment, the sample equipment?
A. Yes, this was in Scotland I think.
Q. So very properly you go and look at the rigs and you test them, and you say:
"I have been able to duplicate the problem here on one of our rigs ."

So did you say there were three --
A. I tested all three and it only happened on one.
Q. "It seems that the screen power button is incorrectly connected to the motherboard, operating the power switch turns off power to the entire unit, not just the screen. We have now identified two instances of this, one in live. This is a hardware build quality issue ."

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## So you clearly flag this as a hardware issue.

A. Yes.
Q. And then in the next box it says:
"Responded to call type L as category 70 - Avoidance Action Supplied."

What did that mean?
A. I don't know.
Q. Then you say a little further down:
"Defect cause updated to 42:Gen - Outside Pathway Control."
A. I don't know.
Q. Doesn't it mean that it's a hardware issue that's the responsibility of another --
A. Probably, yes.
Q. -- institution that deals with hardware?
A. Probably, yes.
Q. If we could then move on there's a second associated PEAK, Mr Roll, that's at $\{\mathrm{F} / 201 / 1\}$--
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Is this just a two-page document, this one?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: It is four pages. The last one was a two-page document, my Lord, yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: The last one was.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm so sorry, I didn't understand your question.

Right, this is PC0100899. This one is dated
21 March. The summary refers to the branch and it is
the same -- you can take it from me, it's the same branch number, FAD number.

The first big box, about four lines down,
17 March 2004, so that's 12 days after you had spotted the problem on one of your three test rigs :
"SSC request base unit is removed and sent to Bracknell for investigation."

So you asked for the postmaster's mobile laptop to be physically removed and brought to you?
A. Yes.
Q. Then if we move down to the next box, 18 March, 15.55 , about four lines down:
"Recommend: base unit (node 1) to be swapped for investigation purposes."

What did that mean?
A. Bring it back to Bracknell so we could look at it .
Q. Very good. And about halfway down that same box, if you could look at the screen, it says "Recommend" and in capitals:
"PLEASE SWAP MOBILE UNIT AND RETURN TO SANDIE BOTHICK FOR PROGRESSION TO SSC."

Who was Sandie Bothick?
A. I can't remember.

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Q. Then over the page $\{F / 201 / 2\}$, on the first big box it says, you can take it from me, that the engineer has arrived at the site and the unit will not arrive in Bracknell until later in the week. Towards the bottom of the page, page 2, 18 March 16.04 Barbara Longley assigned it to you.

Then on page $3\{F / 201 / 3\}$, 24 March at 2.15 and 25 seconds it is recorded that you record that the base unit is received, do you see that? It is the penultimate box, Mr Roll?
A. Yes.
Q. And then I would like to then go to the last box on that page:
"Tests carried out on screen power switch - working correctly, no further action required."

So does that -- I mean the impression I get from reading this is that although you had found this problem on a test rig, in fact it wasn't a problem that was affecting the laptop that was used in the subpostmaster's branch. Would that be right or wrong?
A. No, it was affecting it. You didn't necessarily put these in, enter the data as it happened, if you like. So the base unit would have arrived, I worked on it and then I went and -- so I changed the switchover so it worked properly and then we put it back into stock and
then I filled the data in on that.
Q. I see. So we have a batch of faulty laptops and then if we go back to paragraph 8 of your witness statement, at the bottom of page 7 that's E1, tab 10 , page 7 , you say:
"When I raised this with my manager, Mik Peach, he initially told me not to do anything until he had spoken to someone about this."

Who would he have spoken to about it?
A. I don't know.
Q. It would have been the people who were responsible for hardware issues, wouldn't it?
A. Probably.
Q. So you raised the problem with him and he said "Hang on, I will just speak to the responsible people", would that be a fair way of describing what you are saying?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you say:
"Mick did subsequently talk to the hardware team.
They were responsible for ensuring that ..."
A. I'm certain it was them that he spoke to.
Q. And then you say:
"At which point I found out that this was a known problem."

Is that what Mr Peach told you?
A. At some point I found out that there were several units

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out there that had been changed. I' $m$ not sure if it was Mik Peach that told me or if somebody else told me from the hardware team, I can't remember.
Q. Well, it is quite important, bearing in mind the impression given at the end of this witness statement. Can you really not remember whether Mr Peach was aware of this?
A. Mr Peach was aware of it at some point, that he knew.
Q. And would it be fair to infer that he probably knew because he had spoken -- if this is true he would have spoken to the hardware team about it?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you say:
"No one outside the team responsible for building the laptops had been informed of this, which meant that I had spent several days investigating the problem."

Is this why you remember, because you were cross?
A. Yes.
Q. "Whereas the subpostmistress in this case was provided with a replacement laptop, knowledge of this problem was kept within the departments concerned and the batch of faulty laptops was not recalled."

Are you saying that there was prior knowledge in the hardware team of the problem and the hardware team had not recalled the faulty laptops?

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A. Yes.
Q. Is that what you are saying? And what was your source of knowledge for that?
A. I was told there were several laptops that had the problem on them that had actually gone out into live -into the estate.
Q. How did the hardware team know that the laptops had problems with them given that they had already been distributed out? You're not suggesting that the hardware team identified a problem with a laptop and then sent it out to branches, are you?
A. No, I think what happened is that they suddenly realised they made a mistake at some point but by that time several had already gone out, so then they were able to fix the ones they had ...
Q. And you're saying they didn't recall the others. And do you know how many we're talking about?
A. No.
Q. Could it be two, could it be one?
A. It could have been two, it could have been half a dozen.
Q. So that's the period leading up to the point when the SSC gets involved and you write two PEAKs saying "There is faulty hardware here". Are you in a position to say -- or are you claiming that once Mr Peach had spoken to the hardware team, that remained the position, that
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the hardware team continued to not recall these units?
A. I don't know what happened after that.
Q. Isn't it fairly obvious that once someone quite senior like Mr Peach from the SSC had spoken to the hardware team, the people involved would very quickly have thought "Good gracious me, I had better recall these outstanding laptops"; would that not be a fair inference as to what happened?
A. My inference from this was that it was kept in-house and as a favour and that: okay, we know it happened, it's not going to happen again, it was very limited impact, it 's having probably no impact on the estate, so it 's not worth recalling the laptops.
Q. You say "inference" and that's a fair word to use because it's a word I think I put to you, but you are not saying, are you, that you were told by anyone that after Mr Peach had told the hardware team of the problem that was being encountered, you're not saying that you know that the hardware team continued to sit on their hands and not call the laptops back?
A. Something at the time made me certain that was what was going on.
Q. Something at the time made you certain?
A. Yes. I don't know why l've got that certainty in my mind, but -- and then I was told to put minimal details
on that last -- the last PINICL.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, two more minutes and then we break, would your Lordship give me some indulgence?
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I will on this occasion give you the two minutes.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm grateful.
This looks as if it might be quite a serious allegation. It is one you have just made by this amendment that I received at 10.30 yesterday morning.
A. Yes.
Q. You say:
"I was told by Mik Peach not to include any details of this when I closed the PINICL."

Which is the predecessor of PEAKs. That's
an extraordinary -- are you suggesting, Mr Roll, that the manager of the SSC -- which that's a senior position, isn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. It's a senior management position?
A. Yes.
Q. That he took the view that the hardware team having done this thing that was bad, having allowed bad laptops to remain in circulation, he also took the view that the hardware team should be protected from any criticism and they should be allowed to continue the process under

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which those laptops remained in circulation?
A. I've got no idea what view he took, but I was asked -or told rather not to put -- not to include too much detail in that PINICL.
Q. Why? Did he tell you why?
A. I can't remember.
Q. What conceivable motive would someone like Mr Peach have to affect the record in this extraordinary way?
A. The only motive I can think is that if he was friends -close friends with another manager on the same level and that manager had covered up something in his department then Mik Peach out of friendship and as a favour might have decided that it wasn't worth -- having passed the information on to his manager -- the other manager, it was then his responsibility what to do with it. I got the impression nothing was going to be done with it because of what I was told, but I might be wrong.
Q. Well, Mr Roll, I had thought that when I asked you questions about this you would rather retreat from the allegation that Mr Peach -- who obviously isn't here to defend himself -- did this thing. Are you saying that it is within your knowledge that Mr Peach was a friend of the person who was in charge of the hardware team?
A. No.
Q. So that's speculation?
A. That's speculation.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: But to be fair to the witness,
Mr De Garr Robinson, you did put the question what conceivable motive might Mr Peach have, which is in any case inviting speculation I think.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: That's true.
But that's all you have, you have no basis for --
A. No.
Q. No other basis for thinking that Mr Peach would --
A. No.
Q. The extraordinary thing about this, Mr Roll, is you accept, don't you -- and these are my last questions -you accept, don't you, that it is not in anyone's interests, it's not in the SSC's interests for these faulty laptops to remain in circulation; you accept that, don't you?
A. The only people who would have an interest in this would be the person who might be sacked for trying to cover it up in the first place.
Q. So it is not in the interests of the SSC team that they remain in circulation?
A. No.
Q. It's not in the interests of Fujitsu that they remain in circulation?
A. No.

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Q. You say it could be in the interests of the person who was responsible for not having pulled them back, but if the machines remain out there in circulation, that just increases the likelihood of that person ending up being sacked, doesn't it? Isn't it in that person's interests to get these damn machines back as quickly as he or she can?
A. Yes, then that would -- yes, it would be.
Q. But you do maintain, do you, that you think that person, whoever it was, didn't do that?
A. That was the impression I got at the time, yes.
Q. The impression from whom?
A. I can't remember, but that is how I -- that is what I think happened. You might be right though, you could be right there that -- I was I suppose basing my presumption, which is what it was basically, on the thought that to have to recall the laptops would expose the person to, you know, "Why were you recalling them?", but as you have just pointed out it would probably have been better to recall them and then not have to worry about them sitting out there and potentially causing a problem later.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right. If you are going to pursue this any further you can do it at 2.15 . We really have to try and finish at 1 for the shorthand writers, really.

It's not for any personal convenience.
Right, we are going to come back at quarter past 2. You are still in the witness box. You mustn't talk to anyone about your evidence. And I will see everyone at 2.15.
( 1.15 pm )
(The luncheon adjournment)
( 2.15 pm )
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, good afternoon.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: We have to stop at 4.30 .
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I'm conscious of the need to speed.
I'm going to move on to remote access now, Mr Roll.
Could I ask you to go to paragraph 15 of your first statement which is at $\{\mathrm{E} 1 / 7 / 3\}$. You said:
"During the course of resolving software issues ..." And I asked about software issues. You said:
"... we would frequently access a Post Office counter IT system remotely. An example of a relatively common problem that arose was when a binary bit would ' flip' thus a ' 1 ' became a ' 0 '.'

I want to ask you what you are talking about when you describe that phenomenon and I want to ask you whether you are talking about what Mr Parker talks about in paragraph 55 of his witness statement, so could we go to bundle E2 behind divider 11 please. It is at page 15

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$\{E 2 / 11 / 15\}$ and perhaps I could ask you to read paragraph 55 through and stop at the end of 55.4. (Pause).
A. I have read that page.
Q. Very good. When you are describing what you describe in paragraph 15 are you referring to the condition known as CRC errors?
A. This problem would probably cause -- would cause a CRC error.
Q. And would Mr Parker be right when he says at the end of paragraph 55.1:
"To clarify, this process did not involve changing any transaction data."

In accordance with the definition we have discussed.
A. This error would occur in a line of transaction data. Now, every digit, every character in that transaction data is made up of bits, binary bits. So an A -I don't remember the full binary code for it, but it might be 101010 for instance. Now, times that could flip so it would become 110 or whatever, one of the digits would change. That character would then cease becoming an A and might become a non-principal character or an ampersand or something. That would then cause a CRC fail because the data wouldn't be -- it wouldn't add up.

To correct that when we detected that what would happen at that point is that that message store would then stop replicating . So transactions would then start accumulating on the message store after that point.

We could copy the data that had been -- we could copy the message store off that counter intact, from what I remember, so we would get all of it off.
Q. Yes.
A. You could then identify the line that was broken, for want after better word, and by looking at it, it was quite obvious then which character was wrong, if it was -- if it should have been an angle bracket, it was something else, so you could then correct that in a text editor. And basically you could then put that transaction back in to the message store and then copy the rest of the data back on top of it that you had taken off, so you have corrected that particular line of code. So in this instance we have rewritten a line of code into the message store to correct it.
Q. Mr Roll, I want to distinguish now between inserting individual transactions into a message store -- which you could do and you have read the witness statement so you know it is accepted that you could do that. I want to talk though about the process that you appear to have describing here. It's not possible, is it -- if there's

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data on the message store, it's not possible for you to gain access to the message store in Riposte and alter any line of transaction data? It's physically impossible to do that, isn't it?
A. The way I understand it and what I believe is that if that data hadn't been replicated, if it was on a single server -- sorry, a single counter, if we took that data off and deleted some of it, we could possibly then have created something else and put it on and then by importing it into Riposte it would then have rewritten the cyclic redundancy check correctly so it wouldn't have flagged an error.
Q. Mr Roll, you started by explaining a situation where transactions are stuck on a particular counter and they are not replicating.
A. Yes.
Q. The moving of the bit from 1 to 0 is what you could do remotely in order to unlock the counter so that the replication process would occur as normal?
A. Yes, but to do that we would have to delete -- from what I remember, we would have to delete the existing data, including the broken line of data, and then import the data back into the counter, so we were writing code into the message store remotely.
Q. Mr Roll, I'm asking you about the process by which you
unlock a counter so that it is able to replicate onto other counters.
A. Yes.
Q. And what I'm suggesting to you is that the process of doing that does not involve changing/editing any actual transaction data, any -- as we have discussed -- data that shows up in the accounts. That doesn't involve in he changing of transaction data at all, does it?
A. I'm sorry, I'm -- I think we're talking -- I'm obviously not understanding what you're getting at because to me what I'm discussing is changing the transaction data.
I'mat a bit of a loss here.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, you are explaining that that's the change which happens.
A. Yes.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Mr De Garr Robinson is either putting to you that that physically can't happen, which I think is one of the questions he put, or he is putting questions in relation to something else. So he is just going to explore that with you.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Could you go please to Mr Godeseth's witness statement which is in E2 behind divider 1 and I would like to go to page 11 please $\{E 2 / 1 / 11\}$. Perhaps we could pick it up at paragraph 35, Mr Roll. Could you read paragraph 35 very quickly and then indicate whether

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you agree with it or not.
(Pause).
A. Yes.
Q. And you agree with it?
A. Normally that's what was happening, yes, unless something had broken.
Q. Then if we go to paragraph 37:
"All accounting at the counter was carried out based on the data held in the message store."

That's right, isn't it?
A. I'm just reading it.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Mr De Garr Robinson, I know that you have slightly run out of time but you can't really rush him too much.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: You are right.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: You are putting 12 or 14 lines of text. Right, have you read it now?
A. Yes.

MR DE GARR ROBINSON: So the first sentence is right, isn't it?
A. I believe so, yes.
Q. And the second sentence:
"The Riposte product managed the message store and it did not allow any message to be updated or deleted, although it did allow for data to be archived once it
had reached a sufficient age ..."
A. Yes.
Q. It is correct, isn't it, that Riposte didn't allow any transaction line in the message store to be individually deleted or changed or edited in any way?
A. You couldn't do it through Riposte, no. You had to hack the system to do it.
Q. So would this be right then, that it wouldn't be possible to remotely access a counter and change the data on the message store of that counter remotely?
A. I believe that theoretically it would.
Q. How would that be possible? Riposte wouldn't allow you to do it, would it?
A. By doing the system that I have just said. If you could -- without the message store replicating, so there's no other copies of it, if you could get that message store off, alter the data in some of the lines of code, to do that you would need to strip out all of the preamble and the post-amble, so you're just then left with the basic data as if it had been on the stack or whatever -- forgive me, I'm very rusty on this -- but then by -- I think it was the Riposte import but it might have been something else, you could then reinject that data which is the process we would have used to rebuild a counter. But if you had changed some of that

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data, I think that it would then have rewritten the CRC when it imported it so that then when it replicated, the data could theoretically have been changed.
Q. I'm finding it difficult to follow you and it may be my fault.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I follow what the witness is saying but keep exploring it .
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I would like to distinguish though between transactions insertions -- the process of injecting particular transactions into the message store, which could be done, with the process of actually manually changing a transaction line that is in the message store and you could insert new transactions, couldn't you, but what you couldn't do is you couldn't edit or indeed individually delete lines that were in the message store itself?
A. You would have to delete all of the message -- from what I remember, delete all of the messages down to a certain point to the one you wanted to amend and then inject a load more text, or insert more transactions in to make the message store and Riposte think that it had been put in by Riposte and by the postmaster.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I think you can probably explore this with the experts.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I think I probably should.

So if we go back to Mr Parker's witness statement $\{E 2 / 11 / 16\}$, the process that's described in paragraph 55.4, would you agree that -- you have already read this paragraph, would you agree with what Mr Parker says in --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Wait, it is not on the screen yet.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: E2/11/16.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Page 1 is up but 16 isn't.
(Pause).
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Paragraph 55.4, you have read this already. Is what Mr Parker says there true?
A. In that case, yes, no new data is added, what we have done is correct data and put it back in.
Q. And paragraph 55, Mr Parker -- you will recall how 55 is structured. Mr Parker is trying to figure out what you are talking about and he suggests first of all you might be talking about the process that's described in paragraphs 55.1 to 55.4 and then he says:
" Alternatively, Mr Roll's reference to a binary code flipping may relate to a configuration item ..."

And then he goes on, he gives an example of:
"... a stock unit lock which, in the wrong state, would prevent updates to stock units within a branch. This issue was corrected by a member of the SSC accessing Horizon remotely, but it did not involve

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accessing or editing transaction data in any way or re-creating databases."

Is that true?
A. I can't remember that. I was not referring to that process.
Q. Very good. And then Mr Parker says:
"I cannot think of any other examples of incidents that Mr Roll may be referring to in paragraph 15."

And you are suggesting there is another way, the one that you have just described, are you?
A. That's the way I remember doing it.
Q. Okay. And you continue -- if we go back to paragraph 15 of your original statement $\{E 1 / 7 / 3\}$-- would you excuse me a moment.

It is suggested to me that you may be describing a process that Mr Parker describes in his second witness statement; let me go to that very briefly just to see if you are. \{E2/12/12\} paragraph 38.2. Let's read the whole of 38 together. He says:
"For completeness, in the rare circumstances where it was necessary for Fujitsu to rebuild transaction data in Legacy Horizon, there were three possible scenarios:
"[1] when a counter failed and there was a complete replication of that counter's transactions elsewhere, Fujitsu simply deleted the message (transaction) store

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on the faulty counter and used the standard facilities of the Riposte software to rebuild the data from the replicated copy. In this scenario, the branch would be unable to use the counter while this process was carried out ..."
Is that correct?
A. I think so.
Q. You don't have a clear recollection?
A. I don't have a clear recollection of that.
Q. 38.2:
"Where no replicated copies of the transactions existed on the network, Fujitsu would physically retrieve the disc from the faulty counter. The disc should hold all of the transactions that had taken place on the counter. At its own office, the SSC would extract the transaction data and deliver it to the replacement counter without amending that data."
Stopping there, is that true?
A. In some instances, yes.
Q. "The SSC would need the subpostmaster's memory card ... to decrypt the data. This was a physical card (a subpostmaster had two) and Fujitsu would have to borrow one - so the subpostmaster would know what was happening."
Is that true?
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A. I don't remember the memory cards. I don't remember that process of it.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: You might be able to save time by jumping to the penultimate sentence of that paragraph.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: If I could do the intermediate ones. Next sentence:
"If Fujitsu were to change anything, it would be to remove the envelope around the transaction data. The envelope contains the system admin data ie the sequence number of the data and its ID."
A. That's what I remember doing, yes.
Q. That's what you are talking about?
A. That's one of -- yes.
Q. And just now when you were describing the process that I'm afraid rather confused me, that's what you are talking about here?
A. Yes, that was one of the steps in it.
Q. Thank you. And then it says:
"Fujitsu would not change the transaction data itself and in removing the envelope data, they would simply be allowing the system to automatically renumber the transactions when they were reinserted."

Is that what you are talking about?
A. Effectively, yes, but this is where -- if it was that transaction data that had the corruption in it then all
we would do is correct it to put it back to what it should have been, so in that instance -- in that effect we're not changing the data, we're merely correcting it .
Q. Well, my suggestion to you will be that you never and would never manually change a transaction line of data that a postmaster had keyed in. That's just not something SSC would ever do.
A. The process I have just described is something we did, as far as I remember it.

The process of actually changing a line of code to change it from $£ 100$ to $£ 10$, we would never have done that.
Q. So -- I mean Mr Parker says -- let 's go back to this sentence:
"Fujitsu would not change the transaction data itself and in removing the envelope data, they would simply be allowing the system to automatically renumber the transactions when they were reinserted."

I'm suggesting to you, Mr Roll, that that's the most that anyone at the SSC would ever do in terms of changing transaction data?
A. That's not my recollection of it. It was a long time ago though.
Q. And then he says:
"Ultimately, when the counter was replaced at the
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branch the subpostmaster would be able to see what Fujitsu had done."

Is that true?
A. Again, my understanding is that in certain circumstances the data would be indistig ... sorry.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Indistinguishable, is that what you are trying to say?
A. Yes. Yes, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: You couldn't tell the difference?
A. You couldn't tell the difference. The postmaster wouldn't be able to tell the difference from data that he had entered as he was scanning a stamp or whatever and to what we had put in. That's my understanding -my recollection.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Well, I suggest to you, Mr Roll, that no one at SSC would ever manually change a line of transaction data and then reinsert that transaction data into the message store of any branch. There might be occasions when new transactions were inserted, but it was more than the job of an SSC member was worth to actually start mucking about with lines of existing transaction data.
A. Can I say that we were not "mucking about" with lines of transaction data. We were trying to rebuild counters. If I can take the instance after single-counter
post office where one of the lines of data had been corrupted. Without correcting that corruption and then reinserting it, if the corruption remained then that line of data would have continued to cause problems.
Q. Well, you have heard the case I have put to you. Could I ask you this -- well, actually, can I please ask you to go to E2/13/4, which is the third witness statement of Mr Godeseth. Page 4, paragraph 17. Perhaps I could ask you to read that.
A. Sorry, paragraph 17 was this?
Q. This is where Mr Godeseth is referring -- I don't have time to take you to the underlying PEAKs --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: We are in Parker 3.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: We should be in Godeseth 3, E2, tab 13. I'm so sorry, it should be $\{\mathrm{E} 2 / 14 / 5\}$. Could I ask you to read paragraph 17 please.

> (Pause).
A. I have read that, yes.
Q. Might that be what you are talking about?
A. No, I don't recognise this .
Q. So are you in a position to confirm what Mr Godeseth says or not?
A. No, because the data that -- I'm unsure what BRDB refers to --
Q. I'm so sorry, that's Horizon Online.

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A. -- but the data would have been transaction data that we could have been changing, from my recollection of it.
Q. Then the process you are describing in your witness statement -- you say that you would -- I'm looking now at paragraph 15 of your first statement $\{\mathrm{E} 1 / 7 / 3\}$, you say that you would contact the branch and arrange for them to stop using the computer for a limited period of time. You would then log on to the branch's system, download all the data from the relevant computer. Now, stopping there, when you say "log on to the branch's system", which system are you logging on to?
A. Sorry, we would log into the counter that was faulty .
Q. When you say log into it, you wouldn't physically log into the counters, you wouldn't be in control of the counters, would you?
A. The counter had to be switched on -- my recollection is that if the postmaster hadn't logged on then we could log on with our ID to access the message store and the Riposte system. In that instance there would be an audit trail because our user ID would be in the message store not the postmaster's.

In certain circumstances we could do that. In other instances, the way I remember it is that for the system to operate correctly for the accounting, it had to be the same user ID logged on, so that postmaster, or that
clerk or whatever would have to be logged in with their ID and password so that any data we changed, or put back on, would then go in with their ID, which is why they couldn't use it, then that data would then be picked up correctly by Riposte, Riposte would assume that the postmaster had been operating as normal and would accept the data into the message store and process it correctly .
Q. Could you tell me what were the circumstances in which you had to use the same user ID as the original user?
A. I can't remember what the differences were for the different errors, but it depended on what error was coming up and what bit of data was corrupt -- where the corruption lay in the message store.
Q. So you can't think of a specific reason why it would have to be the same person, but you're saying that it did sometimes?
A. Yes, it -- sorry.
Q. I didn't let you finish .
A. I have lost my train of thought now, sorry. It often made it much cleaner for accounting reasons, from what I remember, if it was the same user ID. All of this -all of these actions would be detailed in the PINICL and if -- from what I remember, if you were accessing a counter in this way, two people had to be there, one

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as an independent witness to make sure that everything was going correctly .
Q. So there would have to be what we now call PEAKs and there would have to be two pairs of eyes --
A. That was what --
Q. -- it would never be left to one particular member of the SSC team to do it on his own?
A. It was never supposed to be and I don't think it ever was but I'm not sure.
Q. So this is a formal process then, is it --
A. Yes.
Q. -- which the SSC took very seriously?
A. It was developed and taken very seriously, yes.
Q. And is it also the case that Post Office consent was always needed for this kind of process?
A. When I was there we were supposed to speak to the postmaster to get his consent. So from Post Office consent, that's what I believe you mean by that. Formal consent from the Post Office itself, maybe not.
Q. Do you remember the phrase OCPs? The operational change process --
A. No.
Q. -- does that ring a bell? Do you remember that a form needed to be filled in in which Post Office consent was obtained for alterations to data that could affect
branch accounts?
A. No.
Q. You don't remember? Can I suggest to you that that was the process and that did have to be complied with.
A. Right. It may have been, yes.
Q. And you are also saying that it was also required that postmaster consent had to be obtained for this kind of change, yes?
A. That was my understanding of the consent that was obtained. It was just one of those things that if you were going to $\log$ on to a counter remotely for whatever reason then you spoke to the -- you should speak to the postmaster first and get his consent.
Q. And it stands to reason, doesn't it, that if you started -- forgive me for the loose form of language, but if you start fiddling with data on his machines that could have an impact on his branch accounts, he or she could hit the roof, couldn't he? He or she would need to know what was happening so as to avoid any upset?
A. Yes.
Q. And is it the case that when you engaged in this process you ensured that proper protocols were followed that you have just described?
A. Yes.

Excuse me, I have just got cramp in my leg, sorry
about that.
Q. Mr Roll, we have discussed what you say you could do and I have put my case to you. The controls, the permission controls, the change controls that we have just discussed, that is having another colleague in the SSC review what changes you are making, obtaining
Post Office consent and obtaining subpostmaster consent to anything that could have an impact on branch accounts, you followed those processes both for the process that you're describing, with which I have certain reservations, but also with the process of transaction insertions that we're coming to in a few minutes, yes?
A. Yes, as far as I'm aware.
Q. If you did anything that could have an impact on branch accounts, those processes had to be followed, didn't they?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. So in paragraph 16 of your first witness statement $\{E 1 / 7 / 3\}$, you say:
"Still on the subject of remote access to branch systems, as I recall some errors were corrected remotely without the subpostmaster being aware."

Those errors are not errors -- or rather those corrections were not corrections which changed branch
accounts in the way that we discussed?
A. No.
Q. You're talking about other errors, aren't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you give some examples of the kind of errors you are talking about?
A. I can't remember I'm afraid.
Q. But would it be things like changing configuration items?
A. Probably, yes.
Q. That sort of thing, which would not have an impact on the branch accounts in the way that we have previously discussed?
A. I think so, yes.
Q. Now, the process that you describe in paragraph 15, you say "We would frequently access a post office counter IT system remotely". The occasions on which you would access a post office counter remotely in order to change lines of transaction data, whether by inserting something or engaging in the other process that we have discussed and I have queried, these changes would only arise in circumstances where the cyclic redundancy check had been triggered where there had been some problem which the CRC system had identified as requiring attention, would that be right?

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A. I'm not sure. I think so.
Q. Very good. Then could I ask you just to look back to Mr Parker's first witness statement at paragraph 55.3 $\{E 2 / 11 / 15\}$ and the top of page 16. He is talking about the CRC process and he says:
" If one of the sets of data on a branch counter became corrupted it would generate an event that would be picked up by the SMC and/or reported to HSD by the branch (an incident reporting a 'CRC error'). There were a total of 629 CRC errors over the life of Legacy Horizon ..."

Would you be in a position to challenge that calculation?
A. That's not my recollection of it. My recollection is that some of these errors that I'm describing we would detect because a counter perhaps hadn't replicated for two or three days, so we would then look to see why it had not replicated and that's when we would find out that the postmaster was still using it, transactions were accumulating on the counter and a corruption at some level had stopped the counter replicating after that point, so we would -- from my recollection it wasn't an error that we were receiving, it was something we were monitoring on an ongoing basis.
Q. Could I just ask you about that, Mr Roll. It's always
dangerous to ask a question to which you don't think you know the answer, but I can understand that something may happen to a counter which means it stops replicating to its fellow systems within the branch; what I don't understand is why it would stop replicating because of a problem with a particular line of -- with a particular transaction message. Why would a particular transaction message stop the unit communicating with its fellow units?
A. A corrupt line of code in the message store would, from my recollection, stop that message store replicating. I can't remember why, but the messages, as I say, including that corrupt one wouldn't get replicated. That's how you could find out which one was broken, you could look at the message store and see that up to line 9,004 had come through, so you would know, if the postmaster had carried on using it, that 9,005 was the bad message.
Q. And would I be right in thinking that the problem with 9,005 , there would be a problem in the envelope, the data in the envelope around the transaction?
A. Not necessarily, it could be in the data itself .
Q. Why would that be?
A. Because of data corruption.
Q. But why would that -- why, for example, if there was

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a problem in the amount that was recorded in the relevant transaction, why would that stop the counter replicating --
A. I don't know, but it did. That's the way I remember it.
Q. Let's move on to transaction insertions. Paragraph 18 of your first witness statement, that's page $3\{E 1 / 7 / 3\}$, you say:
"The ability to remotely access the Horizon system at branch level was extensive, in that we were able to change not only data and transaction information, but we also had the ability to insert transactions and transfer money remotely ..."

I'm not going to ask you about transferring money remotely, the evidence has been explored in a series of witness statements, but what I'm seeking to ascertain from you is that you are talking about two different forms of changing data, are you: firstly, the form of data that you have just discussed, data changing that we have just discussed; and secondly, the form of transaction insertions? Are they entirely separate, or are they the same thing?
A. Separate.
Q. They're separate, are they?

During the course of your time at the SSC did you ever insert a transaction using that facility?
A. I don't think so.
Q. You don't think you did?
A. No. I believe there were instances where corrections had to be made because data hadn't been written in and some members of staff were able to add lines in to correct the problems that were coming up, but I can't remember -- I think -- I can't remember which ones they were.
Q. So when you say in paragraph 18 "we were able to change not only data and transaction information, but we also had the ability to insert transactions", when you say in the next sentence "obviously this was not done by me", are you referring to the ability to insert transactions and the ability to transfer money?
A. Yes.
Q. So you couldn't do either of those things?
A. I could have done. From my recollection.
Q. I'm so sorry, you didn't do either of those things?
A. No. What I'm referring to here is somebody -- if you want to be dishonest -- if the postmaster was using the counter then my recollection was that you could have logged onto the counter without the postmaster knowing --
Q. I don't need to ask you any questions about that, Mr Roll, but I understand why you want to tell me.

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Going back to the form of access you refer to in paragraph 15, this is the situation you're referring to: the counter would stop replicating, you would be aware that the counter would stop replicating . Would that come up in the automatic checks?
A. Yes, I think it was something that certainly in the early days we were looking for, was counters that hadn't communicated for three days or so.
Q. And then you would gain reading access to that counter and see what had happened?
A. You would just log in.
Q. And you would see that the transactions had stopped replicating at a particular point, is that right?
A. Basically, yes. Quite often the postmaster would have gone on holiday, so the counter was turned off or something and that's why it wasn't replicating. In that case there was no need to do anything. In other instances you would see that the postmaster was still using the counter and that's when you would realise there was a problem.
Q. And what would the nature of the problem be? What would be wrong with the line of data that would make the machine stop replicating?
A. As I have previously said, one of the lines of -a digit or a bit somewhere, from what I remember, would

have been flipped.
Q. And are you suggesting that that wrongly flipped bit could also have the effect of, I don't know, making the transaction wrong, making it for $£ 100$ rather than $£ 10$, something like that?
A. Originally I thought that, but I don't think it would, because merely flicking one bit wouldn't alter the data that much. It would make one of the digits wrong but not to the extent that it ...
Q. So the basic features of the transaction, whether it was a purchase of stamps, or a sale of insurance or whatever the transaction was, and the amount involved, the sort of basic features of the transaction that end up having an impact on the branch accounts, the problem you're talking about requiring fixing wouldn't involve any corruption of those features, would it?
A. It could be that if it was $£ 100$ then one of the zeros would get flipped to a non-numerical value.
Q. And that error might itself, what, prevent -- might it also prevent the machine from replicating?
A. That might then prevent the message store from replicating .
Q. This is a voyage of discovery for both of us.
In that situation you say that you would correct the data in the way that you have described?
A. Yes.
Q. And we have already discussed whether you could or not, but how would you know what change to make to the data? How would you know, for example, that it should be $£ 100$ or $£ 105$ or $£ 10$, what investigations would you carry out?
A. You would -- by looking at the value, for example if it was 100 , or should have been, then it would be 1 and maybe a backspace character and a zero. Now, if you change any one of those bits, from my recollection only one of them would result in a numerical value. If you wanted a different numerical value to the original one you would have to change two bits and the chances of two bits becoming corrupted at once were astronomically small.

It would also then if you corrected it -- if you changed to put the wrong value in then there would be probably an accounts or a cash balance mismatch, so you knew that by changing one of the bits you would then get a numerical value and that should -- when it is run through the books properly, it wouldn't affect -- there would be no errors.
Q. So are you saying that when you did this there was a means by which you could be absolutely sure what the right figure should be?
A. Yes.
Q. And how often -- I'm inferring, but it may be optimism bias on my part, but I'm inferring that of the problems that caused counters to stop replicating there were many many problems that didn't involve the basic features of the transaction data being wrong and I'm thinking that the cases in which that problem was caused by the transaction features itself being wrong was a very, very small proportion. Would that be right?
A. Unfortunately this is one of the things where the mundane solutions, which are very easily fixed, you tend to forget about and this, which is a very complex solution, tends to make more of a -- more of a memorable impact. So my perception is that it was frequent, or it certainly sticks in my mind more, but I wouldn't --
I would say it was only a small -- a --
Q. Would you be able to give an estimate --
A. No.
Q. -- as to how many times you did it in the four years?
A. No.
Q. Would it be -- it would be less than a handful?
A. I would think every couple of months, but I could be wrong.
Q. You could be wrong.

It is right, isn't it, that Fujitsu generally, the SSC, was extremely reluctant to make any changes to the

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basic features of transaction data that we have been discussing?
A. Yes.
Q. That's not something they regarded as their job, correct?
A. Sorry, the changes to the transaction data?
Q. The basic features of the transaction data?
A. How do you mean by ..?
Q. Well, changing a figure in the -- the discussion that we have just been having?
A. Right. That would have been our job because it was trying to fix a corruption in the data.
Q. All right. And let me suggest to you that it is something you only did when you absolutely had to do it?

## A. Yes.

Q. So I would like now to ask you to go to your second statement, paragraph 20 please \{E1/10/6\}. You say about halfway down that paragraph -- we may have discussed this already, but here you are describing transaction insertions and there's a discussion about whether you could use the correspondence server to piggy-back through the gateway. And then you say:
"The nature of many problems meant that we had to implement a fix in this way rather than going to the correspondence server, and we frequently did use this
method in practice ."
Could you explain the nature of the problems which
meant it was necessary to use that mechanism?
A. No.
Q. Can you identify a single problem that requires you to
do it that way?
A. I can't remember any specific examples, but it was --
I do remember that quite often we went to the counter as
opposed to the correspondence server.
Q. And then you say:
"If we injected transactions in this way, at the
counter position, then the counter position would be
shown in the branch records and reports as the relevant
counter position used in the branch ..."
Then going to the next sentence:
"Sometimes we had to ask for a specific person to
log in to the counter before injecting transactions so
that the software would not detect any discrepancies."
Could you explain why that was?
A. The way that I remember it, if you -- if the system --
if Riposte was looking at a batch of transactions going
through, so you had a certain user ID logged in, if it
then suddenly saw right in the middle a different user
ID, it would reject that transaction, it wouldn't
process it, it would --
Q. When you say transaction, we are obviously not talking
about transactions undertaken at the branch, we're not
talking about sale -- we have already established --
A. I am in this instance, sorry.
Q. Wasn't your previous evidence, Mr Roll, that you have
never used transaction insertions so as to insert
transactions into --
A. I'm sorry, we're ... I misunderstood your question in
that case. Yes, I did insert transaction data on
occasion into the counter servers under the processes
that we have discussed where we would correct data,
log into the server -- sorry, into the counter and then
put the corrected data back in. I wouldn't insert
data -- or I don't recall inserting data to correct the
system when data had not been written by Riposte.
I believe that on occasion lines of transaction data
were not written into the message store when they should
have been and that there was a way of correcting that
and inserting new lines into the message store, perhaps
not with accounting data in it, but with ancillary data
to -- so that the message store would continue
processing and running properly and I believe that
certain members of SSC did that.
Q. You didn't though?
A. I don't recall ever having to do that myself, no.
method in practice."
Could you explain the nature of the problems which meant it was necessary to use that mechanism?
A. No.
Q. Can you identify a single problem that requires you to do it that way?
A. I can't remember any specific examples, but it was --

I do remember that quite often we went to the counter as opposed to the correspondence server.
Q. And then you say:
"If we injected transactions in this way, at the counter position, then the counter position would be shown in the branch records and reports as the relevant counter position used in the branch ..."

Then going to the next sentence:
"Sometimes we had to ask for a specific person to log in to the counter before injecting transactions so that the software would not detect any discrepancies."

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A. The way that I remember it, if you -- if the system -if Riposte was looking at a batch of transactions going through, so you had a certain user ID logged in, if it then suddenly saw right in the middle a different user ID, it would reject that transaction, it wouldn't process it, it would --

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Q. When you say transaction, we are obviously not talking about transactions undertaken at the branch, we're not talking about sale -- we have already established --
A. I am in this instance, sorry.
Q. Wasn't your previous evidence, Mr Roll, that you have never used transaction insertions so as to insert transactions into --
A. I'm sorry, we're ... I misunderstood your question in that case. Yes, I did insert transaction data on occasion into the counter servers under the processes that we have discussed where we would correct data, log into the server -- sorry, into the counter and then put the corrected data back in. I wouldn't insert data -- or I don't recall inserting data to correct the system when data had not been written by Riposte. I believe that on occasion lines of transaction data were not written into the message store when they should have been and that there was a way of correcting that and inserting new lines into the message store, perhaps not with accounting data in it, but with ancillary data to -- so that the message store would continue processing and running properly and I believe that certain members of SSC did that.
Q. You didn't though?
A. I don't recall ever having to do that myself, no.
Q. If we could look at the transcript at the bottom of page 134. My question to you at the top of the page was:
"Question: ... during the course of your time at the SSC did you ever insert a transaction using that facility ."

And you said:
"Answer: I don't think so."
A. Could we scroll up a little bit further please.
Q. Yes, if we could just go up the page.
A. Thank you.
Q. So I say at line 5 :
"Question: Let's move on to transaction insertions. Paragraph 18 ..."

You refer to them and I quote -- I read out
what paragraph 18 says.
A. Right.
Q. And I say:
"Question: I'm not going to ask you about transferring money remotely ... what I'm seeking to ascertain from you is that you are talking about two different forms of changing data, are you: firstly, the form of data that you have just discussed, data changing that we have just discussed; and secondly, the form of transaction insertions? Are they entirely separate, or

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are they the same thing?
"Answer: Separate.
"Question: During the course of your time at the SSC did you ever insert a transaction using that facility?"
"Answer: I don't think so."
A. I'm sorry, you've got two types of data here which we were discussing. The first one yes, the second one no.
Q. Sorry, and what are the two types of data?
A. So the first one is where we have had the bit that's been corrected, as I have described, and where we have corrected the bit, created a text file which we then log on to the counter via the server with the postmaster logged on but not using the machine. We then ran I think it was an import tool to rebuild the message store on the counter. That's the way that I recall it.
Q. Yes.
A. So that is the process I was involved in.
Q. I see. I think there may be a very large penny dropping, Mr Roll. So the process that we discussed perhaps 40 minutes ago that threw me somewhat, I will be frank, was a process -- I think what you're saying -involving two different actions. The first one was the action to get hold of the data that hadn't replicated and make sure it did get onto the system, but the second was to deal with the problem of a line of transaction
data that was stopping the counter from operating?
A. By -- sorry, if I can just stop you there. Getting that data copied, it meant we had to correct that line of data first to get the data to replicate properly.
Q. Right. But are you saying that the line of data that you corrected was actually a new transaction that you inserted using the transaction insertion facility?
A. It was -- in this instance no it wasn't a new transaction, it was an existing transaction that was put in, but there was the facility to create -- from what I remember, to create a new line of code. Not a transaction in the terms of selling a stamp or something, but in the process of creating -- processing a sale to a customer there would be numerous lines of code, lines of data written to the message store. Now, sometimes one of those might not have got written. The data regarding the sale, the value, et cetera, would have been and maybe one of the other lines wasn't.
Q. Yes.
A. So there was also the facility to correct that, which I believe involved putting a new line into the message store as a correction and that's what I wasn't -I didn't -- I don't remember ever doing that.
Q. So the process that we spent some time discussing earlier on this afternoon, did that process -- I had

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understood you a couple of minutes ago to be saying that as part of that process you did do transaction insertions and those transaction insertions were the kind of transaction insertions that involved putting lines of transaction data in in the way that we have defined?
A. Yes, reinserting existing ...
Q. And that was part and parcel of the process you described at say 10 past 2 this afternoon --
A. Yes.
Q. -- when we started talking about paragraph 15 of your first statement, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. I see. And that's the only kind of transaction insertion that you say you ever did --
A. As far as I can remember, yes.
Q. -- that involved actually inserting transactions?
A. Yes.
Q. And you say it is correcting data, but the truth of the matter is it is just putting in a new transaction line that you yourself have formulated, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. I see. Now that makes more sense to me. And what you say is that's the only time you ever did use the transaction insertion facility in a way that would have
had an impact on a set of branch accounts?
A. Yes.
Q. And what you say is you can't remember how often you did
it, but it could have been once every couple of months?
A. Yes.
Q. And how clear are you in your memory as to how often you did it? Might it have been much less frequent than that?
A. It might have been.
Q. And might it have a bigger impact on your memory because of the -- frankly the palava you had to go through --
A. Yes.
Q. -- before you had sufficient permissions to do that?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you, Mr Roll.

Now, one thing I want to ask you about, Mr Roll, is that on those occasions when you inserted transactions piggy-backing off the correspondence server, you don't remember why you had to do it but you do say you had to do it.
A. Yes.
Q. Would I be right in saying though that the default process of doing it was doing it through the front door?
A. Yes. It was always safer to do it from the correspondence server. The further you got away from

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it, if you like, the more risks and --
Q. And as a general rule the SSC didn't like taking risks of that sort, that's not what they were there for?
A. That's not what we were there for
Q. I'm grateful for that.

And could I suggest to you that in those situations when it was necessary to use the piggy-back procedure and indeed perhaps even more widely, that care was taken to insert something in the message that was sent through to make it clear it did come from the SSC?
A. I don't remember that in the message. In some instances from what I recall, you couldn't do that. I could be wrong, but the way I remember it is that it was -- when we did this it was documented in the paperwork, so there was a record of it on that side of things.
Q. Well, let's look at an example. It's an example when you weren't there, but could we go to $\{\mathrm{F} / 485\}$ please. This is a PEAK that took place in 2009 so it's a long time after you left, Mr Roll, and you will see that the summary indicates there is a harvester exception and I think we have already discussed -- or could you perhaps explain what a harvester exception is?
A. I think a harvester exception was when the servers -the correspondence servers overnight -- they were, from what I remember, UNIX servers handling huge amounts of
data from all of the Post Offices and the harvesters would run sequentially from sort of 2 o'clock in the morning or something, one would run for 15 minutes, it would allow 15 minutes to run and then the next one would run and then the next one would run. So they were not directly related to the counters at all.
Q. Then if we go to page $2\{\mathrm{~F} / 485 / 2\}$ just to see what the problem was in that case. Someone called
Garrett Simpson -- I don't know whether you know who Garrett Simpson was?
A. He was probably the one who knew most about UNIX servers.
Q. And he says at the bottom of the page:
"After discussion with Cheryl and David I think the situation was this:-
"1) The session ... had four Mode:SC transactions for different currencies. Each one of these messages was missing mandatory fields so the harvester rejected them."

Stopping there, could you explain to the court what these mandatory fields would have been?
A. I can't remember. I think -- well, no, I can't remember.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Mr De Garr Robinson, this is an example from five years after he has stopped working there

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I think, is it? 2009?
A. It is, yes, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, just hold on one second.
Am I right it is a 2009 incident?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I question how much help any of
Mr Roll's evidence might be about something in 2009.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: All right. Let me do this very quickly in that case.

As a result of this PEAK a transaction was inserted into the message store of the relevant branch and there's a copy of the transaction that was -- of what was done at $\{F / 416.1\}$ and perhaps we could look at that. (Pause).
This may be a convenient moment.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right. We will have five minutes. I do draw your attention to time.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes, I'm well aware of that.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Good.
All right, we will have a five minute break for the shorthand writers, Mr Roll. Same form as before, back for 20 past 3 please, don't talk to anyone about your evidence.
( 3.15 pm )
(Short Break)

## (3.24 pm)

MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Mr Roll, you will be pleased to know that we are going to have some expedited cross-examination now. Could you please go to bundle E2, tab 12. This is Mr Parker's second witness statement and I would like to ask you to read at page 9 paragraphs 27 and 28 please \{E2/12/9\}.
(Pause).
A. Yes.
Q. Have you looked at the PEAK to which Mr Parker refers in paragraph 28 ?
A. I can't remember if I saw that one or not.
Q. Okay. Well, we actually looked at it just before the break -- I didn't give you the number so there's no reason why you should know that. But you will see what Mr Parker says in paragraph 28.4 and that is a point I would like to put to you $\{E 2 / 12 / 10\}$ he says:
"The messages were inserted with the additional property [Comment:PC0175821](Comment:PC0175821) ..."

Which was the name of the PEAK.
"... to allow them to be identified ..."
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Hold on one second something has gone wrong. Can we jump back a page to page 10 please \{E2/12/10\}.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes, paragraph 28.4:
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## "The messages ..."

This is the transaction insertions and this is in Legacy Horizon that you worked on, although it is five years after your time. He says:
"The messages were inserted with the additional property [Comment:PC0175821](Comment:PC0175821) to allow them to be identified in the audit trail ..."

Now, what I would like to suggest to you, Mr Roll, is that when steps were taken to insert transactions into branch accounts, that was the practice that was followed: you would do something in order to enable the source of the transaction to be identified from the log.
A. This, as you pointed out, is Legacy Horizon from 2009. I would not say that was the same version as the software that I worked on. There were constant changes and upgrades going out all the time. I can't remember if we had the facility to insert comments into the version that I was working on. It may be that we did, but my recollection first of all is that when we were doing it it was documented in the PINICL and also this is for the creation of a new item, a new transaction, that I was not involved -- I do not think I actually got involved in that side of things. It was the correction of the corrupted ones that I was working in.

So it's possible, yes, that there was, but, briefly,

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    I don't know, I can't remember.
Q. If we go down to paragraph }31\mathrm{ {E2/12/10}, Mr Parker
    says:
        "Transactions injected into a counter would appear
        on the transaction logs available on Horizon as if it
        had been carried out by the user that was logged into
        the counter at the time (if nobody was logged on, the
        user ID would be missing)."
            Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. "However, when injecting such a transaction, the SSC
        user would ensure that it was clearly identified in the
        audit trail as having been inserted by SSC. Examples of
        such identification I am aware of are the use of an SSC
        user as the clerk ID and/or details of the incident
        number as an additional property."
            You could put additional properties into the
        transactions you inserted, couldn't you?
A. I don't recall that -- I don't recall. I didn't think
        we could, or I didn't think we did at that point when
        I was working on it. There's a point here where it says
        that "Examples of such identification I am aware of are
        the use of an SSC user as the clerk ID". That is where
        if the SSC user had logged into the counter and was
        inserting a new transaction, rather than getting the
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        clerk to \(\log\) in and then injecting a transaction as if
        it were the clerk who were logged on, so that would --
        in this instance if you were creating a new transaction
        to balance the accounts then you probably won't need to
        log in as that clerk who had done the original
        transactions, in which case it would make sense to log
        in as yourself because then from the user ID it would be
        clearly identifiable that it wasn't a Post Office
        employee doing it, it was someone from the SSC.
    Q. What I'm suggesting to you, Mr Roll, was that when you
        worked at the SSC, first of all there was the ability,
        when using transaction insertions, to include additional
        properties which made it possible for it to be
        identified that you were the one inserting the
        transaction and I want to suggest to you, Mr Roll, that
        it was the practice to use that facility so as to be
        clear as to the state of affairs where the transaction
        came from.
    A. I would disagree, to put it briefly, bluntly. If it was
        a new transaction of the type we are discussing here
        which I didn't do then yes, it's possible it was, but my
        recollection is that if we were rebuilding the message
        store and correcting a piece of data then -- effectively
        creating a new item to go in to replace the broken item,
        then it wouldn't have any comment put into it, but that
    clerk to log in and then injecting a transaction as if it were the clerk who were logged on, so that would -in this instance if you were creating a new transaction to balance the accounts then you probably won't need to log in as that clerk who had done the original transactions, in which case it would make sense to log in as yourself because then from the user ID it would be clearly identifiable that it wasn't a Post Office employee doing it, it was someone from the SSC.
Q. What I'm suggesting to you, Mr Roll, was that when you worked at the SSC, first of all there was the ability, when using transaction insertions, to include additional properties which made it possible for it to be identified that you were the one inserting the transaction and I want to suggest to you, Mr Roll, that was the practice to use that facility so as to be clear as to the state of affairs where the transaction came from.
A. I would disagree, to put it briefly, bluntly. If it was a new transaction of the type we are discussing here which I didn't do then yes, it 's possible it was, but my recollection is that if we were rebuilding the message store and correcting a piece of data then -- effectively creating a new item to go in to replace the broken item, then it wouldn't have any comment put into it, but that
is my recollection.
Q. And how clear is that recollection? I will give you an opportunity to indicate whether you --
A. It is 15 or 19 years ago, so ...
Q. Say again?
A. I might be mistaken.
Q. You fairly accept that you might have just overlooked or forgotten?
A. Yes.
Q. That's very kind of you, Mr -- and very fair of you, if I may say so.

Then in the last few minutes let's go to paragraph 23 of your second statement $\{E 1 / 10 / 7\}$. We are now talking about rebuilding branch transaction data where a particular counter becomes corrupted. You will recall that before the break I read you paragraph 38 of Mr Parker's second witness statement where he went through those stages?
A. Yes.
Q. And my recollection is that you essentially accepted the processes that Mr Parker described?
A. Yes.
Q. You say:
"As part of my role in the SSC, I was involved in rebuilding branch transaction data ... whilst in general

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terms I agree with Dr Worden's summary ... his description is very much a simplification ... when data on a counter became corrupt, the effect was that data transmitted after that corruption could become stuck ..."

Then moving on, you say halfway down:
"There was clearly room for error in this process, where data could be lost, or mistakes made when replicating data."

Now, I would like to ask you first of all what room for error was there in the process where data could be lost?
A. When you are copying the data from a counter, in my recollection, if it's a remote counter, you're copying across the network and then editing it yourself on a computer, you might make a mistake and you might delete something that you shouldn't have deleted. And that is the error -- the room for error that I'm talking about. There were processes -- I have to admit there were processes in place to minimise this risk, such as having two people checking it and so on.
Q. Well, that was going to be my next question, Mr Roll. Why didn't you mention the fact that there were these protections that were specifically designed to reduce that risk to a really infinitesimally small level?
A. It didn't seem necessary to put that in.
Q. It does give a rather unfortunate impression which is rather different from the fact of the matter, would you accept that?
A. To my mind, no, but I will accept that it -- to other people it could perhaps.
Q. Well, could I suggest this to you, Mr Roll. You download this data, you get the line that you think needs correcting and you correct it and this is all with someone else formally sitting there watching what you are doing, is that right?
A. Not at that point necessarily, no.
Q. When would they be watching?
A. When you're about to insert the data.
Q. So let's imagine a situation where that's happening. The person comes along. What does that person -- he obviously have has to check that the data you are inserting is going to be right --
A. They check the data that you've got and then make sure the process is followed correctly to insert the data.
Q. So that person would, for example, make sure that no data has been lost?
A. Yes.
Q. He or she would make sure that the change being made is the correct change?
A. Yes.
Q. And only when both he or she and you are satisfied that it is all correct would be possible for you to press the button and insert the transaction, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, doesn't that suggest that the chances of an error being made such that a wrong transaction being entered into a branch accounts really is infinitesimally small?
A. It is quite small, yes.
Q. Thank you. Then in paragraph 24 of your statement \{E1/10/7\} you say:
"The process that I describe at paragraph [23] above could be carried out without the subpostmaster's knowledge ... and in my recollection it sometimes was done without the subpostmaster's prior knowledge, for example if the subpostmaster was away from the branch on a lunch break and had not logged out of the system."

And then you say at the end of that paragraph:
"... there were times where the job needed to be done quickly to prevent potentially catastrophic failure and we were unable to contact the subpostmaster beforehand."

Were those the only occasions in which you would have inserted a transaction without informing the subpostmaster beforehand?
A. That is the only time we would have got onto a counter without --
Q. Right, so I would just like to ask you: in relation to the particular transactions we're talking about, in what situations would that potential catastrophe arise?
A. I can't recollect exact scenarios. I can't remember.
Q. Can you not give me an idea of what you're talking about?
A. No.
Q. So let us assume there was a situation of potential catastrophe, you would never allow a subpostmaster to have his or her accounts changed without them knowing about it, would you? It might be that you might not have told them beforehand, you would certainly tell them afterwards?
A. You would tell them afterwards.
Q. So it is absolutely standard SSC practice, isn't it, when you are dealing with a branch and correcting problems that the branch has got that the branch will see, it is absolutely standard that you will communicate with the subpostmaster to ensure that the subpostmaster knows what changes you are making?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you.

My Lord, I have rather hurriedly come to the end of
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my cross-examination.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Thank you very much. Mr Green. Re-examination by MR GREEN
MR GREEN: A few points if I may.
Mr Roll, could you please be shown \{F/1839\}. I will tell you what's coming up. It's the spreadsheet you were shown -- a whole load of figures were put to you and you were challenged on your recollection on the basis of various statistics . Do you remember?
A. Yes.
Q. Just a couple of quick points. First of all, can we just look at the RRP live PEAKs into SSC. And scroll up please. Sorry, I thought it was that tab, apologies. Can we try by category, sorry, "RRP live PEAKs by category". That's better, apologies. Can we scroll up just to the top very kindly.

So you've got the closure category codes down the left -hand side: $0,8,9,12,14,15,40,42$ and so forth.
A. Yes.
Q. And you have the legend or the description against them and if we look, for example, at number 63, "Programme approved-no fix required", 115 of those.
A. Yes.
Q. At this distance in time can you remember what was
encompassed in those descriptions?
A. I've got no recollection at all I'm afraid.
Q. Okay. And we see another one "Administrative response" at line 21.
A. Again, I can't remember that. I can't remember any of them.
Q. But that one seems to have quite a lot: 5,358 , so about a fifth of the overall total. Do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You weren't shown it, but the court was told
there was a document which was broadly consistent with what those codes meant and if we can look please at that document, it is at $\{F / 823 / 23\}$. Mr Roll, I'm only going to give a couple of examples of this. If we look at 63 , which is the line we looked at first. If you come down the left -hand code side to 63 . Do you see this table actually only starts at 60 , it doesn't have any of the earlier codes?
A. Yes.
Q. But it does have 63 and you look across and it says "Programme approved no fix required" which on the face of it sounds quite chirpy and positive and then we look and it says:
"Rarely used. Covers the case where there IS a fault in the product and this is acknowledged by both

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Fujitsu and [Post Office Limited], but the fault is there as a result of an agreed design specification and Fujitsu would require POL to fund any correction. MUST NOT be used without approval from HNGX Programme Manager or authorised representative."

At this distance of time can you remember seeing any examples of those that you dealt with?
A. No, I'm afraid I can't.
Q. Just one other one if I may. Can we please see \{F/16/2\}. This is PEAK PC0027887 and you will see it comes in on 21 July 1999. Can you see the narrative there, for FAD code in the third line of the light green box, for FAD code 0011523 on week, 9 receipts and payments misbalance of $£ 1,337.05$, week 10 misbalance of $£ 24,000$, week 11 misbalance of $£ 12,000$, week 12 $1,051,111.48$; do you see that?
A. Yes.
Q. And if we could go forward please to page $3\{F / 16 / 3\}$ and look in the bottom yellow box, 27 July at 10.09, do you see "CAP12" on the left -hand side?
A. Yes.
Q. It says:
"Balance brought forward was multiplied twice due [to] known software error. The initial balance brought forward for this CAP was $1,196,622.72$. This was
Q. And just above it says "Insufficient evidence".
A. Yes.
Q. Can you remember how frequent it was for PEAKs to be closed with insufficient evidence while you were there, or ..?
A. I can't give you an accurate -- I can't say how often I'm afraid. I can't remember. I know it was used but I can't remember how often.
Q. Last point if I may. Can you please be shown \{F/99.2\}. You were asked about pressure in relation to service level agreements and if we look at $\{F / 99.2\}$-- sorry, on my copy --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Do you want 99? We are on $16 / 13$ at the moment.
MR GREEN: I've got printed out on mine F/99.2.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: It might not be wrong, we just might not have got there yet.
MR GREEN: Well, my Lord, I can probably deal with it with another witness.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I think you probably --
MR GREEN: It was a point of fairness to this witness. He was challenged on something and there was evidence about it, but I will deal with it with Mr Parker.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Mr Roll, no questions from me. Your evidence is at an end now, you can now leave the witness
box and you can chat to people about the case if you would like to. Thank you very much.
A. Thank you, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Thank you very much. Right, next witness.
MR GREEN: My Lord, it is Mr Henderson if I may. MR IAN HENDERSON (sworn)
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Thank you, Mr Henderson, do have a seat.
A. I would prefer to stand if I may.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes, of course you may.

## Examination-in-chief by MR GREEN

MR GREEN: Mr Henderson, in front of you there is a file and if you turn to tab 5 you will see an "Amended witness statement of Ian Henderson" $\{E 1 / 5 / 1\}$ and if you turn to the back of that witness statement on page 7 \{E1/5/7\} you will see a signature. Is that your signature?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. And is that statement true to the best of your knowledge and belief?
A. It is, subject to two points. Firstly, I originally prepared a much longer witness statement but I was told that because this is a time limited trial it was not appropriate to submit one of that length, so this is substantially shorter.

Secondly, I think the court is aware that I'm
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a party to an agreement between sort of Post Office and the claimants that restrict the matters on which I can give evidence, so that is a further limitation in my evidence today.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Understood.
Have you any questions in-chief?
MR GREEN: No questions in-chief, my Lord.
Cross-examination by MR DRAPER
MR DRAPER: Good afternoon, Mr Henderson.
A. Good afternoon.
Q. You make very clear from your witness statement that you don't propose to give opinion evidence and I'm not going to ask you any questions about the opinions set out in Second Sight's reports.

What it may be helpful to do is to take you through some of the background to Second Sight's involvement and some of the chronology as to what happened at various stages and your involvement in the mediation scheme.
A. Fine.
Q. With that said, there's one very general point about the scope of Second Sight's work that I would like to confirm with you. As you are aware, the issues to be determined in this trial and to which you refer in your statement are purely technical issues about the Horizon system as to its functions, reliability, robustness.

You are aware of that, aren't you?
A. Yes, I am.
Q. It is fair to say, isn't it, that the scope of Second Sight's work was substantially broader than that? You also considered, for example, issues as to training and support?
A. Sorry, was there a question there?
Q. Yes: that's right, isn't it?
A. That our scope was much wider?
Q. Yes.
A. Well, our scope changed quite substantially during the terms of our appointment. We issued an interim report and it was that that gave rise to Post Office deciding to offer a mediation scheme. Our role at that point changed from being an in-depth investigation to being one of supporting the mediation scheme primarily and dealing with the 150 or so applicants to the scheme.

We adopted the definition of Horizon that Post Office itself adopted, so it was much more than the coding or the software, it also included the way that processes operated, the impact of Horizon on subpostmasters and the various sort of remediation procedures that were available.
Q. Yes, thank you. So just to -- I'm going to run you through the chronology if I may and at the end of my

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doing so there will be an opportunity for you to comment on that but I think everything I'm about to say to you ought to be uncontroversial.

You were engaged first in July 2012, so the total time span of your involvement is 2012 to 2015. You have just mentioned the CRRs we're going to come on to and, as you have you have said, the interim report was produced in July 2013, the mediation scheme was set up around then in the latter half of 2013 and it is right I think to say that the applications to enter the mediation scheme had to be in by November 2013, so roughly towards the end of that year?
A. My recollection is actually slightly different to that. We were first appointed around about July 2012. Towards the end of 2012 we were in active discussions with Post Office and JFSA who invited applications for us to consider various matters. After we issued our interim report, that was the point at which Post Office decided that we should move to the mediation scheme phase.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I don't think the witness did mention a CRR.
A. No, I didn't, my Lord. Case review report.

MR DRAPER: He may not have used the words but I think you said "individual reports in the mediation scheme", didn't you? I may have misheard you.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Rather than be combative, Mr Draper, when you put a question to the witness that says "You mentioned the CRRs" and he didn't, I just wanted to check you weren't at cross-purposes.
MR DRAPER: No, I had understood him to be referring to what I would call a CRR, but we shall come back to those in more detail.
It is right to say, isn't it, that there were initially 150 applicants to the scheme --
A. Of which 136 were finally admitted into the scheme.
Q. Thank you, you finished my question.
Once the mediation scheme started -- and again you have already said something of this -- it is fair to say that you had essentially two roles at Second Sight. The first was the production of thematic reports, which are the reports you describe in your witness statement; that's right, isn't it?
A. Correct.
Q. And the second was the production of what I have called CRRs which are individual reports relating to a particular complainant's case?
A. Correct.
Q. Now, with that background can we turn please to the Second Sight engagement letter which is at $\{\mathrm{F} / 1228.1\}$. Do that you have on the screen there, Mr Henderson?

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A. Dated 1 July 2014 ?
Q. That's the one, yes. It says in "Background" there that
this letter sets out the arrangements for your
engagement on behalf of the working group in relation to
your role in the scheme. And we can read further just
under 2 --
A. Can I just make a point, I'm sorry to interrupt, it is
dated July 2014. I mean that is a long time after the
mediation scheme started, so I'm not sure that that is
the first letter, or was the letter that was relevant at
the time that we started our work in relation to the
mediation scheme.
Q. I'm sure if it is going to be said that there was
a different arrangement that had materially different
terms, that can be suggested by the claimants. So
I just wanted to take you to some key elements of this.
Obviously if you have that concern, you can raise it.
If we could skip down quickly please to clause 4.1 ,
which appears on page 3 \{F/1228.1/3\}, that's the
provision allowing for termination on notice and that's
the provision that was relied on the following year,
isn't it?
A. That's correct.
Q. 4.2 refers to the services being provided exclusively by
Second Sight directors. That's you and one other
A. Dated 1 July 2014?
Q. That's the one, yes. It says in "Background" there that this letter sets out the arrangements for your engagement on behalf of the working group in relation to your role in the scheme. And we can read further just under 2 --
A. Can I just make a point, I'm sorry to interrupt, it is dated July 2014. I mean that is a long time after the mediation scheme started, so I'm not sure that that is the first letter, or was the letter that was relevant at the time that we started our work in relation to the mediation scheme.
Q. I'm sure if it is going to be said that there was a different arrangement that had materially different terms, that can be suggested by the claimants. So just wanted to take you to some key elements of this . If we could skip down quickly please to clause 4.1, which appears on page 3 \{F/1228.1/3\}, that's the provision allowing for termination on notice and that s provision that was relied on the following year
A. That's correct.
Q. 4.2 refers to the services being provided exclusively by Second Sight directors. That's you and one other
director, isn't it?
A. Correct.
Q. Go forward to page 5 please $\{F / 1228.1 / 5\}$, just the signature page, to orientate everyone. Then over the page $\{F / 1228.1 / 6\}$, "Scope of services ", is where this agreement describes what you are actually intended to do. If you could just remind yourself please of 1.1 down to 1.4.
(Pause).
A. Yes, I have read that.
Q. Does that accord with your recollection of what your role was?
A. I remember this letter, but as I said earlier, this letter arrived probably at least halfway through the mediation scheme so we had already done a great deal of work, possibly on terms different than the ones described in this letter.
Q. Understood. If you could turn then to look at 3 $\{F / 1228.1 / 3\}$ please, towards the bottom:
"It is recognised that Second Sight is not required to definitively determine every issue raised by a subpostmaster but rather is required to reasonably investigate and, where appropriate, offer an opinion on the key issues in dispute between a subpostmaster and Post Office ."

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So it was recognised, wasn't it, from an early stage that it might not be suitable for Second Sight to be required to determine each and every issue that arose?
A. I take dispute with "at an early stage". As I said, this letter is dated at least halfway through the period of us supporting the mediation scheme.
Q. Putting to one side whether the situation may have been different, you can confirm I think that it was certainly the position from the date of this agreement, that that was recognised?
A. Yes, I can.
Q. If we look please at 5 which starts at the bottom of the page but really the meat of it is over the page please \{F/1228.1/7\}, 5.1 refers to your expertise and the scope of that expertise. 5.2, just remind yourself of that. And 5.3 Second Sight shall:
"... use its reasonable endeavours to comply with any deadlines or timeframes set by the working group."

I just want to see whether you will agree with this in relation to timeframes: is it fair to say that the anticipation at the outset was that the working group would set relatively demanding timeframes and hope to move forward quite quickly?
A. I think that's a reasonable sort of expectation. It's got to be measured by reality though and we had regular
meetings of the working group and timetable was always on the agenda.

Can I come back to 5.1, which you started to draw my attention to. That was substantially varying the previous scope of our engagement which was that the scope of our work was to be set solely by Second Sight. We believed, as we said in our part 2 report, that issues relating to criminal law and so on were relevant to the mediation scheme, so this was inserted fairly late in the day.
Q. I'm not going to ask you about what you said or didn't say in the Second Sight report, but I think you will acknowledge that this isn't something that was inserted, this was something that you agreed in July 2014?
A. Halfway through the mediation scheme, yes.
Q. Just to get the timeline right, the briefing report part 1 was produced in July 2014; that's right, isn't it?
A. Yes, I think that's right.
Q. And I'm not going to ask you about any opinions expressed in that report, but purely as a matter of getting some understanding of how it all fits together, I think you will agree with me that the part 1 report was intended to be a largely uncontroversial account of Horizon's functions, Post Office's operations, things

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like that, with the part 2 report being intended to contain your opinions on issues?
A. Part 1 was intended to be, yes, uncontroversial, to reflect the permanent information relevant to the matters that we were looking at. The part 2 report was dealing with the thematic issues that we had identified from our previous work.
Q. And it is right, isn't it, that there were two versions of the part 2 report, the first of those being published in August 2014, so really not long after the part 1 report?
A. That's correct, which was very shortly followed up by a very substantive response by Post Office.
Q. Yes. If we could turn to the CRRs that we have already discussed briefly. It is fair to say, isn't it, that they were intended to be one of three key documents that would go before the working group: there would be the written complaint from the subpostmaster, there would be Post Office's written response and there would be your CRR?
A. My recollection is slightly different to that. There would be the application to the scheme which I think was known as the CQR, the questionnaire. At that point we would request such files that were available from Post Office together with a report. As a result of
reviewing all of that information, Second Sight would then produce its consolidated report.

## MR DRAPER: 2014.

If we look at the second paragraph,
Sir Anthony Hooper is saying here the thing that you have just agreed, Mr Henderson:
"The progress of cases at every stage of the scheme has taken longer than the working group would have wanted."

He then sets out those various stages. He then says:
"In addition disagreements within the working group as to whether individual cases should proceed to mediation has led to further delays because such disagreements can only, for reasons of fairness, be resolved at face-to-face meetings."

He then gives some further detail and over the page please \{F/1325/138\}. Do you recall seeing this update on progress at the time, Mr Henderson?
A. I don't recall seeing this letter or this appendix, but those numbers do look broadly familiar and we may well have discussed them in a mediation working group meeting.
Q. So by this time in mid-December, if we look down to roughly two-thirds of the way down the table, we see the cases that had been mediated to date, there were seven of those; that's right, isn't it? And we see from the
very bottom that there were 110 left in the scheme.
A. I see that.
Q. If we could go forward please then -- I should just say for completeness there's a document I won't go to which is a later letter from Sir Anthony Hooper which is at \{F/1325/165\}. That just provides an update a couple of months later.

Moving on then to March 2015, so a few months after, there's a report from CEDR on progress and that's at \{F/1325/186\}.
A. Can I make an observation on this appendix and the apparent slow progress. I can't remember precisely at what point CEDR was selected but it took some time to make the decision that CEDR was going to be the nominated body to administer the actual mediation process and I think that more than anything else reflects the relatively sort of small number of cases that were listed on that schedule.
Q. It is fair for you to add that consideration.

If we look now at the document we have on screen here from CEDR, CEDR explains that by this date -- which you can see from the top is 6 March -- if you look at the second paragraph:
"As you know, since July 2014, CEDR has been referred 31 cases for mediation under the scheme. So 177
far 12 mediations have been taken up by the parties, using six different mediators, and 2 are currently being scheduled for mediation this month."

So this is coming up to a year and a half since the scheme closed to applicants and by this stage there has been 12 mediations. Does that accord with your recollection of the kind of progress that was being made?
A. Well, perhaps I can make another point before I answer that. I mean this letter is to Post Office general counsel. I would not have necessarily seen this letter . I certainly don't recall this letter. Those numbers are broadly sort of consistent with my sort of recollection.
Q. Is it fair to say that by this stage in March 2015 there was a desire within the working group to make somewhat faster progress?
A. Well, I think we had already made faster progress. You will also recall that it was in March 2015 that our appointment under the previous letter that you showed the court was terminated. I think at that point we had reviewed and produced reports for something like 116 sort of cases, so the vast majority of our work was actually complete by that point.
Q. Yes, that's a very fair point for you to make.

If we could just look at it very briefly, the
termination letter to which you have just referred is at \{F/13/24.1\}. That's the termination letter I think to which you at least indirectly referred.
A. That's correct.
Q. If we could look then to $\{\mathrm{F} / 1324.2\}$. This is a much longer letter from Post Office that came to you on the same day. Do you recall this longer letter? If I maybe tell you broadly what it is to do with. It's a letter in which Post Office sets out a plan for how Second Sight could finish its outstanding work. Do you remember that letter?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And the second paragraph makes clear that Second Sight was expected to continue working during the notice period and that even beyond the notice period there would be a proposed future role for Second Sight. That's what this document dealt with, isn't it? It's a fairly long document.
A. It is, but there's another document of that date or very close to that date which you haven't mentioned which was the press release from Post Office announcing the winding up with immediate effect of the mediation scheme itself . That I understand was the primary decision and our termination was a consequence of that not a separate issue.

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Q. Well, I think when you say mediation scheme it's fair to say, isn't it, that this winding up process, as you describe it, did not put an end to mediations; in fact --
A. It put an end to the mediation working group with, as I understand it, no consultation and the announcement was made I think the day immediately before the next planned meeting of the working group, so it was a considerable sort of shock to everybody.

The rationale from Post Office -- because Post Office general counsel was kind enough to explain this to me in a meeting I had with her when I was handed this letter, that Post Office felt that we had reached the point of -- it might be unfair to say sort of diminishing returns, but we were at the point where the mediation process using CEDR could continue without any further input from the mediation working group and that alternative arrangements would be made for Second Sight to complete the I think it was 20 outstanding reports at that point.
Q. And in fact although there was not much time required for this, but also to complete your version 2 of the briefing report?
A. Yes. That was already substantially complete. Within the letter I seem to recall was the requirement to
complete that by 10 April which we were happy to agree to and I think it was signed off on 9 April or thereabouts.
Q. And it is right to say, isn't it, that that version 2 of the briefing report part 2 was in fact -- Second Sight had told the working group that at least the first draft of that report would be produced on the 11th, so the day after this letter, and you in fact did produce a draft very shortly afterwards?
A. Yes, that's my recollection and we invited comments from Post Office to enable us to complete the report and we issued it I think early May -- early April.
Q. And I'm not going to take you through all of them merely because of the time so please do tell me if anything I say here is unfair, but there is then an exchange of letters between Second Sight and Post Office and indeed at least one meeting of which I'm aware in which the terms of Second Sight's ongoing engagement were discussed and agreed over the next couple of weeks.
A. There was a certain amount of to and fro-ing. I do recall that one element of the proposal that was not acceptable to Second Sight was that we were going to be instructed directly by claimants. We felt that that potentially compromised our independence and objectivity and we suggested an alternative, which I seem to recall

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Post Office readily agreed to.
Q. Yes. Just so we have the full detail on that,

Post Office proposed to pay to applicants the amount
that it would otherwise pay to you and for them to pay you directly. You said, for the reason you have given, you weren't comfortable with that and Post Office agreed to essentially continue the existing arrangement which was direct payment from Post Office to Second Sight?
A. Correct.
Q. And is it fair to say that that was the main point of difficulty between you in reaching agreement?
A. That's the main point that I recall but I haven't revisited the documents recently.
Q. That's fair.

Last point just to confirm -- I think this is probably implicit in what you have already said to me, Mr Henderson, but it is right, isn't it, to say that looking at both the CRRs and the briefing report part 2 , version 2 , each of those was ultimately produced slightly -- I make no criticism -- slightly later than had been anticipated by the working group, but in relatively short order nonetheless?
A. I think that's a fair comment.
Q. Thank you very much.

I have no further questions, my Lord.

## MR JUSTICE FRASER: Re-examination? MR GREEN: My Lord, no. <br> MR JUSTICE FRASER: I have some questions. Questions from MR JUSTICE FRASER <br> MR JUSTICE FRASER: The first is the two points that you made at the beginning of your evidence-in-chief effectively qualifying your evidence. You don't need to tell me what you were told by whom, but your understanding was that there was some restriction in length on your written witness statement because this was a time limited trial, is that correct? <br> A. I was told that the draft -- or my first witness statement that I prepared stood the risk of being rejected by the court as going into too much detail and being too long and that I should prepare a much shorter version, which I ultimately did. <br> MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right, well, just to be clear, no such restriction has ever been imposed by the court on your witness statement.

The second one, I understand and you have identified this in your witness statement and it leads into a point I'm going to ask you in a moment, that you remain subject to a confidentiality agreement that you entered into with the Post Office, is that right?
A. Modified by a protocol agreement that released us in

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some respects so that we could work with the solicitors to the claimants and give the evidence that I have given. We refer to it as the protocol agreement but it was quite clear that there were certain matters that I am not allowed to discuss.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right, well, that sort of answers my next question, but I just want to be clear: is it your evidence therefore that because of that protocol agreement your evidence of fact to this court is narrower in scope than it would be absent the protocol agreement?
A. Yes, it is.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Thank you.
Next document please -- or the first document I'm going to show you, which Mr Draper took you to: \{F/1228.1/1\} please. Now, that's the letter that you were shown which you point out is July 2014. As I understand your evidence you were engaged in July 2012, which is two years before that; is that right?
A. Correct.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Was there a letter in similar terms sent to you for July 2012?
A. I think not because the scope was still evolving over that initial sort of six to 12 months. I mean there was
certainly correspondence; I don't recall a formal engagement letter in this sort of style at that point.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right. Can we go please to page 3 of that letter $\{\mathrm{F} / 1228.1 / 3\}$. There's a clause at the bottom of that letter, 6.2, which runs over to the next page which says that:
"Second Sight will not, and will ensure that the SS directors and any SS personnel will not, act directly or indirectly in any capacity ... against Post Office or any of its officers, directors or employees save to the extent (a) that it is expressly agreed in writing ... that the work proposed to be undertaken will not have a material adverse effect on Post Office's commercial or financial interests or reputation ..."

And then there are some other exceptions which effectively relate to court orders.

Do you know if there was a similar provision in respect of your work between July 2012 and July 2014 to that provision?
A. I don't recall that, I'm sorry.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: You can't recall .
When you received this letter in July 2014 did you form the view that it made any material impact or difference to the terms upon which you had been engaged for the two years earlier than that?

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A. I think we anticipated that it was certainly possible that at some point we could be asked either to give factual evidence or support in some other way to claimants in an action against the Post Office. We were quite upfront about that. There is another document where I seem to recall that there was originally a clause referring to 12 months' gap between the completion of any work for Post Office and us working for in this case sort of claimants. I recall a handwritten amendment that I made where we agreed to extend that 12 -month period to 15 months and I notice that in paragraph 6.3, 15 months is the date mentioned there. So at an early point in all of this I think there was a mutual recognition that as experts independently appointed to look into these matters, we could end up acting for either the Post Office or claimants and that was envisaged in the documentation.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right, thank you very much.
Mr Draper, any questions arising? Re-examination by MR DRAPER
MR DRAPER: If I may, just one point of clarification arising out of your Lordship's first question.

You have mentioned the confidentiality restrictions that were relaxed to enable you to speak to the claimants for the purposes of these proceedings. You
didn't feel, did you, inhibited in answering any of the questions that I asked you?
A. I had at the back of my mind that protocol agreement and I tried to make sure that my answers did not infringe that agreement.
Q. It is fair to say they didn't risk doing so, did they, because of the nature of the questions that I asked you?
A. I would have to refresh my mind as to the questions, I'm sorry.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I think that's probably a point for me actually. Thank you, Mr Draper.

## Mr Green?

MR GREEN: My Lord, no.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Thank you very much for coming,
Mr Henderson. That's the end of your evidence, you are now free to leave the witness box.

Mr Green, that's your factual case I think.
MR GREEN: My Lord indeed.
Housekeeping

MR GREEN: My Lord, there is one housekeeping thing --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, there are about five but let's start with yours first.
MR GREEN: -- upon which I think Post Office might be assisted by an indication from your Lordship, because the --

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## MR JUSTICE FRASER: An indication?

MR GREEN: It might have to go further than that but we hope the help might sort it out. The Ernst \& Young reports in relation to the Horizon system, we have reports --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Which you dealt with in opening I think.
MR GREEN: Yes. We've got the ones from 2011. As far as I can tell we seem to have most of them from 2011 going forwards, it may be we have all, but the position on the earlier ones which we have been asking about for a little while is that the latest position I think is that Royal Mail -- from whom Post Office split on 1 April 2012 -- have said, according to my learned friend's solicitors, that they are concerned -- is the word that's used in the letter -- about providing them without a third party disclosure order from the court. We are a little surprised.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Would they be coming from the Post Office or would they be coming from the Royal Mail? MR GREEN: Post Office say that apparently they don't have them and that only Royal Mail has them and Royal Mail is saying that they are concerned about providing them without a third party disclosure order, notwithstanding that Post Office was part of Royal Mail and normally when these organisations are split there are transfer orders in the usual way. So it's a surprising position
which we hope might be lightly resolved initially .
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right, well I will hear what Mr De Garr Robinson has to say. I'm effectively being invited I think to make a third party disclosure order but against Royal Mail who you probably aren't instructed for.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I have no brief for Royal Mail.
My Lord, last year my instructing solicitors --
I think actually Post Office contacted Royal Mail and said "Could we have these documents, they are being requested in these proceedings" and Royal Mail said "We're not going to give them voluntarily, if you want them you will need a court order".
MR JUSTICE FRASER: And this was last year, was it?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: This was towards the end of last year,
yes, in the late part of last year. I'm looking around to --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: All right, if that's the situation then -- do you need them for Monday, Mr Green?
MR GREEN: It would be quite helpful.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: But how is -- I don't see how I can make an order against Royal Mail if they are not here.
MR GREEN: I'm not inviting your Lordship to make a order.
The issue that concerned us -- the letter is at
\{H/227/1\} from Wombles dated 27 February where they
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explain --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Give me a second while it is pulled up on the screen if you're going to ask me to look at it. H what?
MR GREEN: H/227/1. What they say is they don't say they are refusing -- it's the letter of 22 February -- they say:
"... Royal Mail Group are concerned about providing these documents without a formal order from the court for third party disclosure."

So it is pitched at the level of concern rather than anything more.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: The problem is, just purely in terms of logistics ... well, it's a fundamental principle that I can't make an order in these circumstances against Royal Mail.
MR GREEN: Of course.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I can express my views on the transcript and I can also make an order, which I'm going to do, you just have to give me a moment to consider what it is going to be.

## (Pause).

Right, your juniors are going to have to take a note when I get to the order. First of all I will say what I'm going to do on the transcript and why I'm going to
do it.

## Order

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Royal Mail are not here today so
I cannot make, as it has been expressed in the letter of the Post Office's solicitors on 27 February 2019,
a third party disclosure order against the Royal Mail.
However, what I am going to do is make the following order.

I am going to order the claimants to issue an application for third party disclosure of the Ernst $\mathcal{\&}$ Young reports prior to 2011 , to be supported by a witness statement and that should be issued by 1 o'clock tomorrow. I am going to give permission for short service. It is to be served on the Royal Mail if at all possible tomorrow and no later than 12 noon on Monday.

In the event that the Royal Mail still decline to produce these documents voluntarily they can come at 10 o'clock on Tuesday and I will hear the application then and if I do make an order against them in respect of third party disclosure, the necessary order and the relevant timings of that can be dealt with on Tuesday.

Hopefully, considering the transcript, which I'm sure you will provide to them, they will realise there is little to be gained by doing anything other than

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being cooperative but I am not going to pre-judge the outcome of the application.

All right?
MR GREEN: I'm most grateful.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: So that's that done. Is that the only housekeeping from your point of view?
MR GREEN: My Lord, the only one from me.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Mr De Garr Robinson, do you have any?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, I have your housekeeping
points. You asked me to remind you to discuss 8 and 9 May.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes, I have that on my sticker, we will come to that at the end.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I have a file of claimants' witness statements, my Lord.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Excellent, thank you very much.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: If I can hand that up. That includes some sheets of corrections to the extent that any witnesses have minor corrections to make to their witness statements. I have also a document which contains all the corrections in one place if your Lordship is interested to see that.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes please, thank you very much.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: The corrections will of course be provided straight away. We have copies for my learned
friend.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, yesterday you asked for a Word version of opening submissions. Your clerk should now have that.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: You wanted me to address your Lordship on the question of redactions.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I wanted you to tell me how many documents had been disclosed as a function of the review that you have told me about.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, the figures are as follows.
There was a request to review 31 documents.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: And that was a request from ..?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: From Freeths. Pursuant to that request, WBD and junior counsel, Mr Draper, reviewed 31 documents. The redactions were maintained on 16 of those documents on the basis of privilege.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Redactions were maintained on four of those documents on the basis that redacted information was both confidential and irrelevant.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Four of the 16, or another four?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Four of the 31. So we are up to 20 now.

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MR JUSTICE FRASER: On privilege, did you say?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: And four was confidential and irrelevant.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Confidential and irrelevant.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, redactions for privilege were narrowed or removed on seven documents.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: On the basis that the redactions had been applied too widely for privilege. And, my Lord, I can give your Lordship an example of one of those so your Lordship will see the kind of error that was made. If I could ask your Lordship to look at \{F/1251.1\}.
Your Lordship will see an email. This is a Second Sight email involving Post Office. Indeed Mr Henderson I see is one of the recipients. If you go down to the bottom of this page your Lordship will see a script "Privileged and confidential - created for the purpose of obtaining legal advice ". That was inserted by Mr Henderson in his email and that resulted in that email, or large portions of that email being redacted. A similar phenomenon occurred on I think four of the seven occasions. That's what led to that judgment call, which on reflection it was decided was incorrect.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: And, my Lord, in relation to
redactions for confidential and irrelevant documents, they were narrowed or removed in four documents, essentially for pragmatic reasons.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: So of the 31, 16 maintained on privilege, four maintained confidential/irrelevant, seven led to a narrowing and four were handed over, is that right? Or have I got the last four wrong?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Four was confidential or irrelevant, so it led to either a narrowing or a withdrawal.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right. Which led to some material being disclosed that hadn't been disclosed already?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, yes. If I give your Lordship an example. If we look at $\{F / 619.1\}$. Your Lordship will see this is a document where the tracking summary and the executive summary were previously redacted on the grounds that they were both confidential and irrelevant. One may well think that they are completely irrelevant, but on a pragmatic view --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, redaction on the grounds of relevance is a potential two-edged sword, isn't it? But this is the version that has now been disclosed?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: This is the version that's been -- the original version is at --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I don't need to see the original one. But it is the tracking summary and the executive

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summary.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Okay.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: So that gives your Lordship an idea of the scale.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Thank you very much.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, I had thought there was something else. Oh, your Lordship during the course of Tuesday asked for memo views that were talked about in the evidence of Mr Latif.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Post Office has acquired what it thinks are the memo views for January. There's nothing relevant in there that they have found so far, but they want to ensure that they've got all of them so your Lordship may have to bear with us for a while.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Well, that's all right. When they've got them all -- I don't necessarily want them but you ought to give them to the claimants.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, yes.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right, so is that all the outstanding points?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: Would your Lordship give me one moment?
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
(Pause).
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: The only outstanding question is something that actually it's really outside my job description but it's judgment on the common issues trial . I don't know whether your Lordship has any thoughts as to --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I'm going to come on to that now, but as far as housekeeping for this trial, I think that's dealt with all the currently loose ends except for --
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: 8 and 9 May.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: -- 8 and 9 May.
In the time from telling you I was keeping those first two weeks of May clear to you saying when you wanted, I'm afraid the Thursday 9 May is no longer available. It would have to be the 7 th and the 8 th. Now, I'm not going to mess around too much about this. I don't want -- because we're moving it I'm going to be relatively flexible. I would like you please both to see if you can do the 7th and 8th rather than the 8th and 9th.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, yes, we will.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: If there is an insuperable problem we will revisit it on Monday morning first thing. The trouble is there are so many cogs going behind the scenes --

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MR DE GARR ROBINSON: I can imagine.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: -- that despite the fact that one wants to and has a certain degree of autonomy, it is just not possible to keep dates open for the length of time that counsel might expect.

So unless you tell me on Monday morning first thing that the Tuesday and Wednesday of that week, so the 7th and the 8 th, are simply not possible for good and proper reasons, that's when it is going to be. If you say it has to be the Wednesday and Thursday then I'm afraid there's going to have to be yet more to-ing and fro-ing about it. So I need to tell you about that straight away. I only found out yesterday.
MR GREEN: My Lord, if we can give you a completely sure indication by tomorrow lunchtime, would that help?
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes.
MR GREEN: Bearing in mind on the --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes. You can do it tomorrow if you want.
MR GREEN: Most grateful. I'm just trying to help in case there is --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: By all means. But given the general level of judicial business across all the divisions it's not possible to keep everybody happy all the time.

So that then leads me on to the only other thing,
which is the common issues judgment. I am going to hand it down at 12 o'clock tomorrow. I have had typographical and other suggestions from both parties. They are relatively reasonable in scope. I'm fairly confident that although I haven't incorporated all of them now, I will have done either by the end of today or first thing tomorrow and I think we will keep with 12 o'clock tomorrow. I don't intend to deal with any consequential applications at all, but I will be making the relevant order in the relevant terms to extend time as I identified at the beginning of last week and you will be expected to draw it up.
MR GREEN: My Lord, we have already done a draft which I think --
MR JUSTICE FRASER: I don't need it in advance and it depends what it says, but you will be the one doing it so I suggest you bring it with you tomorrow.
MR GREEN: Very grateful.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Anything from the Post Office about that?
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, I have nothing to say. I think my learned friend's order has been shared with my instructing solicitors and if we have any issues with it we will communicate them.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Can I make it clear, for the purposes of
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assisting in terms of cost, I don't require -- and I will read nothing into -- either party turning up in any numbers at all. I will expect one person from the claimant to be here just because of the order. It will be open to the public. There will be printed copies. There are unlikely to be as many printed copies as people might want them but it will be instantly posted on the relevant websites and all those details will be given tomorrow, so please -- particularly for the Post Office team, Mr De Garr Robinson, because I know you have two different teams, please nobody should think that there will be any discourtesy assumed if nobody decides to come.
MR DE GARR ROBINSON: My Lord, thank you.
MR JUSTICE FRASER: Finally, I have something for Opus which is a hardly used envelope, compliments slip and plastic folder which can be reused.

Thank you all very much. 10.30 -- well, 12 o’clock tomorrow and then 10.30 Monday.
( 4.34 pm )
(The court adjourned until 10.30 am on Monday, 18 March 2019)

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[^0]:    the problem and getting it fixed, however long that time was, Fujitsu had in place a mechanism by which all the branches that would pop up being affected by that problem would be identified; that's right, isn't it?
    A. Over time, yes.
    Q. So the fact that there was a gulf in time, however big or small the gulf might be, between spotting the problem and getting a fix released onto the entire network, regardless of how long that period of time was, the postmasters that would be affected by the problem in the meantime would be identified so that they could be sorted out; would you agree with that?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Thank you. Then you say:
    "I also recall situations where software developers worked on a coding fix which was then sent out, however the bug reappeared several weeks later because, it seemed, the IT team responsible for developing upgrades had been working on an older version of the software ..."

    Mr Roll, I don't know what you are referring to. Are you seriously suggesting that there were times when the development team would actually be looking at a historical version of the Horizon software?
    A. Yes.

[^1]:    Q. Really?
    A. Yes.
    Q. How is it that happened, can you explain?
    A. My understanding of this was that the development team had the current version of software and they were working on that, a bug -- a coding bug was then identified, a hot fix was written and sent out, but it wasn't implemented onto the code that the developers were using, so six months later when this new batch of code went out it overwrote the hot fix that had been sent out, so then the hot fix had to be re-applied.
    Q. Oh, I see, so you are not suggesting that the team would be working on an already historical version of Horizon, what you're talking about is regression, you're talking about a later update undoing the good things that was done by an earlier update?
    A. Yes.
    Q. I see, thank you. That did happen but it was very rare, wasn't it?
    A. It was rare but it did happen.
    Q. Very good.

    I would like to ask you now about hardware failures.
    Could we go back to your first witness statement please, paragraph 14 \{E $1 / 7 / 3\}$. I'm sorry, you haven't got there yet.

[^2]:    (Pause).
    A. Yes.
    Q. Have you read that paragraph before?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And have you looked at the PEAKs that Mr Parker refers to?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And are those the PEAKs that actually describe the case
    that you are talking about?
    A. Yes.
    Q. Very good. The well, let's have a quick look at those PEAKs. The first one is at $\{F / 197\}$. So this is PC0100174. It happened on 4 March 2014 and the summary says "Kit rebooting itself for no apparent ..."

    And I think it must mean "reason". And you will see from the bottom of the first large paragraph:
    "Information: contacted SSC and spoke to Richard Roll."

    So you are the contact man for this and later on down the page, three boxes up from the bottom,
    1 March 2014 at 16.56 and 40 seconds, Barbara Longley assigns this to you.

    If we go over the page $\{F / 197 / 2\}$ there's
    a description of the problem. Perhaps we can pick it up at 5 March at 10.50 , about nearly halfway down the page:

