Embodied, Affective and Relational Selves and Anorexia Nervosa (AN)
Abstract
Within her book, Law’s Relations, Jennifer Nedelsky argued that an optimal conception of human selves would integrate understandings of human beings as embodied, affective and relational. I assess the extent to which these aspects of human selves have been sufficiently captured within relevant laws (in particular, relevant case law) and academic literature, within the jurisdiction of England and Wales, pertaining to patients with the eating disorder anorexia nervosa (AN). I argue that, although relational factors may help to explain the decisions in some cases, decided by the Court of Protection, not to continue to forcibly treat patients with longstanding and severe eating disorders (LSEDs) against their will, such decisions, and related academic commentary, do not sufficiently take into consideration the broader social relations relevant to the aetiology of eating disorders, in addition to the embodied and affective aspects of those patients suffering with the disease, which may lead to unjustifiable decisions concerning capacity, autonomy and futility.
Keywords: embodied; affective; relational; anorexia nervosa; capacity; futility.
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