

A QUAKER INITIATIVE TO END THE KOREAN WAR

This article is being written as war rages in the Gulf, and Quaker energies are directed to the search for a just peace. The situation is in many ways similar to the Korean war 40 years ago. Then, as now, the crisis was precipitated by an act of aggression, in the Korean case confirmed by UN observers, in the Gulf case admitted by the aggressor. In both cases, the United States, with British support, took the issue to the UN Security Council. In both cases, the Security Council authorized military action to expel the invader and restore international peace and security. In the Korean case, the Security Council created a Unified Command under the United States of America, and the United States provided the bulk of the combat forces: in the Gulf, the United States assumed the leadership of the Coalition and again provided the major part of the military force.

Both wars caused grievous disappointment to those Friends and others who had conceived of the UN as an agency for peace, persuasion, and conciliation rather than for coercive military action. The Charter had declared that the UN's purpose was to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, and Friends were unhappy that military coercion was used before non-military measure had been given a proper chance.

British Quaker peace efforts in 1950-53 were entrusted to the East-West Relations Group (hereafter referred to as the EWRG). A Russia Group had been established by the Friends Peace Committee in 1946, with Geoffrey Wilson as chair, and a China Conciliation Group in 1947. The functions of these two Groups were merged in 1950 and the new EWRG was formed, with Gerald Bailey as secretary. It was intended that the EWRG should work closely with the American Friends Service Committee. The first meeting of the EWRG was held on 14 May 1950, six weeks before the outbreak of the Korean war.

The negotiations for a Korean armistice began on 8 July 1951, as the war entered its second year. Two US diplomats had travelled into Manhattan in a limousine with Soviet ambassador Malik, followed shortly afterwards by two hush-hush meetings between Malik and George Kennan, a senior US diplomat who happened at that time to be on leave of absence at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton. Shortly after the second meeting, Malik made an important broadcast over UN radio, proposing that the two sides in Korea should open negotiations for a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces, but making no reference to other issues on which China and the United States were at loggerheads.

The negotiations opened at Kaesong but were later moved to Panmunjom. By the following Spring, much of the text of the armistice had been agreed, but two issues had not been resolved. China and North Korea had proposed that complaints of alleged breaches of the armistice should be investigated by neutral nations, and the Unified Command had agreed to this. There then ensued seemingly interminable discussions about which nations had been truly neutral in the Korean war, and particularly over the proposal of North Korea and China that the Soviet Union should be one of the neutrals.

The other and more intractable issue concerned the future of prisoners of war and whether, when they were released at the end of hostilities, they should be compelled to return home or could choose to stay on the detaining side or even go to some other country. This was difficult to resolve because of a contradiction between the humanitarian principle that released POWs should not be compelled by the use of force to go anywhere against their will, and the clear wording of the Geneva POW Convention: 'Prisoners of war shall be released *and repatriated* without delay' (my italics).

On 28 April 1952, the Unified Command had presented to the Communist side a package deal, containing all the provisions already agreed and compromise proposals on outstanding issues. This had been rejected by North Korea and China, and negotiations had thereafter languished.

The EWRG had been actively concerned to end the fighting in Korea from the outset. Four of us (Gerald Bailey, Percy Bartlett, Agatha Harrison and myself) had discussed the negotiating deadlock at Panmunjom with Selwyn Lloyd (Minister of State at the Foreign Office)

on 3 April. The deadlocked armistice negotiations at Panmunjom arose at each meeting of the EWRG, and when we met on 27 June, we had to decide whether any further Quaker action was indicated following the Communist rejection of the Unified Command's package proposal. The armistice issues had by now been complicated by the fact that nine days before our meeting, the Soviet Union had raised in the UN Security Council the allegation that US forces in Korea had resorted to germ warfare, and the *Manchester Guardian* (as it then was) had suggested in a leading article that Quakers might have a role in investigating the Communist charges.

If the International Red Cross is not acceptable to the Russian, Chinese, and North Korean Governments, what about the Quakers? A year ago Mr Malik himself received a delegation of British Quakers and treated them with many signs of respect and friendship. Would he and his Government now approve an investigation by an international commission of Quakers, with the help of such scientists as they may select?¹

This referred to a delegation of British Friends to the Soviet Union the previous year, which was notable as the first occasion since the onset of the Cold War that a non-Communist group had visited Moscow and engaged in frank talks with Soviet leaders.

After heart-searching discussion, the EWRG came to the conclusion that the investigation proposed by the *Manchester Guardian* was probably not a proper Quaker responsibility or within the competence of Friends. 'Nevertheless [the minute continued] we do feel that Friends need to be constantly alert to all opportunities of assisting in the bringing of peace to Korea

Attention then turned to a suggestion made by Pandit Nehru the previous week that India might be able to help over the POW deadlock, and the EWRG approved a proposal of Roger Wilson that a statement be prepared welcoming Nehru's suggestion and expressing the hope that it would be supported by all Commonwealth countries.^{1b} Roger Wilson was asked to draft a suitable statement and to consult the American Friends Service Committee, and Gerald Bailey was asked to write to Selwyn Lloyd at the Foreign Office commending Nehru's suggestion.

Roger Wilson's draft was sent to the EWRG's parent body, the Friends Peace Committee, which agreed to publicize Roger Wilson's draft statement. Marion Parmoor was asked to present the draft to Meeting for Sufferings on 4 July. After slight amendment, the draft was approved. It stated that Friends had met under a sense of grave concern

for the situation in Korea, the recent large-scale bombing of North Korea by the Unified Command, an increased risk of extending the war, and the deadlocked negotiations at Panmunjom. Fresh initiatives were urgently needed to stop the fighting. Friends warmly welcomed Nehru's offer of help, were confident that it would be sympathetically considered by HMG, and hoped it would be vigorously commended at the United Nations. Copies of the statement were to be sent to (among others) the Prime Minister (Churchill), the Foreign Office, and Krishna Menon, who was in the process of giving up his job as Indian High Commissioner in London. Marion Parmoor died two days later.

The third World Conference of Friends was due to convene in Oxford at the end of July. Inevitably, there were many references to the Korean war and the armistice deadlock. Two sessions on 2 August had concerned 'Christianity in a World of Tension', and minute 13 had read:

The continuing tragedy of the war in Korea has rested heavily upon us. It is our earnest hope that all those in positions of political authority will make renewed and constructive efforts to achieve peace. In particular we hope that the willingness of the Government of India to use their good offices in the cause of peace may be followed up actively. It is our desire that all Friends everywhere should unite in prayer for those in authority that they may be led into the paths of peace.

The conference asked that copies of the minute be sent to the foreign ministers of China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain; to the two teams of negotiators at Panmunjom, and to the prime ministers of North and South Korea; to UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie; and to Nehru. The EWRG and the equivalent committee of the American Friends Service Committee were asked to decide whether the minute should be given wider circulation.

The EWRG, meeting at the end of August, considered the request of the Friends' World Conference, and also some suggestions for ending the deadlock at Panmunjom which had been prepared by Horace Alexander. After minor amendment, these suggestions were approved and transmitted to the Peace Committee, which on 4 September forwarded them to Meetings for Sufferings. The draft was introduced by Horace Alexander, and during the discussion, reference was made to a statement by Churchill in the House of Commons, that if Quakers had "new suggestions", these should be sent to him in writing. A decision would then be made by HMG about receiving a Quaker deputation.

The statement from the EWRG was approved with some slight modifications, which are not indentified in the minutes.

The statement began by expressing appreciation for the 'unflagging efforts on the part of the negotiators at Panmunjom in a situation of unparalleled difficulty ...' It then went on to make four specific proposals.

1. That a mutual cease-fire be effected in Korea on the conditions already agreed in the negotiations, leaving the POW issue to be resolved later. This was suggested so as to release the Unified Command negotiators from 'their exacting and exhausting labours': fresh minds could then be brought to bear on outstanding problems. Friends admitted that a cease-fire without resolving the POW issue would necessarily lead to some delay in the release of those POWs who were willing to be repatriated, but it would mean an earlier end to carnage and destruction.

2. On the question whether POWs should be sent home against their will, Friends admitted that this was required by adherence to the strict letter of the Geneva Convention. On the other hand, the statement continued, the drafters of the Convention had hardly anticipated a situation in which some prisoners might be reluctant to be repatriated. (This was not correct: a proposal by Austria that a POW should be entitled to ask for transfer to a country other than his own had been submitted but rejected at the conference which led to the adoption of the Geneva Convention in 1949). The statement went on to say that after the second world war, Quaker relief workers had been 'profoundly disturbed at being involved in forced repatriation which ignored the fears of individuals.' (This was a reference to the experience of a Friends Relief Service team at Goslar in 1946).² The statement suggested that re-screening and release of POWs should be put in the hands of a commission composed of Asian governments or 'a mixed commission of two appointed by each side'. the problem should be resolved in accordance with the spirit rather than the letter of the Geneva Convention, and prisoners rejecting repatriation should be 'given asylum in areas where they cannot be used in any further fighting'.

3. The statement went on to commend 'the good offices of India ...'

4. Finally, Friends asked that "all Governments" should urge the media to exercise restraint and not impute evil motives to the other side.

Although we did not know it at the time, the second paragraph of the statement was in many ways similar to a proposal which Mexico had

been discussing with the United States. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff had reservations about any agreement to stop fighting that left crucial issues unresolved, but the State Department thought that the Mexican proposal was worth pursuing, and UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie was given information to this effect.³ An amended version of the Mexican plan was subsequently submitted to the UN General Assembly but later withdrawn in favour of a compromise promoted by India.⁴

The Recording Clerk, Stephen J. Thorne, sent the Meeting for Sufferings statement to Churchill on 8 September. With the agreement of No. 10 and the Foreign Office, the statement was issued to the press on 17 September, and (according to the minutes of the EWRG) was 'widely noticed by all the principal papers'. I have a copy of an accurate summary printed in *The Times* on 18 September. As Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden were both absent from London, our request for a meeting with a member of the Government was referred to Selwyn Lloyd, who agreed to see a Quaker group on 24 September.

Monthly meetings of the EWRG were, at the time, spread over three days. When we met on 19-21 September, we were told that a copy of the statement had been sent to Clarence E. Pickett, general secretary of the American Friends Service Committee, and that the substance had been discussed with the Indian High Commissioner. It was decided that copies should be sent to officials in China, and that our proposals should be discussed at a forthcoming meeting with the Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy. The EWRG, conscious of Quaker protocol, delicately informed Stephen Thorne that Gerald Bailey and I 'would be willing to participate' in the meeting with Selwyn Lloyd 'if desired', and the EWRG also suggested the inclusion of 'Wilfrid Littleboy or some other Friend not a member of this Group ...'

In the event, the Quaker group consisted of Gerald Bailey, Agatha Harrison, Percy W. Bartlett, and myself. A Foreign Office memorandum noted (correctly) that I was 'apparently no relation to Mr. Gerald Bailey' and that, so far as the Foreign Office knew, Percy Bartlett was no relation to Vernon Bartlett (a well-known journalist then with the *News Chronicle*).⁵ Another Foreign Office memorandum described the Quaker statement as "helpful in tone" and as containing "useful, if unoriginal suggestions for ending the deadlock ..."

In preparation for Selwyn Lloyd's meeting with Friends, Foreign Office officials had prepared a detailed and cautious brief on the issues raised in our paper. Selwyn Lloyd (according to his own account now in the Public Record office) began our meeting by saying that he had read our memorandum with great interest: he was glad to find that 'there was

no real point of difference between our two points of view'. He would like to comment on our points in reverse order: this, presumably, was so as to take the easier issues first.

Restraint. Lloyd's brief had said that HMG deprecated any dogmatic or contentious comment in the press. Lloyd himself went a little further: 'It was indeed a major consideration ... to try to make it possible for the Chinese to accept [the Unified Command's] terms without too much loss of face.'

Role of India. The brief stated that HMG recognized the role that India might play. Lloyd was more forthcoming, for he told us "in confidence" that the fullest possible use would be made of Indian good offices. This was not widely known, he said, because Nehru believed that his most useful contribution could be made 'if he appeared to be acting independently and not at the instance of one of the parties to the conflict.'

Re-screening and release of POWs. Lloyd's brief dwelt on the difficulties, especially the intransigent approach of the Communists at Panmunjom and their negative attitude to the International Committee of the Red Cross. There was also a note for Lloyd on the legal aspects of the Geneva POW Convention, repeating what had recently been stated in a White Paper: that nothing in the Convention required forcible repatriation, but disregarding the fact that a proposal that POWs should be entitled to *reject* repatriation had been defeated when the Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1949.

Lloyd said that our proposals were "entirely acceptable" to HMG, though he thought they would be rejected by China.

Conclusion of an armistice with the POW problem unresolved. Lloyd's brief said that our proposal had been considered but that HMG could not conclude a cease-fire or armistice that did not provide for the immediate return of all POWs held in North Korea.

Lloyd said, for our own most confidential information only, that an immediate armistice on the basis of the agreement already reached, but deferring the question of POWs refusing repatriation, would "probably" be acceptable to HMG. He hoped that it would be possible to put forward new proposals at Panmunjom before the convening of the UN General Assembly. (The new proposals were submitted a fortnight later.) 'My visitors [wrote Lloyd] expressed great satisfaction at this information which they undertook to treat as strictly confidential.'

One other issue arose during the general discussion following Lloyd's exposition. We raised the bombing policy of the Unified Command, not

knowing that Anthony Eden had already made forceful representations to Washington on this issue.⁶ Lloyd, perhaps with a slightly uneasy conscience, assured us that the air offensive was a matter of strict military necessity.

After the meeting, copies of the Meeting for Sufferings' memorandum were sent by the Foreign Office to British embassies in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, and to the High Commissioners in all Commonwealth countries (plus the Irish Republic and Southern Rhodesia). The US State Department later reciprocated by giving the British embassy in Washington a memorandum from the American Friends Service Committee (which, except in one detail, covered much the same ground as the Meeting for Sufferings memorandum) and an account of a conversation on 15 October between two AFSC representatives (Lewis Hoskins and Richard Wood) with two State Department officials. The State Department line was a degree harsher than that of the Foreign Office. One of the officials pointed to a similarity between the AFSC proposal and that advocated by 'Communist publicity organs all over the world.' The proposal of POWs was inherently dangerous as there would be no guarantee that POWs of the Unified Command would be repatriated. 'In view of the traditional Communist disregard of human lives, it is improbable that the Communists are overly concerned about the early return of their prisoners.' A Foreign Office note on the AFSC memorandum commended one section, to the effect that as the operation in Korea was a police action, not a war, the objective was not military victory but the restoration of peace and order.

The EWRG had previously made an appointment to see John Addis, a senior China specialist in the Foreign Office, two days after the meeting with Selwyn Lloyd. An issue concerning India's role was clarified, there was some discussion about future Quaker relief work in Korea, and Addis was told that Friends were considering sending a mission to Beijing. This visit took place in 1955.⁷

A report of the meeting with Selwyn Lloyd was given to Meeting for Sufferings in October. It is not clear how much of the information which Selwyn Lloyd had given us in confidence or in strict confidence was reported to the Meeting. The short minute simply stated: 'Gerald Bailey has given an encouraging account of this confidential interview.' The subsequent minute of the EWRG was slightly more detailed: on the re-screening of POWs, the minute said that Lloyd 'was unable and unwilling' to be more specific about the new proposals of the Unified Command at Panmunjom, and there was no reference in the minute to

Lloyd's "most confidential information" about the possibility of stopping the fighting with aspects of the POW issue unresolved. Tom Driberg asked Eden in the House of Commons what consideration he had given to the Mexican and Quaker proposals. On the letter, Eden said that the Quaker proposal for screening of POWs under neutral supervision was "generally acceptable" to HMG. In the first draft of Eden's reply prepared in the Foreign Office, it was said that, if the Communists would be willing to postpone the question of POWs rejecting repatriation until after the armistice, 'that would be a development to which we would give most careful attention.' This was deleted from a revised version, and in the event, Eden simply said that it would be impossible to conclude an armistice that did not provide for 'the safe return of our own prisoners from North Korea.'⁸ In a note for Eden for dealing with possible supplementary questions, a Foreign Office official wrote that there had been no sign from China or North Korea that the Quaker proposals contained any matter that would provide a basis for further discussion.

The question of POWs in Korea was the main item on the agenda of the UN General Assembly in 1952. Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, was now a beleaguered man, assaulted from all sides: the Pentagon, the US China Lobby, Syngman Rhee of South Korea, and the UN Members providing combat or medical units to the Unified Command in Korea. Moreover, the US election took place during the General Assembly, leading to the election of Dwight Eisenhower as President and the appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State-designate. Truman and Acheson were thus lame-duck office-holders from 4 November 1952 to 20 January 1953.

Acheson complained bitterly in his memoirs of a hostile Cabal at the UN consisting of Selwyn Lloyd, Lester Pearson of Canada, and Krishna Menon of India.⁹ Pearson, who was President of the Assembly, pressed (as had Meeting for Sufferings) for an immediate cease-fire without resolving the POW question, but Acheson was "quite disturbed" by the idea, and Selwyn Lloyd told Eden in a personal and confidential letter that it would be "a highly dangerous arrangement."¹⁰

Britain initially co-sponsored a US proposal calling on China and North Korea to agree to an armistice which recognized the right of POWs to be repatriated, but with no use of force. But when Krishna Menon arrived later in the session with an elaborate Indian plan for re-screening POWs under neutral auspices, Britain decided to support the Menon plan, which was finally approved on 3 December.¹¹ All other proposals were withdrawn.

The armistice was finally concluded seven and a half months later. North Korea and China dropped their proposal that the Soviet Union should serve on the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, so it was composed of officers from Czechoslovakia and Poland (nominated by the Communist side) and from Sweden and Switzerland (nominated by the Unified Command). Its main supervisory functions were suspended in 1955-6, but it is still present in the demilitarized zone separating the two parts of Korea, where it performs a useful conciliatory role.

The disposal of POWs was referred to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRP) consisting of the four states mentioned in the previous paragraph plus an Indian chairman, assisted by an Indian Custodial Force. The NNRP was never a harmonious body. It encountered acute difficulties because of the intimidation of some POWs by other POWs, the refusal of the majority of POWs to hear explanations about their rights, and the uncooperative attitudes of the two military commands. The NNRP took custody of some 23,000 non-repatriated POWs from the two sides, and these were disposed of as follows:

	POWs held in <i>North Korea</i>	POWs held by the <i>Unified Command</i>
Refusing repatriation and remaining on the detaining side	347	21,839 (of whom 14,235 went to Taiwan)
Eventually opting for repatriation	10	628
Went to a neutral country (Brazil, Argentina, or India)	2	86
Died or disappeared	—	51
	359	22,604

It is interesting that the percentages accepting and rejecting repatriation were exactly the same for the two sides (96.6 and 2.7 respectively)

Looking back on this episode 40 years later, what conclusions can one draw about the Quaker peace effort?

The EWRG was deeply concerned with the Korean war from its outbreak in 1950 until the armistice in 1953, and thereafter. To some extent this concern was expressed in language that the secular world may have found platitudinous such as the Meeting for Sufferings statement of 4 July and part of the first and the fourth points of the Meeting for Sufferings Statement of 5 September. But we all know how difficult it is to find suitable language to express deep religious concern.

It is noteworthy that the EWRG was not simply concerned with general principles of peace and justice, but immersed itself in the technical details of the issues to be resolved. This is illustrated by the fact that the *Manchester Guardian* should have thought that Friends were competent to investigate the germ warfare charges, and by the September statement of Meeting for Sufferings which contained a number of specific proposals for resolving the difficulties at Panmunjom.

Friends were, of course, in touch with all the parties involved, in some cases face-to-face, though in the case of the two Korean governments and the negotiators at Panmunjom only by correspondence. Whatever they may have thought privately, none of those we were in touch with seemed to doubt our over-riding commitment to peace and justice, our impartiality and independence.

The AFSC was less fortunate when a State Department official stressed the similarity between Quaker proposals and those contained in Communist propaganda. As it turned out, when the Menon plan was presented to the General Assembly later in the year, it was strongly opposed by the Communist bloc, which cast the only negative votes.

I think we were all grateful at the time to Agatha Harrison and Horace Alexander, and other members of the India Conciliation Group, for building relations of trust with Indian leaders over two decades. Krishna Menon was not the easiest man to deal with, and I recall one occasion when Nehru became quite short-tempered with a Quaker delegation on Korean issues; but doubtless there were some difficult characters on the Quaker side too.

It is interesting how easy it was in those days to see Ministers and senior Foreign Office officials when we had questions to ask or matters to discuss. This became even easier after we launched the Conferences for Diplomats in August 1952. I recall several relaxed meetings with Anthony Eden at his home in London after the breakup of his first

marriage. My impression is that Ministers and officials are more remote nowadays than they were 40 years ago, but also busier.

Friends, like governments, agonized over the conflict between international law as expressed in a treaty (the Geneva POW Convention) and the humanitarian principle, dear to Friends, that force should not be used to compel people to act contrary to conscience. Both sides in the Korean war used the POW issue for propaganda purposes. What we did not know for certain at the time was that the United States had decided as early as 1950 that 'the treatment of POWs ... shall be directed toward their exploitation, training and use for psychological warfare purposes ...'¹² Friends, with the experience of the FRS Goslar team in mind, stressed 'the spirit of the Geneva Convention rather than its letter ...' It has been a Quaker tradition from the start that individual conscience overrides secular law.

One has a certain sympathy for Selwyn Lloyd, who in my experience always did his best to be accommodating in his meetings with Friends. The brief prepared by the Foreign Office staff rejected any cessation of hostilities that left the POW issue unresolved. Lloyd, as Minister of State, was fully entitled to overrule his officials, though he stressed that he was speaking in strict confidence when he told us that our proposal for an immediate armistice on the basis of the agreement already reached, with the question of prisoners refusing repatriation to be remitted forward for later discussion, would "probably" be acceptable to HMG. The trouble was that this was not what we had proposed: we had suggested deferring 'the unresolved issues, especially the matter of the release of prisoners,' and not, as Lloyd put it, 'the question of prisoners refusing repatriation'. In any case, the British position was made abundantly clear by Eden in the House of Commons a month later and simultaneously by Lloyd at the UN General Assembly.

Our proposal for a commission to handle the re-screening and release of POWs contained two alternatives: 'a commission either representing a few Asian Governments in which both sides have confidence, or a mixed commission of two appointed by each side.' In the event, these options were merged in a commission of two states designated by each side, with an Indian chairman. This placed India in an awkward situation, sometimes siding with one side, sometimes with the other, abused by the prisoners they had come to help, and criticized in the most virulent language by the South Korean Government (the Indian Custodial Force had to be airlifted by helicopter from a ship in Incheon harbour to the demilitarized zone because South Korea refused transit rights). In any case, committees composed of states are never suitable

instruments for mediation: they spend more time negotiating with each other than with the contending parties.

One wonders, in retrospect, why it was necessary to issue the Meeting for Sufferings statement to the media a week *before* our meeting with Selwyn Lloyd. That must have had the effect of reducing flexibility on both our part and on Lloyd's. There was, I recall, pressure from the meetings that Sufferings should "say something" about the armistice deadlock, but my own inclination is to go public *after* a piece of delicate Quaker diplomacy rather than before, taking appropriate account of what one has learned during the process.

This episode draws attention to a difficulty that often arises in Quaker mediation. Lloyd gave us some information "in confidence" and some other information for our own "most confidential information only". I confess that I am still often uncertain what "confidential" is supposed to mean. Was the delegation entitled to pass on any of the information that Lloyd asked us to treat as confidential to the bodies that had mandated us: Meeting for Sufferings, the Peace Committee, and the EWRG? If we had told them what Lloyd had said "in confidence", were the members of those bodies entitled to pass on any of the information "in confidence" to Quaker meetings? And if we respected to the letter Lloyd's request for confidentiality and simply gave Meeting for Sufferings "an encouraging account of this confidential interview", as the minute has it, how could Sufferings judge whether it had acted wisely in endorsing the EWRG's statement? May any part of the Quaker machine ask for authority to act, and then simply report later that the outcome was confidential? How can Friends give pastoral and moral support, and administrative and financial backing, to colleagues who cannot disclose what (if anything) they have done?

This was not a typical piece of Quaker mediation: it was simply one phase of an ongoing peace effort in which our own country was involved. It thus had affinities with later Quaker work regarding Southern Rhodesia in the 1970s in which Britain was a direct party, and the Gulf war in the 1990s in which, as in Korea, Britain was part of a collective action under some kind of UN authority. I have long wished for more case-studies of Quaker mediation so that we can learn from past experience: I hope that this article will provide a factual basis, along with other case-studies, for Friends in the future to draw general conclusions about what to do and what not to do when performing a mediating role.

Sydney D Bailey

NOTES AND REFERENCES

¹*Manchester Guardian*, 23 June 1952, p.6.

^{1b}I am grateful to Roger C. Wilson for advice and help in preparing this article.

²Roger C. Wilson, *Quaker Relief*, Allen and Unwin, 1952, 235-6, also A Tegla Davies *Friends Ambulance Unit*, 1947, 448-9.

³*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1952-4, vol.XV pt.1, 476-8, 485-9, 492-4.

⁴UN General Assembly Official Records, 7th session, Annexes, Agenda item 16, pp.30-1, A/C.1/730; 1st Committee, 535th meeting (1 Dec. 1952), para.89.

⁵Public Record Office, file FO371 99585/FK1071/510.

There are 55 pages of documents relating to this episode in the Public Record Office in files FO371 99584/FK1071/493 - 99587/FK1071/596.

⁶Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, Norton, New York, 1969, 656-7.

⁷*Quakers visit China East West Relations and Peace Committees*, 1956.

⁸House of Commons *Hansard*, 29 Oct. 1952.

⁹Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, Norton, New York, 1969, 697-700.

¹⁰Lester Pearson, *Memoirs, 1948-1957*, London, Gollancz, 1974, 316; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1952-4, vol.XV, p.564; Public Record Office file FO371 99589/FK1071/626.

¹¹UN General Assembly resolution 804(VIII).

¹²Department of State memorandum, 31 Aug. 1950, in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1950, vol.VII, 678.